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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, there has been increased focus in the scholarly research on the effect of 
natural resources on the duration of civil wars. Some scientists argue that countries 
dependent on natural resources, measured as the primary commodity export ratio to 
the gross domestic product, are more prone to the onset of civil war. Additionally, 
resource dependence is claimed to prolong the duration of civil war, as both rebels and 
the central government do not find incentives to settle for peace. The reason is that the 
cost of settling for peace is higher than the alternative as long as resource extraction 
can take place. Other scientists emphasize the need to classify natural resources by 
lootability and obstructability. This argument claims that unobstructable, lootable 
natural resources, referring to resources that are easily extracted by unskilled labourers 
and easy to smuggle, will most likely benefit the rebels and prolong the duration of 
civil wars than compared with unlootable resources.  
 
This thesis applies the lootability and obstructability approach and the resource 
dependence approach in studying the effect of natural resources on civil war. Results 
from the quantitative analysis indicates that resource dependence shorten civil war 
duration: if primary commodity export increases with 1%, the risk of civil war 
termination increases with 2.1%. Moreover, there is indirect support for the hypothesis 
that lootable resources prolong civil war duration. Furthermore, unlootable resources 
increase the risk of termination with 3.0% when exports of this resource group 
increase with 1%. The results also show that the estimates for obstructability of natural 
resources are positive, and similar, but not statistically significant, which implies that 
the obstructability approach is not a suitable method. This is highlighted in the chapter 
about the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a country abundant with natural 
resources. Although natural resources can be said to have fuelled the civil war in the 
DRC, it is nevertheless not the cause of it. However, most of the results are 
insignificant, and the results are generally weak, indicating that more precise is needed 
in order to firmly establish a correlation between natural resource and civil war 
duration. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
After the end of the cold-war period, civil wars have come to dominate the post war 
period. The causal mechanisms of civil war onset are often diverse and it is hard to 
pinpoint one exact reason for why some conflicts seem to be everlasting. The principal 
explanations are that civil wars break out because of poor economic performance, 
weak state capacity, high level of inequality, ethnic fractionalization and war-prone 
neighbouring countries (Collier 1999a and 199b, Hegre & Sambanis 2006, and 
Elbadawi & Sambanis 2002). In turn, these underlying dimensions make it harder to 
end civil wars. 
 
Since the end of the 1990s, there has been an increased focus on environmental factors 
in civil wars, especially after the civil war in Sierra Leone. In this conflict, it became 
evident that illicit trade of diamonds contributed to finance the atrocities of the rebel 
group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which contributed to prolong the 
internal conflict (United Nations Environment Programme 2009). Resource 
abundance, especially of high-value resources such as oil and diamonds has proven to 
fuel internal fighting (Fearon 2005). The civil war of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo is another example. The country is abundant with several resources. Coltan, a 
mineral used in consumer products like cell phones, is one of the more lucrative. 
World demand for this mineral increased the price of coltan in 2000, and rebel groups 
controlling the coltan mines profited substantially (Hayes & Burge 2003). Countries 
abundant with lucrative resources tend to become very dependent on the sale of these 
resources. This is because such resources generate high revenues and subsequently 
account for the majority of the gross domestic product. 
 
Most of the existing scholarly research on this topic recognizes a link between the 
duration of civil war and economic dependence on natural resources. Yet, how this 
causality should be understood remains unclear. Previous quantitative studies have 
focused on the relationship between the risk of onset of civil war and resource 
dependence measured as the primary commodity export ratio to gross domestic 
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product (GDP) (see Fearon 2005 and Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2004). Evidence from 
the scholarly work differs in the conclusions about the effect of natural resources on 
the risk of civil war onset. Researchers like Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 2004) and 
Humphreys (2005) find evidence that dependence on the sales of natural resources 
increases the outbreak of internal conflict. Others like Elbadawi & Sambanis (2003) 
and Fearon (2005) find no evidence of such a relationship. Additionally, some studies 
emphasize that resources like oil, gas, and diamonds account for evidence of an 
increased likelihood of civil war outbreak (de Soysa 2002, Fearon 2005). Furthermore, 
lootable minerals such as alluvial diamonds are demonstrated to have a higher 
probability of the onset of internal conflict by researchers like Lujala, Gleditsch & 
Gilmore (2005), Ross (2004b), and Buhaug & Rød (2006)  
 
Ross (2003a) claims that natural resources may trigger the onset of civil war in several 
ways: by harming a country’s economic performance, by financing rebel movements, 
and by giving people in a region abundant with natural resources an incentive to form 
an independent state. Even though the research on the relationship between natural 
resources and the duration of internal conflicts is less extensive, I still assume that 
Ross’ (ibid) assumptions hold for the effect of natural resources on the duration of 
civil wars. 
 
The scholarly findings on civil war duration are less divergent compared with studies 
of the onset of internal conflicts. General results indicate that resource dependence 
makes civil wars last longer (DeRouen & Soebek 2004). The results indicate further 
that high value resources create incentives for rebels to continue to fight instead of 
settling for peace, as the alternative may be more profitable (Collier, Hoeffler & 
Söderbom 2004). However, findings from Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002), Fearon 
(2005), and Buhaug & Lujala (2005) do not support this relationship. Moreover, 
researchers have found that conflicts in areas abundant with lootable resources are 
more difficult to terminate. This applies especially to resources like oil, diamonds, and 
illegal resources, for example opium and coca (Buhaug & Gates 2002, Humphreys 
2005, Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2005, and 2009, and Lujala (forthcoming). 
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This thesis provides a new empirical approach to studying the link between natural 
resources and the duration of civil wars. In addition to exploring a possible correlation 
between resource dependence and civil war duration, lootability and obstructability of 
natural resources are included. In this way, it is possible to examine the different effect 
they may have on civil war duration. Lootable resources are resources that can easily 
be extracted by unskilled labourers, are easy to transport, and do not need to be refined 
before transportation (Lujala 2003 and Ross 2002). The obstructability of natural 
resources are by Ross (2002) separated in three groups by the extent of which the 
resources can be transported without difficulties by a small group of people. Lootable 
and moderately obstructable resources are resources such as timber and agricultural 
products, whereas alluvial diamonds and illegal resources like opium are 
unobstructable, but still lootable (Ross 2002). Oil and gas are typical unlootable 
resources, but since onshore oil is transported through above-the-ground pipelines, 
making them vulnerable to terrorist attacks, onshore oil is highly obstructable, and 
offshore oil is thus unobstructable (Ross 2002). This is further explained in chapter 4. 
 
I classify the most important natural resources according to their lootability and 
obstructability. Then I analyze the extent to which civil war duration is affected by 
resource dependence and these various classes of resources. In addition, the usual 
proxy, resource dependence measured as primary commodity export ratio to GDP, is 
included. Whereas previous studies only investigate resource dependence as the total 
export ratio of GDP, I will statistically test if there is a difference in resource 
dependence on resources’ lootability and obstructability. Moreover, the analysis 
includes the primary export variable used in previous studies such as Collier & 
Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon (2005) in order to investigate if my new approach of 
defining natural resources has a different effect on the outcome of the analysis. 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce the need for an analysis of civil wars and natural 
resources and present the research question. Moreover, the definitions of natural 
resources and the duration of civil wars will be briefly explained. 
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My research question is thus the following: Does resource dependence prolong civil 
war duration? And does coding natural resources by their lootability and 
obstructability give a better empirical picture of civil war duration? 
 
This thesis does not aim to critically analyze if countries’ possession of natural 
resources is correlated with the onset of civil war. Previous research has established 
that the onset of internal conflicts is not caused by natural resources alone. Instead, a 
combination of different elements like poverty, inequality, and unstable governments, 
combined with resource-richness, fuels civil wars (Ross 2003a). The purpose of this 
thesis is to analyze if and how dependence of different types of natural resources in a 
country experiencing civil war affects the conflict’s duration. This is further explained 
in the following chapters. Therefore, this thesis aims to build on previous findings.  
 
The research question is answered by statistically testing a correlation between natural 
resources and the duration of civil war, using Cox regression, a type of survival 
analysis. The applied dataset is the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, as used in 
Gleditsch et al 2009. Results from the analysis indicate that resource dependence does 
not lead to longer lasting civil wars as first expected. Rather, an increase of 1% of 
primary exports increases the likelihood of civil war termination with 0,21% when 
using data from the World Bank, and with 0,26% when applying data from the 
UNCOMTRADE. Furthermore, the results imply that it is useful to separate between 
lootable and unlootable resources since the two groups of resources have different 
effects on civil war duration. The former prolongs and the latter shortens the duration 
time. Additionally, the results indicate that classifying natural resources by their 
obstructability is not a suitable approach as the results show that both obstructable and 
unobstructable natural resources shorten civil war duration. Moreover, most of the 
coefficients from the analysis are weak and not statistically significant. This makes it 
difficult to firmly establish a correlation between natural resources and civil war 
duration. This is further discussed in chapter 5.  
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In addition to study this relationship statistically, chapter 6 presents a study of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This is done in order to illustrate if 
different types of natural resources affect the duration of the civil war in the DRC and 
how these mechanisms take place. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has 
experienced civil war several times, which indicates that the country’s possession of 
natural resources might have made it difficult to permanently settle for peace. How the 
natural resources may have prolonged the conflict has not clearly been established. It 
is therefore highly interesting to explore if differences in lootability and obstructability 
of natural resources may affect the duration of civil wars. Moreover, studying how 
possible causal mechanisms may have worked in the DRC from the time of 
independence in 1960 and until today is additionally interesting. The DRC is a country 
rich with several natural resources; amongst them is coltan1
 
, a mineral that is both 
lootable and highly valuable. This is further elaborated in chapter 6. 
According to King, Keohane & Verba (1994:15), there are two criteria all researchers 
should aim to meet. The first criterion is that the project one is looking to investigate 
should be a topic that is interesting and important. The causes of civil wars are 
arguably of interest to both scholars and people in general. If civil wars are to be 
prevented and peace settled easily, then it is crucial to discover the mechanisms that 
contribute to prolong civil war duration. By confirming such a relationship, primary 
commodity trade of natural resources may come under further scrutiny and there may 
be a demand for corporate social responsibility. In this way, the global society can try 
to ensure that export revenues from commodity export do not fall into the hands of 
rebels, which may prolong internal fighting. Studying how natural resources affect the 
duration civil wars as this thesis does fulfils this criterion. 
 
Secondly, a project should contribute specifically to the existing scholarly literature. 
One possible way of contributing to the literature is to choose an important hypothesis 
that has not been studied systematically yet. Several researchers have already explored 
                                                 
1 Coltan is the commonly used word for columbite-tantalite, an alluvial (or riverine) mineral used in 
electronic products such as cell phones, computers and DVD-players (Hayes and Burge 2003:9). 
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the correlation between natural resources and civil war duration (see Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004, 1998, Ross 2002, 2003a and 2003b, Lujala 2003 and forthcoming). 
Although there are studies of how natural resources affect internal conflicts, this thesis 
are nevertheless an important contribution as I use recent data on civil wars that have 
not yet been used in the same matter. In this way, I explore another possibility to make 
a contribution by choosing an accepted hypothesis (that different types of natural 
resources affects duration of civil wars). As far as I know, this correlation has not been 
thoroughly confirmed. Therefore, I study it further in order to falsify or confirm it 
(King, Keohane & Verba 1994). 
 
This thesis is divided into several chapters. In the first chapter, I clarify the central 
terms in this thesis, focusing especially on natural resources. Thereafter I present 
previous scholarly findings and results. In chapter 3, the theory applied in this thesis is 
presented. The theoretical contributions are applied throughout this thesis, particularly 
in the chapter about the DRC. Next, I present the research design and explain how data 
is collected and used in this thesis. Problems that occur when applying statistical 
analysis in general, and problems that have arrived with this thesis are discussed in this 
chapter. Chapter 5 presents the analysis, and the results from the analysis are presented 
and discussed in this chapter. The following chapter, chapter 6, contains the case study 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo. This case is analysed by using both the 
theoretical distributions in chapter 3, and the results from the statistical analysis. 
Finally, the thesis is summed up and a conclusion is reached regarding the research 
questions. 
 
1.1 Definitions 
In order to study the duration of civil wars, it is crucial to determine what kind of 
conflict may be defined as a civil war. The UCDP/PRIO dataset on armed conflicts 
defines civil wars as a: “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 annual battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et 
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al 2002a)2
 
. In this thesis, I use the UCDP/PRIO dataset and thereby apply their 
definition. By using a threshold of 25 annual battled-related deaths, the possibility of 
more statistically significant results opens up. The duration of civil wars is defined as 
the time span of the conflict (Gleditsch et al 2002b).  The data used in this thesis will 
be commented in chapter 4. Furthermore, I will use the terms civil war, violent 
conflict, and internal conflict interchangeably to describe internal violence between the 
ruling government and rebel groups. 
Natural resources are resources such as minerals and energy that are produced by 
nature, and they are often grouped into renewable and non-renewable resources. 
Renewable resources are resources that in a human time scale are regenerated, like 
water, fish, and forests. According to Lujala (2003: 6), these resources belong together 
in an ecological system, which means that each resource is dependent on the other. 
Non-renewable resources, on the other hand are not similarly dependent on other 
resources. Examples of non-renewable resources are crude oil and natural gas (ibid). 
There are however no clear guidelines for classifying natural resources, but there are 
several attempts in the existing literature. These can be narrowed down into three 
approaches: (1) the primary commodities exports ratio to GDP approach, (2) the 
lootability approach, and (3) the geographic mapping approach.  
 
The first approach looks exclusively at the total primary export share of the GDP in 
the discussion of how natural resources may prolong civil wars. This approach is 
arguably too narrow as it only tells if natural resources fuel civil wars. According to 
Lujala (2003), it is also necessary to study why, how and to what extent natural 
resources affect the duration of civil war. Recognizing that natural resources will 
                                                 
2 This is not the only definition of civil war. Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004:6) provide a different 
definition drawing on the Correlates of War project, defining civil wars as: “violent conflicts that 
resulted in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per annum.” Additionally, the conflicts are internal and 
rebel groups account for at least 5 % of the deaths. Fearon (2004:278) is even more particular when 
classifying civil wars by the following criteria: (1) fighting took place between the state and organized 
rebel groups seeking to overthrow the ruling government, take control of a region or change the 
government’s policy using violence, (2) the death toll reached a minimum of 1,000 people with an 
average of at least 100 per year and (3) on both sides, at least 100 people were killed. This last 
criterion is added to rule out massacres by unorganized and ineffective oppositions, e.g. the genocide 
in Rwanda in the latter part of the 1990s. 
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affect rebel and state motivation in addition the nature of civil wars is crucial in order 
to correctly infer about the effect of natural resources on civil war duration (ibid). The 
lootability approach takes this into consideration when differentiating between natural 
resources than can easily be extracted by unskilled labourers (lootable) and resources 
that require advanced technology and security in order for the mineral to be extracted 
(unlootable) (ibid). By separating between lootable and unlootable natural resources, 
the risk of diluting results of a statistical analysis is reduced since the different types of 
natural resources may affect the duration of natural resources differently and even in 
opposite directions (ibid: 4). How natural resources are geographically distributed in a 
conflict country is additionally important as the availability of natural resources may 
shape the nature of the conflict. However, this provides several challenges. It is not 
always clear which resources are spread over vast areas and is available and which are 
concentrated in small areas. 
 
This thesis combines the first and the second approach, recognizing that although the 
total primary export ratio to GDP is a suitable proxy when investigating how natural 
resources affects the duration of civil wars, it is not adequate. Previous studies (see 
Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2004 and Fearon 2005) have applied the World Bank data 
(The World Bank 2009) on the total value of primary exports. The World Bank does 
not separate between the different natural resources, and does not provide information 
about which primary commodities they have defined as natural resources. For this 
reason, I have collected export data from 1962-2004 on 55 separate natural resources 
for all the countries in the UCDP/PRIO dataset. As argued above, natural resources 
should be classified by their distinction of lootability and obstructability in order to say 
something more about the direct effects of natural resources on civil war duration. In 
addition, the classification is necessary in order to thoroughly examine how natural 
resources affects civil war, as some may prolong the duration of civil war where as 
other shortens conflict time (Lujala 2003: 3-5). If the World Bank data is applied, it is 
not possible to decide which resources are lootable and which are unlootable. By 
gathering data on all 55 natural resources for all the countries in the dataset, it is thus 
possible to separate a large group of natural resources by lootability and 
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obstructability. This is done by thoroughly examining the qualities of each of the 
resources, consulting several sources and applying guidelines and classification 
schemes designed by researchers like Lujala (2003) and Ross (2002). As far as I know, 
collecting data for 55 separate natural resources for all conflict-years and countries and 
then separating these individually by lootability and obstructability has not been done 
before. This is further discussed in the next chapters of the thesis. 
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2 PREVIOUS FINDINGS  
The literature on the causes of civil wars is plentiful, and to single out a specific cause 
is difficult. There is rarely one single cause that triggers internal conflict, and the 
causal mechanisms are complex. Studies of the relationship between natural resources 
and civil wars have increased rapidly since the 1990s. Some of these studies find a 
correlation and conclude that natural resources have an important role to play (Ross 
2003a). This is backed up by empirical evidence: According to the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), at least 18 civil wars in the past 20 years have been 
fuelled by natural resources (United Nations Environment Programme 2009). In this 
chapter, I present the main findings from the scholarly research. 
 
The main focus in the existing literature is on the onset of civil wars, especially when 
analyzing the effect of natural resources. According to the scholarly research, natural 
resources may trigger the onset of internal conflicts in several ways. First of all, 
presence of natural resources may harm a country’s economic performance through 
resource dependence. This may result in weak governments, making these societies 
prone to civil war (Ross 2003a). One of the principal explanations for this is the Dutch 
disease phenomenon. The argument is that resource-rich countries, particularly those 
that export oil, performs economically poorly because new discoveries of favourable 
price changes in one sector, like petroleum, cause low relative prices in other sectors, 
such as agricultural production, in which agriculture and industrial production is 
discouraged (Karl 1997, see also Collier & Hoeffler 2005). This is evident in the case 
of the DRC where thousands left agricultural production in order to mine coltan 
instead, causing economic and humanitarian distress (see chapter 6 for further 
elaboration). 
 
Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 2004 and 2005) state that resource dependent states have an 
increased risk of civil wars breaking out because of: “the taxable base of the economy 
constituting an attraction for rebels wishing to capture the state” (Collier & Hoeffler 
1998: 571). Not all resource abundant countries experiences civil war though. Scholars 
11 
 
argue that when income from natural resources reaches a very high level, the risk of 
onset of civil war is reduced. The reason for this is that with very high incomes from 
natural resources, the government has an increased financial capability to defend itself 
against rebellions through increased military expenditures amongst other measures 
(ibid). Brunnschweiler & Bulte (2009) also find evidence of a correlation between 
resource dependence and civil wars. Instead of increased dependence leading to a 
higher risk, they find that resource dependence lowers the risk of civil war onset. In 
addition, Humphreys (2005) finds support for a relationship between natural resources 
and the risk of civil war, but that the risk of civil war onset depends on past natural 
resource production. This can further be explained partly by the weak state mechanism 
(Humphreys 2005). 
 
Fearon & Laitin (2003) on the other hand find no support for such relationship. Fearon 
(2005) claims that it is weak state capacity, not resource dependence that makes states 
more prone to civil war. Although he finds support for some resources to increase the 
likelihood of civil war outbreak, these resources, such as oil, cannot account for the 
resource dependence mechanism claimed by Collier & Hoeffler article from 2004 
(Fearon 2005). Instead, oil is an exemption. Moreover, oil is rather associated with the 
risk of civil war onset because oil-exporting countries on the average have less 
accountable government and a weak state capacity. In turn, this may increase the 
likelihood of outbreak of civil war. Additionally, oil abundance may give stronger 
incentives for people living in a region abundant with natural resources (such as oil) to 
form an independent state (Fearon 2005 and Fearon & Laitin 2003). According to 
Fearon (2005) and Ross (2003a), secessionist movements are linked to the risk of civil 
wars and this, not resource dependence, cause civil wars (Fearon 2005). This is also 
supported in some degree by De Soysa & Neumayer’s study from 2003 which cannot 
find support for Collier & Hoeffler’s claim of resource dependence being linked to the 
risk of civil war onset. Other researchers like Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002) have 
replicated Collier & Hoeffler’s study from 2004, but have produced mixed results. 
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Finally, natural resources are a source of revenues for rebels who can finance their 
operations by the sales of natural resources. In turn, this may increase the likelihood of 
civil wars (Ross 2003a). This applies especially for lootable resources, which increase 
the incentives for belligerents to seek out rebellion. The reason for this is that lootable 
resources are easily extracted with no need for specialists, and often have a high price 
to weight ratio. This further implies that these types of resources are highly profitable 
at low costs for rebel movements (Ross 2002 and Lujala 2003). Scholars such as 
Humphreys (2005), Buhaug & Rød (2006) and Lujala (forthcoming) provide 
quantitative findings on this correlation. These scholars focus especially on alluvial 
diamonds. Buhaug & Gates (2002) find in their study of civil wars in Africa that 
diamond abundant areas have a higher probability of outbreak of internal violent 
conflict. This is also supported by findings from Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore (2005). 
Moreover, Lujala’s (forthcoming) results imply that countries with alluvial diamond 
production have a 40% higher risk of experiencing civil war. This is not however 
supported by Humphreys (2005) whose findings rather support a relationship between 
agricultural commodities and civil war onset. 
 
The obstructability of natural resources has not been studied statistically. There have 
only been conducted qualitative studies on the obstructability of natural resources as 
far as I know. These studies have concluded that the obstructability of natural 
resources affects civil war duration. Furthermore, lootable and unobstructable 
resources are concluded to provide a means for rebels to finance their activities (see 
Ross 2002). Moreover, there are no quantitative studies that classify natural resources 
by lootability and obstructability as it is done in this thesis. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main quantitative scholarly work on the onset of civil wars.  
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Table 1. Quantitative Analyses of Natural Resources and the Onset Civil Wars 
Quantitative Analyses of Natural Resources and the Onset of Civil Wars 
Studies Data Variables Findings 
Collier & 
Hoeffler (1998) 
Singer & Small 
dataset,  
1960-1992 
(Correlates of War) 
Primary commodity export ratio to 
GDP  
 
Dependency on natural 
resources increases the risk 
of onset and duration of 
civil war in a curvilinear 
matter 
Elbadawi & 
Sambanis 
(2002) 
Singer & Small 
dataset,  
1960-1999 
(Correlates of War) 
 
Primary exports ratio to GDP The likelihood of civil war 
onset increases and then 
falls with the degree of 
natural resource 
dependence, but when 
modifying the variables 
because of missing, the 
results are weakened 
De Soysa & 
Neumayer 
(2003) 
UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflicts 
Dataset,  
1989-2000 and 
Fearon & Laitins 
data from 2003, 
1945-1999 
General trade dependency (import 
and export ratio to GDP 
Curvilinear relationship, 
but not significant. When 
adjusting data, results show 
evidence against the view 
that resource dependency 
raises the hazard of civil 
war 
Fearon & 
Laitin (2003) 
Own data on civil 
war, 1945-1999 
Primary commodity export ratio to 
GDP and oil exportation 
Primary export ratio to 
GDP has no significant 
effect, oil exportation 
increases the likelihood of 
civil war 
Humphreys 
(2005) 
Fearon & Laitins 
data from 2003, 
1945-1999 
Diamonds and oil production and 
reserves, and agricultural value as 
share of GDP 
Oil production increases 
the risk of civil war 
breaking out, oil reserves 
and diamond production 
does not have a significant 
effect 
Collier & 
Hoeffler (2004) 
Singer & Small 
dataset,  
1960-1999 
(Correlates of War) 
Primary commodity export ratio to 
GDP in five year intervals  
Higher risk of onset of war, 
but only the oil dummy 
variable was significant 
when commodities was 
categorised into four 
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groups 
Fearon (2005) Replication study 
of Collier & 
Hoeffler (2004) 
Replication study of Collier & 
Hoeffler (2004), adds country-year 
for primary exports ratio to GDP 
Using Collier& Hoeffler’s 
data, no strong of robust 
association. Some 
association when adding 
oil variable, is instead an 
indicative of weak state, 
which increases likelihood 
of onset of civil wars. 
Lujala, 
Gleditsch & 
Gilmore (2005) 
Fearon & Laitins 
data from 2003, 
1945-1999 
Diamond deposits and production Diamonds matter for civil 
war incidence, but do not 
generally affect the risk of 
conflict onset 
Buhaug & Rød 
(2006) 
Civil wars in 
Africa: 
UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflicts 
dataset and GIS3
1970-2001 
 ,  
Geographic resource variables: 
distance to petroleum and diamonds 
Diamond-abundant areas 
have higher probability of 
onset of internal conflict 
Brunnschweiler 
& Bulte (2009) 
Dataset from 
Collier & 
Hoefflers’ article 
from 2004 
Primary commodities ratio to GDP 
as proxy for resource dependency 
and estimated net present value of 
rents of countries’ natural capital 
stock as proxy for resource 
abundance 
Resource dependency 
endogenous variable to 
conflict, negative 
significant relationship 
between resource 
abundance and the onset of 
civil war 
Lujala 
(forthcoming) 
UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflicts 
Dataset,  
1946-2003 
Petroleum and diamonds reserves 
and allocation 
Onshore oil production 
increases risk of onset, 
offshore oil has no effect 
 
There is little reason to believe that the causes of the onset of civil war are not related 
to civil war duration. Previous research on the effect of natural resources and the 
duration of civil wars indicate that lootable and high-value resources contributes to 
longer-lasting civil wars. Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004) find that rebellions 
                                                 
3 GIS, or Geographic Information System is a system that enables scientists to analyze and manage 
data on all form of geographic referenced information. For further information, visit 
http://www.gis.com/.  
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take place when the costs are low and the profit is high. This is regularly the case for 
rebels in areas abundant with lootable natural resources. In turn, this creates incentives 
for rebels do continue to fight, as the alternative would mean less profit and higher 
cost when rebels have access to these types of resources (ibid). Fearon’s (2004) 
findings favour this approach, indicating that civil wars where belligerent groups 
receive revenues from the sales of lootable contraband goods like opium last longer 
(ibid). The studies by Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala (2009) and Lujala (forthcoming) also 
support this. Their findings imply that conflicts in areas abundant with lootable 
resources, especially diamonds, are harder to settle and that sales of lootable resources 
secure rebels with a high revenue income (ibid).  
 
Results from quantitative analysis of resource dependence and the duration of civil 
wars are also mixed. As with the onset of civil wars, Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002) 
find weak or not significant results in several different model specifications. The 
results from the study by Buhaug, Gates & Lujala (2009) indicate that civil wars in 
areas abundant with natural resources are harder to settle and that conflict where 
diamond production takes place are more durable. Other studies, like Collier, Hoeffler 
& Söderbom’s study from 2004, conclude that internal conflicts are shortened when 
there is a decline in price of exported primary commodities (ibid). DeRouen & 
Soebek’s (2004) findings additionally support a relationship between natural resource 
exports and duration of civil wars. Their results indicate that rebel access to natural 
resources, measured as primary commodity export ratio to GDP, increase the 
probability of government victory. Moreover, it does little to help rebels winning a war 
(ibid). Humphreys (2005), on the other hand, find that production of natural resources 
such as oil, diamonds and agricultural products a more likely to end quickly with a 
military victory for one of the conflicting partners instead of ending as a result of a 
cease-fire agreement and peace agreement.  
 
Table 2 sums up the main results on the quantitative research on the correlation 
between natural resources and the duration of civil wars. 
 
16 
 
 
Table 2. Quantitative Analyses of Natural Resources and the Duration of Civil 
Wars 
Quantitative Analyses of Natural Resources and the Duration of Civil Wars 
Studies Data Variables Findings 
Collier & 
Hoeffler 
(1998) 
Singer & Small 
dataset,  
1960-1992 
(Correlates of 
War) 
Primary commodity export ratio to 
GDP 
 
Dependency on natural 
resources increases the risk 
of onset and duration of 
civil war in a curvilinear 
matter 
Buhaug & 
Gates (2002) 
UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflicts 
Dataset, 
1946-2000 
Geographic resource variables: 
geographic characteristics of resources  
Longer-lasting conflicts 
encompass larger areas 
Elbadawi & 
Sambanis 
(2002) 
Singer & Small 
dataset,  
1960-1999 
(Correlates of 
War) 
Primary commodity export ratio to 
GDP 
Varying results do to 
specification processes with 
the data. All in all, results 
are weak or are not 
significant 
Collier, 
Hoeffler & 
Söderbom 
(2004) 
Correlates of 
War,  
1960-1999 
Primary commodity export ratio to 
GDP and change in commodity price 
index 
Conflicts are shortened with 
decline prices of exported 
primary commodities and 
external military 
intervention 
DeRouen & 
Sobek (2004) 
Data from Doyle 
& Sambanis 
(2000), 
1944-1997 
Primary commodity export ratio to 
GDP as a measure of resource 
availability 
Primary commodity exports 
increase probability of 
government victory 
Fearon (2004 
and 2005) 
Data from Fearon 
& Laitin (2003), 
1945-1999 
Contraband resources controlled by 
rebel groups (cocaine, gems and opium) 
Civil wars where rebels 
receive revenues from 
contraband goods last 
longer  
Buhaug & 
Lujala (2005) 
UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflicts 
Dataset,  
1946-2001 
Geographic resource variables: 
gemstones, coca, cannabis, opium, 
diamonds and primary exports ratio to 
GDP 
Resource dependency as 
primary exports ratio to 
GDP is not significant, civil 
wars in areas with natural 
resources are harder to end 
Humphreys Fearon & Laitins Diamonds and oil production and Resource conflicts are more 
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(2005) data from 2003, 
1945-1999 
reserves, and agricultural value as share 
of GDP 
likely to end quickly with 
military victory for one side 
Buhaug, 
Gates & 
Lujala (2009) 
UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflicts 
Dataset, 1946-
2005 
Geographic resource variables: GIS: 
oil, gas, gemstones and diamond 
location  
Conflicts with gemstones 
and petroleum production 
are more durable  
Lujala 
(forthcoming) 
UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflicts 
Dataset,  
1946-2003 
Petroleum and diamonds reserves and 
allocation 
Resources located in 
conflict zone doubles the 
duration whether or not 
there has been production 
(oil and gas) 
 
As shown, the focus is largely on the onset of civil wars. To sum up, there are five 
aspects previous studies have derived different conclusion about: (1) whether or not 
natural resources influence the onset and the duration of civil wars, (2) whether natural 
resources affects all types or just specific types of civil wars (e.g. separatist wars), (3) 
whether all types natural resources affects civil wars or just specific types (e.g. oil, 
diamonds) and (4) what causal mechanisms are related to civil wars (Ross 2004a: 
338). This thesis focuses on the first and third aspect. Additionally, the last aspect is 
included in the construction of the theoretical framework, which are based on the 
scholarly writings presented in the previous tables. The theoretical perspectives are 
presented in the following chapter. 
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3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The applied theory in this thesis is largely based upon previous writings and inferences 
concerning the relationship between natural resources and the duration of civil wars. It 
is important to note that natural resources themselves are never the only source of 
conflict. Rather, civil wars are caused by a set of events like ethnicity, weak 
governments, and unstable regimes (Ross 2003b). Still, studies reviewed in the 
previous chapter have found that the presence of natural resources affects the nature of 
internal conflict: The chance of breakout of civil war increases and the conflicts are 
even harder to settle. Even though conflicts can be said to be a resource conflict, to 
conclude that civil war would not have taken place if it were not for the resources is 
problematic. This is because not all resource-rich countries experiences civil war (Ross 
2003b: 19 and United Nations Environment Programme 2009). It is nonetheless of 
interest to study how and if natural resources affect civil war duration. 
 
The theoretical framework of natural resources and civil wars is divided into three 
parts. The first part describes how resource-rich countries dependent on income from 
natural resources tend to underperform economically, have weak democratic 
institutions, and additionally have high levels of corruptions caused by dependence on 
revenues from resource exports. The link between specific types of natural resources 
and the duration of civil war is outlined in the second part. The argument is that 
difference in lootability and obstructability of natural resources affects civil war 
differently. Finally, both rebels and government have motives leading up to civil war, 
these motives being influenced by natural resources. 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical perspectives and discusses how they are related to 
the research questions. From this discussion, I derive four hypotheses to be tested 
statistically. 
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3.1 Resource Dependence  
The first mechanism concerns how resource abundance and resource dependence in 
general affect the duration of civil wars. Resource abundance was in the aftermath of 
the Second World War regarded as an opportunity to lift countries out of poverty 
through the sales of natural resources (Le Billon 2005). However, history and 
experience has shown that this did not always take place. Instead, resource dependent 
states have fallen under the infamous resource curse (or Dutch disease) used to 
describe the economic, democratic, and social outcomes of resource dependence (Le 
Billon 2005 and Karl 1997). The main argument is that countries dependent on income 
from the sales of natural resources will be more prone to internal violent conflict than 
non-dependent countries. This is because the resource sector undermines governance 
and economic performance (Le Billon 2008: 347-348).  
 
The economy in resource dependent countries is affected by resource dependence in 
several ways. In some instances, poverty increases and economic growth is reduced, 
both increasing the likelihood of civil war breaking out (Ross 2003b). The reason for 
this is that rioting against the government in power is more likely to happen when a 
country performs economically poorly (ibid). Economic underperformance in resource 
dependent countries may also result in low per capita income. Scholars such as Collier, 
Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004) show that low per capita income cause and lengthen civil 
wars (Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2004). In addition, with high unemployment rates 
and increased poverty rebels find it easier to recruit discontent protesters to fight for 
their cause. For potential rebels, fighting together with belligerent groups is more 
attractive than omitting (Ross 2003b: 21).  
 
In addition, resource dependent countries tend to be more corrupt and are 
characterized by unaccountable governments (Le Billon 2005 and Ross 2003b). 
Corrupt government pocket revenues from resource exports themselves with little 
benefits for the population. These resource dependent states, abundant with resources 
to sell, tend to have weaker governmental institutions and are not able to handle 
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economic and social problems associated with resource dependency (Ross 2003b: 24, 
Ross 2001, Wantchekon 2002, Sandbakken 2006 and Tsui 2005). A discontented 
population with a high degree of inequality is more prone to protest than in countries 
with a higher degree of equality amongst the population. Having a weak and 
inefficient state bureaucracy hinders a country to solve social conflicts. Lastly, 
resource dependent countries tend to be less democratic and thus less accountable 
(Ross 2003b: 20-27). In addition, resource-rich countries are able to build up strong 
armies, clamping down on human rights in order to secure a certain degree of stability 
to secure exploitation of natural resources (Le Billon 2005). All these factors make 
resource dependent countries more prone to the outbreak of civil war. This is because 
rebel groups will form to protest and seek control over resources and benefit 
themselves instead of the government (Ross 2003b: 20-27). 
 
A common proxy of resource dependence and abundance in relation to civil war is 
primary commodity export ratio to gross domestic product (GDP) as described in the 
previous chapter (See Le Billon 2008:348, Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2004, de Soysa 
2002, Fearon 2004, 2005, and Humphreys 2005). Internal conflict is argued to be 
shortened if the country in which a civil war takes place experiences a sharp decline in 
the prices of the country’s exported primary commodities (Collier, Hoeffler & 
Söderbom 2004: 268). Large rents from natural resources will thus influence the 
duration of civil wars. If engaging civil war is profitable for rebels not only during, but 
also after the fighting period, then: “the duration of civil war should be increased by 
the extent of pre-conflict primary commodities exports” (Collier, Hoeffler & 
Söderbom 2004: 254). For instance, the price ratio to GDP may decrease during a 
fighting period compared with the price ratio to GDP before the conflict broke out as 
civil war may sustain resource extraction. Another explanation may be that rebel 
groups have seized control over a commodity and mining site, thus profiting from 
direct sales of the primary commodity. This may evolve into a separatist conflict over 
the control over a limited territory abundant with lucrative resources, not only 
increasing the risk of civil war onset, but also prolonging their duration (Ross 2003b). 
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From this discussion, the first hypothesis may be derived: 
 
H1: Civil wars in countries that are dependent on natural resources last longer than 
countries that are not dependent on natural resources, ceteris paribus.  
 
3.2 Lootability and Obstructability of Natural Resources 
According to the United Nations Environment Programme, the existence of natural 
resources may “alter the dynamics of conflict itself by encouraging combatants to 
direct their activities towards securing the assets that enable them to continue to fight” 
(United Nations Environment Programme 2009: 11). Resources that prolong conflicts 
are mainly oil, hard-rock minerals like coltan, diamonds, gold, and gemstones, in 
addition to timber (Ross 2003b). Illegal drugs can also be added to the list of natural 
resources. These resources have additionally played a crucial part in linking conflicts 
with natural resources, although sales of drugs are illegal, and revenues from these 
types of resources are difficult to measure (Ross 2003b 17-18). These resources are all 
classified as lootable resources. A resource is lootable when unskilled workers can 
easily extract the resource themselves and thus sell and smuggle it. In addition, the 
government or rebel groups may be able to interfere with the transportation of the 
resource. For instance, rebels can hold the transportation of a resource back and 
demand a beneficial ransom that will finance continuous fighting. This is possible if 
the resource is highly or moderately obstructable, like onshore oil (Ross 2003b). 
Obstructable and lootable resources in a country with an ongoing internal fighting may 
in this way affect the dynamics and the duration of internal conflict (Le Billon 2003, 
2005, 2008, Ross 2002, 2003a, 2003b, and Lujala forthcoming). The difference 
between lootability and obstructability is discussed further in chapter 4. 
 
There are several methods involving lootability and obstructability in which rebels 
receive revenues from natural resources. Highly obstructable resources such as 
onshore oil can become a target for extortion and kidnapping of skilled workers (Ross 
2002 and Ross 2003b). Countries with onshore oil and gas have kilometres of exposed 
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pipelines above ground and this type of resource is thus highly obstructable, meaning 
that others than skilled worker can easily attack these pipes. In Colombia, kilometres 
of pipelines run through the country, transporting oil to the coast for further 
transportation. Taking advantage of this, rebel groups bombed the pipelines 98 times 
in 2000 and received an estimated 140 million USD from extortions and threats of 
further attacks. The National Liberation Army (ELN) has particularly benefitted from 
this. By using these revenues, the group has grown from a mere 40 members in the 
mid 1980s to approximately 3000 members in beginning of the 2000s (Dunning & 
Wirpsa 2002 and Ross 2003b: 33). 
 
Rebels can also receive revenues from natural resources through direct looting and 
selling of resources, which they have taken control over (Ross 2004b and 2003b: 31). 
According to Ross (2002), lootable resources, for example alluvial diamonds, prolong 
internal conflicts because these kinds of natural resources have a tendency to profit 
rebel groups (Ross 2002: 66-67). This is also supported by the study of Addison, Le 
Billon, and Murshed (2003). In their description of African civil wars, civil wars are 
prolonged when looting of natural resources is the primary motivation of rebel 
fighting. Civil wars located in countries with lootable resources involve therefore a 
security aspect since rebels will strive to keep the control of natural resources in their 
possession. Moreover, unlootable resources will also have an effect on rebels group 
and the duration of internal conflict. Even though a resource is not lootable, rebels may 
still want to prolong conflicts if the future price of the resource is large enough. For 
instance, rebels might believe that they will net a substantially higher sum of the sales 
of oil in the future than at the present time (Lujala forthcoming).  
 
An example of how lootable natural resources prolong civil war is the case of Angola. 
The rebel group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 
received revenues from gold, timber, and alluvial diamonds, all lootable resources. 
They maintained access to the diamond fields because of their strategic geographic 
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location, the means of production and because of a poorly regulated marked4
 
 (Le 
Billon 2001b). The UNITA’s revenues came especially from the sales of alluvial 
diamonds, which where difficult for the government to control. According to Le Billon 
(2001b), during the 1990’s UNITA is estimated to have received on average about 500 
million USD per year through the sales of alluvial diamonds (Le Billon 2001b: 62). 
The government also benefitted from the sales of natural resources. Most of their 
income was based on the sales of offshore oil, an unlootable resource that they had 
almost exclusive access to. Government revenues from the sale of oil are estimated to 
be on average 1,8 billion USD per year during the same period (Le Billion 2001b: 62). 
Since both the rebels and government in Angola had a constant flow of high revenues, 
the conflict in Angola persisted for almost 30 years according to the dataset applied in 
this thesis (Gleditsch et al 2009).  
To statistically test how lootablity and obstructability of natural resources affects the 
duration of civil war, the following hypotheses are constructed: 
 
H2: Lootable natural resources make civil wars last longer than unlootable natural 
resources, ceteris paribus. 
 
H3a: Moderately obstructable and highly obstructable natural resources shorten civil 
war duration, ceteris paribus. 
 
H3b: Unobstructable natural resources make civil war last longer than highly 
obstructable resources, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.3 Motivations and Profitability 
Motivations and incentives for rebels and government are important driving forces that 
prolong civil wars. Although some rebels claim to fight for freedom and political 
                                                 
4 Regulations to hinder illicit trade of the so-called “blood diamonds” did not come into place until the 
Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was established in 2000. By then, the conflict in Angola 
had officially been declared over (Le Billon 2005: 76-77), although fighting still continued at the end of 
2004 according to Gleditsch et al 2009. 
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rights, some may be directly motivated by the profitability of natural resources (Lujala 
forthcoming). The opportunity for rebels to receive financial gains from controlling 
resources can create incentives to keep up the fighting in which the incentive lies in 
the payoffs during the conflict. This is also known as the rebellion-as-business 
approach. This approach argues that rebels want to sustain civil war when the profits 
surpass the costs of fighting (Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2004). According to 
Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2004) rebellions occur only when they are profitable, 
and the costs are low. When rebels receive high revenues from the sales of natural 
resources, which they control, conflict is expected to last longer (Collier & Hoeffler 
1998, 2004 and Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2004).  
 
Le Billon claims that conflict resources are “natural resources whose control, 
exploitation, trade, taxation or protection contribute to, or benefit from the context of, 
armed conflict” (Le Billon 2003:216). This approach identifies resources as a means of 
financing armed conflicts and as providing financial opportunities motivating violent 
rebels. Natural resources are a lucrative source of finance because extraction of 
resources may produce large profits. Additionally, the production of resources takes 
place at a specific location, which is difficult to move (Le Billon 2008, Fearon 2004 
and Ross 2003b). In this way, the resource sector rewards rebels, implying that it is 
more profitable for soldiers or their leaders to continue looting during the conflict than 
to settle for peace. As a result, the conflict may last longer. This means that wealth of 
resources discourage peace settlements since rebels’ access to valuable resources gives 
them revenues to buy arms and pay soldiers (Le Billon 2008:347-349, Fearon 2004 
and Ross 2004a, 2004b, 2003b: 30-31). The existence of easily extractable natural 
resources does not only make funding of further fighting feasible, it may also alter the 
conflict dynamic by providing rebels with motives to secure their assets. This in turn 
provides them with revenues to continue insurgencies. In this way, the violence may 
be a result of greed, resulting in more difficulties of settling for peace since the rebels’ 
payoff of war or victory is higher than settling for peace (United Nations Environment 
Programme 2009). 
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Both the government and rebels may be motivated by the profitability of natural 
resources, and the lootability of natural resources affects both groups. According to 
Ross (2003b), lootable resources will most likely benefit rebels, whereas revenues 
from unlootable resources usually benefit the government (Ross 2003b). The part that 
controls a resource-abundant area is most likely to benefit from it. However, if this 
area is mostly filled with unlootable resources, for example copper and oil, the 
government will most likely benefit more than rebels (ibid). This is because unlootable 
resources require skilled labourers and security guarantees of extraction and 
production. The government is more able to obtain and maintain this than rebel 
groups. This does not mean that rebels will not benefit at all from controlling 
unlootable resources. By blocking government revenues in this matter, the rebels have 
in possession a means to execute pressure, causing the government to comply to rebel 
demands (ibid).  
 
Moreover, Ross (2003b) claims that unlootable resources will still be of less value than 
lootable resources. He argues that the net change in the government’s income when 
rebels control the unlootable resource is the amount of annual income lost in the 
exploitation of the unlootable resource, in addition to the amount of annual revenue 
gained by the rebel. The latter is however zero since the rebels normally do not have 
the means necessary to extract the resource (ibid). If the rebels instead take control 
over a lootable resource from the government, then the rebels are able to extract the 
resource. In this way, they will gain revenues, doubling the loss of the government. 
Thus, lootable resources are more lucrative for rebel groups than unlootable resources, 
both types motivating the involving parties (ibid). 
 
Alluvial diamonds and illegal resources like coca, both lootable, exhibit: “low 
production costs and high prices (due to cartels or supply constraints) confer especially 
high rents that are insensitive to even significant rises in production costs or transport 
costs” (Auty 2004: 42). The high value of lootable resources makes these resources 
highly attractive for rebels and government to seize control over and use as a source of 
finance their activities. Civil wars will become harder to end as rebels may have little 
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to gain from ending the war once a monopoly of power over lootable resources have 
been established (Auty 2004: 43). According to Lujala (2003), lootable resources have 
a high value to weight ratio since they are easily smuggled and transport. 
 
Rebels can also receive revenues from the sales of future rights to resources that they 
do not yet control, but hope to do during the time of war. In addition, they can receive 
revenues by selling the rights to resources that have not been extracted yet. This is also 
known as “booty futures” and is operated so far only in Africa (Ross 2003b: 32). 
Although potentially profitable, booty futures also involve a certain risk. By selling 
future rights, the rebels show signs of being in a weak position compared to rebel 
groups who sell natural resources directly. This source of income can prolong civil 
wars, as a fighting party is able to pay soldiers and buy arms. Instead of being defeated 
or forced to negotiate a ceasefire agreement, rebel groups or the army are not only able 
to continue fighting. They have in addition an incentive to fight, as the payoffs of civil 
war by selling booty futures are higher than settling for peace.  
 
An example of this is the civil war in 1997 in the Republic of Congo, also know as 
Congo-Brazzaville5
 
, where sales of future exploitation rights to the country’s oil 
reserves funded Denis Sassou-Nguesso’s private militia. The sales of future rights, 
estimated to be a figure of 150 million USD paid by a European oil company, enabled 
Sassou-Nguesso to buy weapons and replace the serving president, Pascal Lissouba. 
Moreover, the conflict escalated to a bloody war which over a period of four months 
cost about 10 000 lives (Ross 2003b: 33). Rebels’ dependence on the sales of natural 
resources can also shorten the duration of civil wars. This because the international 
community can execute pressure or credible threats, as the rebels are dependent on 
access to international markets in orders to sell natural resources (Auty 2004: 43). 
However, rebels can solve this by illicit trade, which will be further discussed in 
chapter 6. 
                                                 
5 Not be confused with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which also goes by the name Congo-
Kinshasa, adding the name of the capital in order to differ between the two countries. 
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It would be desirable to measure how the profitability of natural resources motivates 
involving conflicting parties, but this is unfortunately not feasible. Although 
profitability of natural resources is elaborated in the previous sections, this is such a 
biased element that measuring it statistically is not possible. To compensate, the 
primary export ratio to GDP separated by lootability and obstructability is included in 
the thesis in addition to examining the price to weight ratio for the natural resources. 
This is seen as an appropriate measure of profitability and motivation of rebels and 
governments.  
 
From this discussion, the last hypothesis may be derived: 
 
H4: Civil wars in countries with natural resources with a high price to weight ratio 
last longer than countries with a low price to weight ratio, ceteris paribus. 
 
Le Billon (2001) stresses the importance of the geographic approach to natural 
resources. Crucial to the shaping of economic networks in armed conflict economies 
and conflicts are the nature and geography of natural resources. This is because rebel 
groups will more easily control and exploit resources close to a border. Additionally, 
they will use this as a source of financing the cost of war and consequently prolong 
civil war duration. However, it is far more difficult to seize control over resources that 
are close to the capital. This is also known as the proximity-distance approach (Le 
Billon 2001a). Furthermore, the location of rebel and government forces can both 
increase and lower the relative military capabilities of the belligerent parties. Intrastate 
conflicts in the periphery of the country are longer lasting (ibid, Buhaug, Gates & 
Lujala 2009 and Buhaug & Gates 2002). Moreover, conflicts in rugged terrain is 
considered to favour insurgencies in the way that the effectiveness of conventional 
forces are reduced which in turn makes it easier for rebels to sustain oppositions. If 
fighting takes place in areas abundant with lootable natural resources, the fighting 
parties will have incentives to sustain fighting (Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009). 
Conflicts located near the capital and the area of the fighting zone also matter in 
addition to the adjacencies of an international border (Buhaug & Gates 2002). 
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Geographic dimensions are not added to the dataset, and this factor is for this reason 
not analysed statistically. The geographic factors are nevertheless included and are 
discussed when analyzing the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in chapter 
6. 
 
Table 3 sums up the hypotheses that will be statistically tested. 
 
Table 3. Hypotheses to be tested statistically 
Hypotheses to be tested statistically 
H1: Civil wars in countries dependant on natural resources last longer than countries that are not 
dependant on natural resources, ceteris paribus. 
H2: Lootable natural resources make civil wars last longer than unlootable natural resources, ceteris 
paribus. 
H3a: Moderately obstructable and highly obstructable natural resources shorten civil war duration, 
ceteris paribus. 
H3b: Unobstructable natural resources make civil war last longer than highly obstructable resources, 
ceteris paribus. 
H4: Civil wars in countries with natural resources with a high price to weight ratio last longer than 
countries with a low price to weight ratio, ceteris paribus. 
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 3) research design is about: “how to 
pose questions and fashion scholarly research to make valid descriptive and causal 
inferences.” Moreover, a research design is a detailed plan of how the research 
question is answered. More specifically, research design is about how data is collected 
and the analysis is conducted, and how the inferences from the results of the analysis 
are related to the specific research question and the hypothesis. 
 
The research question in this thesis is answered by using quantitative methods of 
research. Quantitative method of research implies that the researcher systematically 
collects comparable information about the objects of interest and then expresses this 
information in numbers. Thereafter the researcher derives hypothesis about the 
question he or she seeks to answer. Next, statistical analysis is conducted in order to 
test whether or not these hypotheses can be confirmed. Finally, inferences are drawn 
from the result of the statistical analysis (Hellevik 2003:13). In order to conduct a 
statistical analysis, theoretical concepts must to be operationalized so that data can be 
collected and analysed.  
 
This chapter first explains how data are collected, and how the dependent and the 
independent variables are operationalized. Next, it describes how natural resources are 
selected and classified. Then an explanation of natural resources’ lootability and 
obstructability is presented. Finally, methodological challenges that occur when 
conducting statistical analysis, such as data’s validity and reliability with regards to 
lootability and obstructability, are discussed. 
 
4.1 The Model 
The purpose of this thesis is to establish if and how natural resources affect the 
duration of civil wars. The thesis also tries to establish if there is any difference 
between the different aspects of natural resources’ obstructability on the duration of 
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fighting. Additionally, the lootability of natural resources is included in order to 
observe if this element of natural resources affects the duration of civil war. This is 
illustrated in figure 1: 
 
Figure 1. Possible Effects on the Duration of Civil Wars 
 
 
 
4.2 Units of Analysis  
Conflicts are the units of analysis where the calendar years make up the sub-unit of 
every observation (Gleditsch et al 2002b: 3). Conflicts taking place in the same year in 
the same country are separated. If a conflict between June and November results in 30 
causalities, then that given year will be registered as a year of conflict. If the same 
number of casualties occurred between November and February, and the conflict does 
not fulfil the 25 battle related deaths in neither of the two calendar years, then neither 
year will be recorded as a conflict (ibid). 
 
According to Ross (2004a: 347), there are four datasets on which the majority of 
recent studies have drawn upon: The Collier and Hoeffler dataset, the Fearon and 
Laitin dataset, the Sambanis dataset and finally the Gleditsch et al dataset, also known 
as the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. These scholars put forward different 
definitions of civil war, which have produced different results (see chapter 2). Gleditsh 
et al (2009) provide data on the duration of civil wars in this thesis. Their data are 
Duration 
of civil 
wars
Lootability of 
Natural 
Resources
Natural 
Resource 
Dependence
Obstructability 
of Natural 
Resources
31 
 
based on Gates & Strand (2006) using the UCDP/PRIO criteria of 25 annual related 
battle deaths as described in chapter 1. Conflicts are in the UCDP/PRIO dataset 
outputted as years, and the dataset separates between different conflicts that take place 
in the same year, in the same country. Moreover, there are 275 conflicts in the dataset. 
Of all the observations in the dataset, there are 246 failures. This means that 246 
conflicts have failed to persist. More precisely, 246 conflicts ended in a peace 
agreement (Gleditsh et al 2009).  
 
4.3 Operationalization of the Variables 
An important part of any analysis is the operationalization of the research question and 
the variables. The operationalization of theoretical concepts is also referred to as the 
measurement validity, meaning how the researcher has operationalized the concepts 
that he or she seeks to measure (Adcock & Collier 2001). This chapter describes how 
both the dependent and the independent variables are operationalized in order to 
conduct a statistical analysis. Data’s validity and reliability are further discussed in 
chapter 4.5.  
 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable: Duration 
As mentioned previously, duration data are taken from Gleditsch et al (2009). The 
scholars collecting the data provides in most cases the start and end date of the 
conflict, and if not, at least the month. Duration is coded as conflict years and the 
dataset consist of conflicts that took place between 1946-2004. Conflicts that took 
place before 1946 and those that where still continuing by the end of 2004 are 
subsequently censored. This is further explained in chapter 4.4  
 
4.3.2 Independent Variable: Natural Resources 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are no clear guidelines of defining and 
grouping natural resources. Scholars researching this topic have used different 
approaches in order to identify the significant importance of natural resources and 
hence produced different conclusions (Ross 2004a: 337-340).  
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There are three main approaches of classifying natural resources. Most of the studies 
described in chapter 2 apply the export value of natural resources as a measurement for 
resource dependence (Collier & Hoeffler 2002). This is measured as primary 
commodity export ratio to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (ibid). Problems occur 
by only applying this measure in order to study this relationship. Ross (2004a) points 
out that the causal arrow between the export of natural resources as a part of GDP and 
the onset of civil wars may go the other way. Internal conflict may lead to resource 
dependence. This is because resource dependence forces a country’s production sector 
to run off while leaving the immobile natural resource sector the major component in 
the country’s economy by default (ibid).  
 
Geographic mapping is another approach of classifying natural resources, separating 
between resources that are concentrated in small areas (point) and resources that are 
spread over vast areas (diffuse). This approach is also known as the point-diffuse 
distinction, as used by Buhaug & Gates (2002) and Le Billon (2001 and 2008).  
Both measures are somewhat coarse according to Lujala (2003:6-8). The first attempt 
does not separate between the different types of resources, making it hard to 
distinguish between the different effects of natural resources on civil war. 
Furthermore, by using the point-diffuse approach, the researcher will have problems 
with deciding which natural resources are point and which are diffuse.  
 
A third approach of measuring natural resources is by distinguishing them by their 
“lootability.” A resource is defined as lootable if unskilled workers or individuals 
easily can appropriate it (Ross 2002:47). Both Ross (2004b: 46-49 and 2002: 54-56) 
and Lujala (2003:4) prefer this approach since it is easier to determine how and when a 
resource is valuable for a rebel group (Lujala 2003:9). The conditions that need to be 
fulfilled in order for a resource to be lootable are illustrated in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Natural Resource Classification Scheme 
Source: Lujala 2003: 13. 
 
A resource is then unlootable when the extraction of the resource requires complicated 
technology and skills, when the resource has a low value to weight ratio, and when 
transportation of the resource is both difficult and costly. A lootable resource, on the 
other hand, is easy to transport and smuggle, has a high price to weight ratio or 
revenues from the resource can easily fall into rebels hand. This makes it a main 
source of financial incomes to provide further violent fighting. 
 
Furthermore, Ross (2002) has constructed a table of classification of natural resources. 
He does not only group resources by their lootability, but distinguishes as well 
between resources’ legality and obstructability. If the transportation of a resource can 
be blocked without difficulties by a small, armed group of people, then the resource is 
obstructable. A resource that can only be blocked by many soldiers and heavy 
equipment is thus classified as unobstructable (ibid). What is more, resources with a 
high value to weight ratio like gems, opium and coca, which can be flown out of 
remote areas, are classified as unobstructable, as blocking transportation and illegal 
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smuggling is difficult. Timber, agricultural products, and minerals have a lower value 
to weight ratio and are moderately obstructable since they most often have to be 
transported by truck or train at long distances. Highly obstructable resources are 
resources like natural gas and onshore oil. The reason is that these resources are 
transported at long distances in liquid form through pipelines above the grounds since 
pipelines always bear a risk of disruption along the pipes’ entire length. The 
obstructability of a resource is correlated to its lootability as described in Lujala’s 
figure above (Ross 2002:54). 
 
Table 4. Natural Resources Classified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ross 2002:55. Bold denotes illegal resources (Ross 2002:55). 
 
Natural resources in this thesis are classified by combining the different approaches 
mentioned above. The resources are classified by their lootability and obstructability 
accordingly to both Lujala’s figure  (Lujala 2003) and Ross’ table (Ross 2002). By 
looking at both measures, the qualities of different natural resources come into focus. I 
suspect that the occurrence of unlootable, unobstructable natural resources such as 
offshore oil will affect the duration of civil wars differently than lootable, 
unobstructable resources like alluvial diamonds. Additionally, the natural resource’s 
export ratio to GDP is used as a proxy of resource dependence and determines the 
importance of each resource for the countries’ economy. Furthermore, the export price 
ratio to exported kilograms of primary commodities are added, and applied in the case 
study of the DRC in chapter 6. 
 
Data on export value and exported weight in kilograms for all the natural resources are 
taken from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
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(UNCOMTRADE), where more than 140 countries’ export and import data are 
provided from 1962 until 2008 (United Nations Trade Statistics Database 2009a, 
2009b, and 2009c). Export values have been collected for all the selected natural 
resources for all the countries in the dataset, and for all conflict-years. In the dataset, 
resource dependence is measured as percentage of GDP in order to substantially 
interpret how changes in primary commodity exports affects civil war duration. 
Additionally, the trade value in relation to the economy in conflict-countries is the 
main interest, and therefore measuring primary commodity exports ratio to GDP in 
percentages is considerate a more suitable approach. The price-weight ratios for the 
natural resources are divided into three groups: low, medium, and high. Resources that 
are exported in litres, like oil and gas, are also included, both classified as having a 
low price to weight ratio. In addition, the UNCOMTRADE does not report of the 
exported kilograms for silver and uranium. Nevertheless, it is reasonably to assume 
that these two resources have a high price to weight ratio. Therefore, they are placed in 
this group. 
 
Conflicts and conflict-years that took place before 1962 are additionally excluded from 
the analysis. In addition, the UNCOMTRADE does not have observations for all the 
reported conflict years. This may be because primary commodity exports was 
sustained during the conflict years, or that the UNCOMTRADE have not succeeded in 
obtaining data.  
 
Data on the countries’ GDP for all years at current prices and constant 2005 prices in 
US Dollars are taken from Penn World Tables which contains data on about 30 
variables for about 167 countries over some or all the years 1950-2004 (Heston, 
Summers and Aten 2009a, 2009b and 2009c). Penn World Table does not include data 
on former countries like the Soviet Union. Moreover, Myanmar is entirely excluded, 
the argument being that national accounts in constant and current prices to link 
national accounts estimates to the present are not available. In addition, China is listed 
in two versions in the data. In this thesis, I only apply one version, “China II” since 
this data, according to the contributors: “provide a more consistent recent economic 
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history of China relative to other countries6
 
” (ibid). After all the exclusion processes, I 
am left with 236 conflicts compared with the initially 275 conflicts to analyse. 
Geographic mapping is not included, since defining natural resources as point or 
diffuse is not only difficult, but also beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus lies on 
income from different types of natural resources as a means of financing rebel fighting 
and resource dependence affecting the duration of civil wars.  
 
4.4 Selecting Natural Resources  
The CIA World Factbook is the main source of information of which natural resources 
the countries in the datasets possess (CIA World FactBook 2009). The Factbook offers 
a table, which consists of more than 70 natural resources that are grouped into their 
respective country. Illegal natural resources such as opium and coca have not been 
included in this thesis. Although these resources may indeed prolong internal fighting, 
reliable data on these resources are hard to find. Therefore, only legal natural resources 
listed in the CIA World Factbook are included. This list includes natural resources 
such as minerals, petroleum, hydropower, and other resources of commercial 
importance.  
 
From the World Factbook, natural resources are sampled out. Only resources that the 
countries in the dataset possess are included. From this group, some resources are 
excluded. Resources like arable land, fertile soil, and similar resources that cannot be 
classified as a primary commodity that can be exported are excluded. By primary 
commodity, I refer to “[…] unprocessed raw materials of agricultural and mineral 
origin […]” that can be traded (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2000 and 
Radetzki 2008:7). Agricultural products like rice is not included in the CIA World 
Factbook list, and the CIA does not offer any further elaboration of their selection 
                                                 
6 The Penn World Table (PWT) Version 6.3 offers users a choice of 2 Chinas in PWT6.3. “China I” uses the official growth 
rates for the whole period as in PWT 6.2. In “China II” PWT 6.3 uses the recent modifications of official Chinese growth 
rates for the period before 1990, and apply the modification of the official rate from 1995-2000 to the official rate after 2000. 
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criteria. Rice is nevertheless added in the data as I find it to be an important natural 
resource despite CIA’s exclusion. Furthermore, natural resources that either has not 
been found at all or an appropriate code has not been found in the UNCOMTRADE 
database are also excluded. Additionally, some of the resources have coincidental 
names, meaning that the World Factbook have listed them twice, but under different 
names. One example of this is aluminium, listed as both bauxite (the name of the 
concentrated ore) and aluminium. In addition, some of the natural resources are 
separate resources, but are grouped together in the export data7
 
. The final selection of 
natural resources is listed in the table 5 below in which the resources also have been 
classified according to their lootability and obstructability.  
After the exclusion process, I am left with 55 different resources. Note that diamonds, 
precious stones, petroleum, and gas are listed more than once: diamonds and precious 
stones are listed as alluvial and deep shaft. Gas and petroleum are listed as onshore and 
offshore commodities. In addition, data for industrial diamonds are included. Since 
there is a difference in lootability and obstructability for these types of resources, these 
crude resources are listed as illustrated in table 5. Several sources of information have 
been consulted in order to define a natural resource’s lootability and obstructability 
accordingly to the table presented above. These are all listed in the reference chapter 
of this thesis.  
 
4.5 Selecting SITC Codes 
The natural resources are classified according to the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) in order to collect information about the resource’s export value 
(United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). The 
SITC is a system that covers every single commodity that is exported and imported in 
                                                 
7 Excluded natural resources are the following: antimony, arable land, asphalt, chicle, coastal climate, 
diatomite, emeralds, fertile soil, forest, gemstones, gold, hydropower, kaolin, lignite, methane, natron, 
nitrates, pyrites, scenic beauty, shrimp, silica, soda ash, tar sand, timber, wildlife and zircon. Natural 
resources that have the same name are not included in this overview. For further information, go to 
the CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2111.html?countryName=&countryCode=&regionCode=%C5%92 and check the 
appendix for a complete overview. 
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the world from 1962. The SITC divides all commodities into nine main groups: (0) 
food and live animals, (1) beverages and tobacco, (2) crude minerals, inedible, except 
fuels, (3) mineral fuels, lubricants and related material, (4) animal and vegetable oils 
and fats, (5) chemicals, (6) manufactured goods classified chiefly by material, (7) 
machinery and transport equipment, (8) miscellaneous manufactured articles and (9) 
commodities and transactions not classified according to kind (ibid 2009a). These 
main groups are once more divided into subgroups. Each natural resource is correlated 
with the suitable commodity and thereafter is assigned a unique SITC code. For 
example, iron has been given the code 281.3, the code for iron ore, belonging to the 
second group in the classification. This means that iron is a crude mineral. This is done 
in order to easily identify data on export value and similar variables (ibid 2009b and 
2009c).  
 
There exists four versions of this code system, and these versions do differ somewhat 
from each other. The latest version (Rev.4) covers only the period of 2007-2008. Since 
the time period in question for this thesis is from 1946-2004, this version is 
consequently excluded (ibid 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). Version number two, Rev. 2 is also 
excluded since it only provides data from 1976. The first version (Rev.1) gives a 
coarser grouping of the commodities, whereas the third revision is far more detailed. 
For this reason, it would be desirable to use the third revision (Rev.3). The third 
revision does not however cover the entire time period this thesis seeks to examine, as 
it only provides data from 1988 (ibid). Therefore, Rev.1 is applied throughout the 
thesis and the natural resources are classified according to this version. The selected 
resources are mainly all crude minerals. A crude mineral is defined as an unprocessed 
substance, which is naturally present in the earth or chemicals substance obtained in 
chemical processes (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2000).  
 
Two of the resources are not crude: platinum and cobalt. They are by-products of a 
crude mineral. They have still been included as I find them important, and are placed 
in the category six and five of the SITC, coded respectively 681.21 and 513.54. Two 
other important resources are excluded: tar sand and gold. An appropriate SITC code 
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has not been found for these resources in the UNCOMTRADE database. Tar sand is 
listed, but as a by-product of other sand types. This mineral is not commonly found in 
nature, and according to the CIA World Factbook (2009) the only country in the 
dataset that possess tar sand is Madagascar. Gold, however, is present in several 
countries in the dataset. I have not succeeded to find pure gold in the UNCOMTRADE 
database or a similar classification; only manufactured goods containing gold are 
listed. Gold has for this reason been excluded from the analysis in spite of its assumed 
high ratio of the export value of primary resources. In addition, missing values of 
primary commodities from the UNCOMTRADE are coded as 0. This is because I 
assume that missing values implies that the given country does not export the specific 
commodity at all, or that the specific commodity was not exported in the time periods 
that are outputted as missing.    
 
Moreover, the UNCOMTRADE and the SITC system do not separate between exports 
that come from onshore and offshore oil and gas, and alluvial and deep shaft diamonds 
and precious stones. This information is crucial in order to identify the effect 
lootability and obstructability of natural resources has on the duration of civil wars. In 
order to compensate, data on diamonds, and oil deposits for the countries in the dataset 
have been added. In this way, it is possible to separate these resources. Although there 
exists specific dataset for precious stones or gemstones, data on diamond deposits is 
used to distinguish what kind of stones the countries in the dataset have. This is 
because data on gemstones does not separate between alluvial and deep shaft stones8
 
. 
By using this method to compensate for the lack of distinction from the SITC and 
UNCOMTRADE, resources can be classified in accordance with lootability and 
obstructability. Since there is no precise data that separates between offshore/onshore 
gas and oil, and alluvial/deep shaft diamonds and stones, this method is considered to 
be sufficient for the purpose of this thesis. Country data for diamond deposits are taken 
from the Gilmore, Gleditsch, Lujala & Rød (2005a and 2005b). Data on oil and gas 
deposits are taken from Lujala, Rød &Thieme (2007a, 2007b and 2007c). 
                                                 
8 See Lujala 2009. 
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In some cases, countries are reported to have both alluvial (secondary diamonds) and 
deep-shaft9
 
 diamonds (primary diamonds) (Gilmore, Gleditsch, Lujala & Rød 2005a 
and 2005b). This also occurs for oil and gas. In these cases, the dominating type of 
deposit is used. The number 1 has been added to the SITC code for onshore oil and 
onshore gas, and the number 2 has been added to the SITC code for offshore oil and 
offshore gas. This is additionally done for precious stones and diamonds, where the 
number 1 identifies alluvial diamonds and stones, and the number 2 identifies deep 
shaft diamonds and stones. For example, Angola is reported to have two large deposits 
of alluvial diamonds, and one deposit of kimberlite diamonds. Hence, Angola is set to 
have alluvial diamonds. Export revenues from diamonds for Angola is accordingly 
identified to come from alluvial deposits. The SITC code for diamonds is normally 
667.2 and the code for alluvial is set to 1, meaning that exports data for diamonds from 
Angola is thus coded 6672.1. There is unfortunately a discrepancy between the 
reported data from the UNCOMTRADE (2009c) and the data collected by Gilmore, 
Gleditsch, Lujala & Rød (2005a and 2005b) and Lujala, Rød & Thieme (2007a, 2007b 
and 2007c). For instance, the UNCOMTRADE reports of several other countries than 
those listed by Lujala, Rød & Thieme (ibid) exports oil, diamonds, precious stones, 
and gas. Countries that according to the UNCOMTRADE export both oil and gas, but 
are only recorded as exporting oil by the scholars, have been classified as exporting 
both resources. Countries that are not mentioned in the data provided by researchers 
are excluded from the analysis, as there is impossible to identify the lootability and 
obstructability of the resources in these countries. A complete list of how oil, gas, 
diamonds, and resources are classified is reported in Appendix II.  
The natural resources analysed in this thesis are presented in table 5. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Also called kimberlite referring to rocks that contain diamonds in subsoil deposits (Gilmore, 
Gleditsch, Lujala & Rød 2005a). 
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Table 5. Natural Resources by Lootability, Obstructability, and SITC codes 
 
 
This thesis thus provides an entirely new empirical approach in studying natural 
resources’ effect on the duration of civil wars by combining the approaches by Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004), Lujala (2003) and Ross (2002). Whereas previous studies have 
used the total primary export value for the combined group number 0,1,2,3,4, and 68 
(Fearon 2005, Collier & Hoeffler 2004) of the SITC codebook, this thesis has defined 
each one of the 55 resources by their respective code. These are then divided into five 
groups, separating the resources between lootability and obstructability: (1) highly 
obstructable and unlootable, (2) moderately obstructable and lootable, (3) moderately 
obstructable and unlootable, (4) unobstructable and lootable and (5) unobstructable 
and unlootable. This strengthens the data validity, as each resource’s export value is 
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added, not just the total export value of all of the combined commodity groups. By 
identifying each natural resource, the qualities of the resources will become more 
evident in the case of lootability and obstructability. To strengthen these believes the 
total export of primary export ratio to GDP is compared with the group of five. In 
addition, data from the World Bank used by previous studies on the total primary 
export for the combined SITC groups (0-4 and 68) (see Fearon 2005 and Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004) is added to the dataset (The World Bank 2009).  
 
4.6 Control Variables 
Control variables are added in order to control for spurious effects and hold 
confounding factors constant so that the impact on the explanatory variables can be 
studied for given control groups (Skog 2004: 41-45). When researching if natural 
resources affect the duration of civil wars, it is easy to infer wrongly if not controlling 
for other variables that might lead to the result presented by the data.  
 
The first control variable is level of development. This variable is added as it easy to 
assume that developed countries possess more resources to put in use in order to 
hinder rebellion and formation of small-armed guerrilla groups. This is also correlated 
with the level of democracy. In democracies, the opposition may have a stronger voice 
than in authoritarian regimes, meaning that in the former the likelihood of rebellion is 
lower than in the latter. Also, developed countries are suspected to settle internal 
fighting faster than developing countries. The reason for this is that the latter lack the 
resources sole internal disputes and conflicts, even though the country is abundant 
with natural resources and experiences high incomes from the sale of crude minerals. 
According to the results in Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom’s 2004 article, prolonged 
civil wars are correlated with a low per capita income (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 
2004).  
 
Level of development is measured in this thesis as GDP per capita, measured in 
constant 2005 USD. Data are taken from the Penn World Table Version 6.3 (Heston, 
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Summers and Aten 2009b and 2009c). It can be argued that this measure is to a certain 
extent too coarse. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has taken 
this into consideration when constructing the Human Development Index10
 
. The HDI 
does not however provide data for all years; data are only available from 1975-2005 in 
five-year intervals. GDP per capita is nevertheless an unbiased measure and although 
missing data occur, the data are still considered to be of high reliability. Therefore, the 
HDI have been eliminated as a measure of level of development, and GDP per capita 
is considered an appropriate measure.  
The second control variable is regime type. Regime type is added since previous 
studies have shown that there is a high correlation between resource dependence on 
crude minerals such as petroleum oils and the level of democracy. Resource rich 
countries are claimed to have authoritarian regimes since it is easier for leaders in 
countries wealthy on natural resources to stay in power when oppressing the people by 
spending these riches on the population. Previous regression analysis show that the 
more oil that is discovered, the less democratic the oil-rich country becomes (Ross 
2001, Tsui 2005 and Wantchekon 2002). It is also more likely that democracies will 
end civil wars through diplomacy and negotiations, as this regime type is dependant on 
support from the population in order to stay in power. Put differently, leaders in 
democratic regimes have high incentives to heed demands from the population and 
thus negotiate to cease internal fighting. Gleditsch and al (2009) provide data on 
regime type, using the Polity IV index developed by Gurr, Jaggers & Marshalls 
(2009). The Polity IV index set the level of authoritarianism along a spectrum from 
fully institutionalized autocracy, mixed, incoherent authoritarian regimes to fully 
consolidated democracies measured on a scale from -10 to +10 (Gurr, Jaggers & 
Marshalls 2009).  
 
Ethnic diversity is also believed to affect the duration of civil wars and is therefore 
included in the analysis. Ethnic diversity may take the form of ethnic political 
                                                 
10 The UNDP constructs the HDI by calculating the level of development by adding up data on life 
expectancy at birth, level of education and GDP per capita (UNDP Human Development Reports 2009). 
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cleavages where the majority may find the ethnic diversity as an opportunity to take 
advantage of the minority (Collier & Hoeffler 2004 and Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 
2004). Moreover, ethnic dominance may cause the feeling of grievance in ethnic 
minority groups, which may not only trigger civil wars, but also prolong them. The 40-
year-old ethno-religious civil war in Sri Lanka serves as an example. In their article 
from 2004, Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom comes to the conclusion that the one aspect 
that prolongs the duration of internal conflict is a moderate ethnic division (Collier, 
Hoeffler & Söderbom 2004). A common measure for ethnic diversity is ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, in which the probability of two randomly drawn persons 
belonging to the same ethnic group are measured (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Data on 
ethno- fractionalization are also taken from Gleditsch et al (2009) who have collected 
this data from Roeder (2001) (Gleditsch et al 2009: 173). 
 
Finally, population is added as a control variable as it may be reasonable to assume 
that the size of a population will have an effect on the duration of war. Data on 
population size is taken from the Penn World Table Version 6.3 (Heston, Summers 
and Aten 2009b and 2009c).  
 
4.7 Statistical Methods 
Duration is analysed using the method of event history analysis or survival analysis, a 
type of analysis that is used when examining events that represent a transition of state 
(Box-Steffenmeier & Jones 2004:1). A linear model of OLS regression becomes 
problematic when event history data is analysed. This is because duration data must be 
positive, which usually means that the response variable will show evidence of 
asymmetry, especially if some of the observations have remarkably long duration 
times (ibid: 16). A common solution to this problem is to log-transform the response 
variable and then apply OLS. According to Box-Steffensmeier & Jones (2004), the 
new model mitigates the skewness problem, but does not solve other problems like 
failing to observe the termination or onset of a spell whose observation took place 
before the starting time set by the researcher (ibid: 16). For example, if a researcher 
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wants to investigate civil wars between 1960 and 1980, she has to be aware that some 
of the ongoing conflicts in the dataset may have been initiated before 1960. By 
conducting survival analysis, these problems are solved by right censoring and through 
left truncation. This means that observations that did not experience an event during 
the time span of the study and observations with history prior to the first observation 
point is unobserved is accounted for. OLS regression is therefore not compatible with 
duration analysis as it may produce biased samples, leading to incorrect conclusions 
(Box-Steffenmeier & Jones 2004: 15-20). 
 
Event history analysis consists of units like individuals, countries, and dyads: 
“observed at some natural starting point or time-of origin.” This type of analysis is 
also referred to as survival model, referring to how long it takes for a unit to 
experience a certain event. Put differently, “as something persists—as it survives—
what is the risk it will subsequently end?” (Box-Steffenmeier & Jones 2004: 3+7). 
This event is called “failure,” which in this thesis refers to when a conflict ceased to 
exist (that it “failed” to last) (Hamilton 2009: 308). After this event has taken place, 
the unit is no longer at risk of experiencing another kind of event, or are no longer 
observed (Box-Steffenmeier & Jones 2004: 3+7). This means that when failure has not 
occurred to a given observation by the time data collection ends, that observation is 
then “ right censored” (Hamilton 2009: 308-310). In this case, when a conflict did not 
experience an event during the time span of the dataset (1946-2004), the conflict is 
right censored. The UCDP/PRIO dataset reports after the exclusion of non-matching 
cases of 236 conflicts in which 207 conflicts experienced an event. This means that 
207 conflicts ceased and ended in a cease-fire. 
 
When there is a good reason to expect that the duration dependency exhibit some 
particular form, parametric models of analysis like Weibull and Gompertz, which 
yields monotonic hazards, are desirable (Box-Steffenmeier & Jones 2004). In research 
generally, and in this thesis also, the focus is on the relationship between the outcome 
and the covariates of interest.  Moreover, researchers do not always know what kind of 
form the duration dependency might display, and a flexible model is thus of better use. 
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This thesis therefore applies the Cox proportional hazard model, better known as the 
Cox model. The advantage of this model is that it is a fully flexible duration model 
where the estimates of the covariates a researcher is interested in is obtained and the 
particular form of the duration dependency is left unspecified (Box-Steffenmeier & 
Jones 2004: 47-48). 
 
The Cox hazard function is written as follows:  
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where h
 i
(t) is the hazard rate at time (t) for unit i . b
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 is the regression parameter for 
the covariate X
1
, and h
0
is the baseline hazard function (ibid: 48-49). The baseline 
hazard rate, h
0 
(t) is not specified in the parametric part of the Cox model, and 
consequently the model does not have an intercept term, b
0
 
. This is instead absorbed 
into the baseline hazard function (ibid: 49). In this thesis, the hazard rate is thus the 
probability that a conflict will end in a cease-fire at time (t) while the conflict is at risk 
for this event to occur (ibid). More specifically, the hazard rate is the unobserved rate 
at which events happen and it controls both the timing and the occurrence of events 
(UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group 2009).  
A key assumption in the Cox model is proportional hazards. The hazard function for 
each observation must follow the same pattern over time (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 
2004). If not, the model will overestimate the impact of variables whose associated 
hazards are increasing. In addition, the coefficient estimates for covariates in which the 
hazards are converging will be biased towards zero. For this reason, the assumption of 
proportional hazards must be tested (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 132). Testing 
for non-proportional hazards can be done in several ways. One possibility of checking 
the proportional hazards assumption is to test if there is a relationship between the 
residuals bases on the Schoenfeld residuals (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez 2004: 178). 
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Results from the Schoenfeld test of proportional hazard assumption for all models 
indicate that all of the variables except two fulfil the assumption of proportional 
hazards. This is the log-transformed variable of population and the variable for regime 
type. Box-Steffensmeier & Jones (2004) suggest that when a variable does not fulfil 
the assumption of proportional hazards, an interaction variable with time (t) should be 
generated and applied in the analysis instead. This will result in a variable that fulfils 
the assumption (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 136-137). This solves the problem 
with the regime type variable, but it does not solve the problem of proportional hazard 
for the log-transformed variable of population. The new interaction variable of log-
transformed population and time still does not fulfil the assumption. However, since 
population is not the main variable of interest, but a control variable, the assumption of 
proportional hazards for this variable is ignored. Moreover, when comparing results 
from analyses including and excluding the interaction variable of the log-transformed 
population variable, the coefficients hardly change, indicating that colinearity is not a 
problem. Since the interaction variable makes the model fit the data better than with 
the original population variable, and since neither fulfil the assumption of proportional 
hazards, the interaction variable for populations is included in the analysis as this 
variable has no impact on the overall conclusion in this thesis. 
 
4.8 Methodological Challenges 
Methodological challenges always arise when researchers seek to answer to their 
research questions through statistical analysis. Statistical analysis will always try to 
increase both validity and reliability of the data in order to conduct analysis as 
precisely as possible. 
 
Missing data must be taken in consideration when applying statistical analysis. Some 
countries in the dataset are former states of countries today. In these cases, data on the 
successive state is used if no exact data exist for the previous state formation. Some 
countries also rule over smaller colonies. These are excluded in this thesis since the 
UNCOMTRADE reports this data separately and not as export values from the 
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administrative country11
 
. Moreover, the UNCOMTRADE does not offer any export 
data before 1962. These are subsequently excluded, as there are no available data. In 
addition, the UCDP/PRIO dataset reports of conflicts where the UNCOMTRADE does 
not report of any exports to have taken place, thus defining these instances as missing.  
Missing also applies for the Penn World Table, which does not offer data on former 
countries like the Soviet Union. Moreover, one existing country is also excluded: 
Myanmar. The Penn World Table argues that figures from Myanmar are questionable, 
and does not offer any data on the country (Heston, Summers & Aten 2009c). In 
addition, I have not been able to identify what kind of precious stones, diamonds, gas, 
and oil 76 of the countries in UNCOMTRADE statistical database have. These 
countries are not excluded from the analysis- the other natural resources may still have 
an effect the nature of the civil war in these countries.  
 
Data’s validity is defined as the: “degree of correspondence between the theoretical 
meaning of a variable in the causal model and the measure used for the variable in the 
empirical analysis.” In other words, validity is the relevance of the data for the 
research question. When the theoretical definition corresponds with the 
operationalization, then face validity is fulfilled (Hellevik 1988:120 and Hellevik 
2003: 53). The definition of natural resources is unquestionable since the resources 
cannot be anything else than what they are: natural resources. Yet, what kind of 
resources can be classified as being natural can be problematic. For instance, resources 
such as rice have been excluded from the CIA World Factbook. The most common 
perception of natural resources is that they are produced in nature, as explained in the 
first chapter of the thesis. Most of the resources in this thesis are natural and crude, 
with some exceptions. When it comes to natural resources, I find that face validity is 
fulfilled. 
 
The issue of validity with regard to civil wars and their duration on the other hand are 
more problematic. The general perception of the term is internal conflict between the 
                                                 
11 These small states are Macao, Hong Kong, Guadeloupe, Reunion, Montserrat, Sabah, and Mayotte. 
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government and a rebel group. However, scholars define civil wars and measure 
duration differently, which may lead to divergent results and inferences. Still, the basic 
criteria remain similar in the different datasets, so whichever dataset I choose, I 
assume that the measure used in the dataset corresponds well enough with the 
empirical perception of the term. In this thesis, the UCDP/PRIO dataset is applied, and 
thus their definition of civil war being conflicts with a 25 annual battled related deaths 
is applied.  
 
Validity of lootability and obstructability is also not straightforward. What makes a 
resource lootable and when can a resource be classified as obstructable? Researchers 
like Ross (2002) and Lujala (2003) have constructed tables and measures, without ever 
classifying natural resources other than diamonds, oil, and gemstones according to 
their schemes. Lootability and obstructability is classified as far as possible in 
accordance with Ross (2002) and Lujala’s (2003) measures, leaving it highly 
challenging to classify other resources than oil, diamonds, and gemstones. 
Underground minerals, for example, copper, iron, and silver and crude minerals like 
petroleum and gas are classified as unlootable, whereas alluvial minerals and 
agricultural products are classified as lootable. The obstructability of these resources 
has also been difficult to classify. According to Ross (2002), most natural resources 
are moderately obstructable. Only oil, gas, diamonds and gemstones can be separated 
by the degree of obstructability, and these resources have thus been easily classified.  
 
Even though several sources have been consulted in order to categorize the resources, 
a geologist for instance would perhaps not agree with my classification. In addition, 
the classification is based on the general occurrence of the resource-some resources 
come in very different form in different countries. Coltan, a tantalum ore in the DRC is 
an example of this. This resource can be defined as both lootable and unlootable, but 
since the resource belongs in a SITC code with other resources12
                                                 
12  In Rev1 of the SITC, tantalum, the ore coltan origins from, is classified as SITC code 238.93 
“Niobium, tantalum and vanadium ores and concentrates.” 
, it has been classified 
as unlootable. In the DRC on the other hand, it appears in streambeds, and can be 
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easily dug out and is thus a lootable resource. This will of course affect the conclusion 
of this thesis, but an appropriate alternative in studying the effect of natural resources 
on civil war duration have not been found. Considering the scope of this thesis, I 
consider the validity of lootability and obstructability fulfilled. Nevertheless, natural 
resources should be utterly explored in order to enhance the validity of the data. 
 
In addition, oil, gas, diamonds, and precious stones come in different forms, and are 
classified as either deep-shaft/alluvial or onshore/offshore. Unfortunately, the SITC 
does not differ between these categories, and using external data to determine this 
means is not desirable, but acceptable. What is more, some countries are listed to have 
both. Moreover, some countries are not reported to have oil and diamond reserves 
according to the scholarly data although the UNCOMTRADE reports that they do. 
Deciding which type of resource a country has by comparing onshore/offshore and 
alluvial/deep-shaft deposits is not desirable, but sufficient for the scope of this thesis as 
no such data for export exists. In the future, precise data should be obtained in order to 
increase the validity. Considering the lack of appropriate data and the scope of this 
thesis, I conclude that data’s validity is sufficiently fulfilled.  
 
Reliability is defined as the: “degree to which data are free of random measurements 
errors” (Hellevik 1988:120). By conducting reliability tests, the possible impact of 
measurement errors may be assessed (ibid: 110). With quantitative analysis, the 
inferences I draw can easily be reproduced and tested by other researchers. This can be 
done by performing the very same analysis I have conducted in order to test the 
reliability. This is far more difficult than when using qualitative methods where 
measurements errors are harder to discern. 
 
Additionally, the relationship between natural resources and internal conflict may be 
spurious. It is possible that another variable affects both civil war and resource 
dependence, e.g. weak rule of law or level of development. Resource-rich countries 
with weak rule of law may find it difficult to attract foreign investment and thereby 
become more dependent on exporting natural resources. The correlation between 
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natural resources and internal conflict can therefore become significant statistically, 
but this correlation may not be true in the real world, as the one factor may not cause 
the appearance of the other (Ross 2004a: 338). In order to compensate for this, control 
variables that are assumed to possibly affect this relationship are added. Analyses are 
conducted first with the control variables, then without. The change in the results will 
tell if there may be a spurious effect or the result may become not significant at all. 
This is further explained in chapter five. 
 
4.9 Data Summary 
Table 6 describes the variables in the dataset where duration is the only dependent 
variable. Four control variables are added, and two of these are added as squared in 
order to check for a possible non-linear relationship. These are population size, level 
of development measured as GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD, regime type and 
level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The independent, or the explanatory 
variables are total primary commodity export ratio to GDP using data from the 
UNCOMTRADE and the World Bank in addition to the variables that separates 
natural resources by lootability and obstructability. Furthermore, the variables of price 
to weight ratio is added, keeping low price to weight ratio as the reference category. 
Two variables for oil and one for alluvial diamonds are added. This is further 
explained in chapter 5.1 (see table 9). Overall, this gives me a total of 1440 
observations. 
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Table 6. Data Summary, Descriptive Statistics 
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5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Does resource dependence lead to longer lasting wars? And is there a difference 
between the effect of lootable and unlootable natural resources on the duration of civil 
war? This chapter presents the results and the findings from the statistical analysis. 
First, the multivariate results are presented and shortly commented. Thereafter, the 
findings are summarized and discussed in accordance with the theory presented in 
chapter 3. 
 
5.1 Results from Cox Analysis 
A multivariate analysis is conducted in order to control for confounding factors. In this 
chapter, the control variables described in chapter 4.3.3 are added to the analysis. In 
other words, the effect of the variables of natural resources on the duration of civil war 
is analysed, keeping all the other factors constant. The control variables included in the 
multivariate analysis are level of development (GDP per capita in constant 2005 
USD), regime type, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The results are mainly in 
line with the applied theory described in chapter 3. However, in some cases, the results 
are quite weak, and the coefficients are on average not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Multivariate Results 
b b b b b b b
(SE) exp (b ) (SE) exp (b ) (SE) exp (b ) (SE) exp (b ) (SE) exp (b ) (SE) exp (b ) (SE) exp (b )
Total Primary Commodity Export/GDP (UNCOMTRADE) .026 1.026
(.016)
Total Primary Commodity Export/GDP (World Bank) .021** 1.022
(.009)
Highly Obstructable & Unlootable Exports/GDP .029* 1.030
(.018)
Moderately Obstructable & Unlootable Exports/GDP .381*** 1.464
(.143)
Unobstructable & Unlootable Exports/GDP .011 1.011
(.049)
Moderately Obstructable & Lootable Exports/GDP -.011 .989
(.050)
Unobstructable & Lootable Exports/GDP -.101 .904
(.647)
Lootable Exports (sum of all lootable)/GDP -.009 .991
(.051)
Unlootable Exports (sum of all unlootable)/GDP .030* 1.030
(.016)
Unobstructable Exports (sum of all unobstructable)/GDP .014 1.014
(.046)
Obstructable Exports (sum of all obstructable)/GDP .027 1.027
(.0168)
Population Interaction (lnpop * _t) -.001 .910 -.001 .910 -.001 .910 -.001 .910 -.001 .910 -.001 .910 -.001 .910
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
GDP Per Capita, Constant USD (ln) .103 1.108 .101 1.107 .105 1.111 .149 1.161 .114 1.120 .147 1.160 .122 1.130
(.114) (.116) (.113) (.111) (.114) (.111) (.113)
Ethnic-lingustic Fractionalization (centred) -.144 .866 -.057 .945 -.204 .815 -.139 .871 -.169 .845 -.168 .845 -.199 .820
(.415) (.415) (.427) (.417) (.409) (.410) (.406)
Ethnic-linguistic Fractionalization (centred) (sq) -.802 .448 -.522 .594 -.580 .550 -.286 .751 -.580 .550 -.317 .729 -.694 .500
(1.592) (1.587) (1.600) (1.572) (1.574) (1.560) (1.585)
Regime Type -.015 .985 -.014 .987
(.013) (.013)
Regime Type Interaction (polityiv * _t) -8.25e-06 .910 -9.12e-06 .910 -8.21e-06 .910 -9.08e-06 .910 -8.67e-06 .910
(5.03e-06) (4.97e-06) 5.02e-06 (4.98e-06) (4.99e-06)
Regime Type (sq) -.001 .910 -.002 .998 -.001 .910 -.001 .910 -.001 .910 -.001 .910 -.001 .910
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) .003 (.003) (.003)
df
LR
N
* = p<0.10, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01
 -636.15226
7 7
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
7 7 11 7 7
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
1024 1022 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024
 -635.1681     -635.97218 -625.1673  -632.95422  -636.18034 -634.87333
Table 7. Multivariate Results 
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Table 7 presents the result from the multivariate analysis for model 1 through 7. The 
remaining models are displayed below.  
 
Three estimates are listed in all of the models. The first coefficient, b, is the log hazard 
ratio, which describes the change in the risk a unit has of conflict end over a time 
period (t, t+1), given that the duration has lasted up to t (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 
2004: 15). The hazard rate can in this way be referred to as the termination rate, a term 
that will be used henceforward. If the coefficient is positive, then the termination rate 
is interpreted as increasing. This means that with positive coefficients civil wars have a 
shorter survival time (ibid: 59). A negative coefficient, on the other hand, indicates 
that the termination rate is decreasing. This implies that with a negative coefficient 
civil wars last longer, that is they have longer survival times before failures occur 
(ibid). 
 
The next estimate, SE(b), written in parenthesis below the coefficient b, is the standard 
error of the parameter estimate. The standard error is the standard deviation of the 
probability distribution for the b estimate, and is an indicator of how much the 
estimate will deviate from the correct parameter value (Skog 2004: 135). The p-score 
is the probability of obtaining the observed parameter estimate, b, if the true value of b 
is zero. The p-value is calculated based on the parameter estimate and the standard 
error, and it used to test statistical significance of the variables in order for hypothesis 
to be confirmed or rejected. The researcher herself sets the p-value that is the level of 
significance. If the results show that the p-value is lower than the selected level of 
significance, the null hypothesis is rejected (Skog 2004: 177-178).  
 
The level of significance required to reject a null hypothesis is the result of personal 
preference. The researcher concludes that there is no relationship between the 
variables if he or she cannot reject the null hypothesis. If the truth is that there is a 
relationship, the researcher commits a type II error. This means that he or she wrongly 
concludes that there is no effect between the variables. If the level of significance is 
too high, the researcher may wrongly reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
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is a relationship between the variables. This is a type I error and the probability of 
committing a type I error is decided by the level of significance set by the researcher. 
The probability of making a type II error, on the other hand, is determined by the level 
of significance, the sample size, and the distribution of the population of units (Skog 
103+207-208). In the following analysis, I apply a 5% level of significance, meaning 
that the p-value is p = 0.05. This means that estimates with a p-value higher than 0.05 
is not statistically significant and are subsequently excluded from the analysis and the 
interpretation of the findings. Two stars indicate significant coefficients at a 5% level 
as shown in table 7. In addition, significant coefficient at a 10% level is indicated by 
one star, and three stars indicate significant results at a 1% level. 
 
The last estimate is the exp(b), the exponential regression coefficient, which expresses 
the hazard ratios. More specifically, the exp(b) is the relationship between two hazard 
rates. This ratio is interpreted as the changes in the hazard, or risk, that a conflict ends 
when the independent variable increases by one unit. Hazard ratios between zero and 
one means that the risk of civil war determination decreases when the dependent 
variable increases, which leads to longer lasting civil wars. For example, a exp(b) = 
0.30 indicates a 70 % lower risk of civil wars lasting longer, meaning that the risk of 
determination decreases with 70 % when the covariate increases by one unit of 
measure. Positive hazard ratios, on the other hand, are ratios larger than one, which 
means that the risk of termination increases with the dependent variable. This indicates 
that internal conflicts do not last for a long period of time. If the analysis results in a 
exp(b)= 1.30, the risk of determination when the covariate increases by one unit is 
predicted to be 30 % (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 50, 60-63). 
 
Model 1 contains the variable for total primary exports ratio to GDP based on the 
UNCOMTRADE data in addition to the control variables. The control variables are 
also listed as squared in order to uncover possible non-linear relationships. Results 
from the analysis show that the log hazard ratio (b) for total primary export ratio to 
GDP is positive. This means that resource dependence has a positive effect on the 
termination rate of civil war, indicating that civil wars are shortened. Increasing 
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primary commodities export ratio to GDP by one standard deviation, other factors kept 
constant, predicts an 8.6% increase in the termination rate13. Moreover, in model 1, the 
hazard ratio for a one-unit increase is 1.026 when other factors are kept constant. This 
further indicates that when resource dependence increases with one unit of measure, 
that is when export of primary commodities increases with 1%, the likelihood of civil 
war termination increases with 2.6 %. This is reflected from the low value of the 
coefficient, also indicating that this covariate has little effect on civil war duration. 
However, none of the coefficients in this model are statistically significant14
 
, and the 
hypothesis can thus not be confirmed. In addition, the coefficient is quite small, 
indicating that resource dependence, based on data from the UNCOMTRADE have a 
weak impact on civil war duration. To sum up, there is no support for hypothesis H1: 
Civil wars in countries dependent on natural resources last longer than countries that 
are not dependent on natural resources, ceteris paribus when applying data from the 
UNCOMTRADE. 
In model 2, data from the UNCOMTRADE on total primary export ratio to GDP is 
replaced by data on primary exports from the World Bank. As with the former model, 
the coefficient in model 2 is positive, and there is insignificant difference between the 
b estimates for the UNCOMTRADE and World Bank data. This implies that civil wars 
have a shorter duration time in countries dependent on natural resources, and that the 
effect when applying the World Bank data are close to identical when applying the 
UNCOMTRADE data. In this model, however, the coefficient is statistically 
significant. Table 7 demonstrates this further where the results show that the standard 
error for the coefficient for the World Bank data is substantially lower than the 
UNCOMTRADE standard error. Raising primary export ratio to GDP based on the 
World Bank data by one standard deviation when other factors are kept constant 
indicates an 11% increase in the termination rate. The hazard ratio for this covariate is 
also positive at 1.021, other factors kept constants. This indicates that when export of 
                                                 
13 This is calculated as exp(0,0260*3,205)=1,086. See table 6 for standard deviations for all variables. 
14 The interaction variable for the log transformed population with time is statistical significant in all 
models. However, since this variable does not fulfill the assumption of proportional hazards, it is 
therefore not included in the discussion of significant effects, and is not indicated as being significant 
in all of the models. 
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primary commodities increases with 1%, the risk of civil war termination increases 
with 2.1%. Hazard ratios close to 1 are interpreted as the coefficient having no effect 
on increasing or decreasing the hazard of event (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 63). 
The results from the Cox analysis can be used to infer about the hypothesis, although 
the effect is relatively weak. To summarize, the results contradict hypothesis H1 when 
applying the World Bank data. Thus, dependence on natural resources reduces civil 
war duration when applying data from the World Bank.  
 
Model 3 includes all the variables of lootability and obstructability15
 
. Compared to the 
coefficient for moderately obstructable and unlootable resources, the rest of the 
coefficients are relatively smaller, indicating weaker effects on civil war duration. 
Results from the analysis indicate that the estimate for highly obstructable and 
unlootable natural resources, like offshore oil, is positive. The hazard ratio for this 
estimate when other factors are kept constant is 1.029. This indicates that when 
exports of highly obstructable and unlootable resources increases with 1%, the risk of 
civil war termination increases with 2.9%. Increasing this variable by one standard 
deviation, other factors kept constants, predicts a 7.6% increase in the termination rate.  
For unlootable and moderately obstructable resources, the effect on civil war duration 
is much stronger. Moderately obstructable and unlootable resources such as deep-shaft 
minerals have additionally a positive effect. The risk of termination increases with 
46%, other factors kept constant, when exports of this group of resources increase with 
1%. Raising moderately obstructable and unlootable natural resources by one standard 
deviation indicates an 8% increase in the termination rates when other factors are kept 
constant. The last group of unlootable resources, that is resources that are 
unobstructable and unlootable, for instance onshore oil, also have a positive effect. For 
these type of resources, an exports increase of 1% increases the risk of termination of 
civil wars with 1.1% when other factors are kept constant. Increasing this variable by 
                                                 
15 In order to control for colinearity, each of the variables for obstructability and lootability have been 
analysed in separate models. This reveals that the estimates are almost identical, implying that there 
is not a problem of colinearity in the estimates. The results are displayed in Appendix V. 
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one standard deviation, predicts a 1.5% increase in the termination rate when other 
factors kept constants. 
 
Turning to lootable resources, which are argued in chapter 3 to prolong civil war 
duration, the results indicate that lootable resources have a negative effect on civil war 
duration, thus prolonging them. For moderately obstructable and lootable resources, 
like sands and agricultural products, the risk of civil war termination decreases with 
1.1%, other factors kept constant, when exports of this group of resources increases 
with 1%. Increasing moderately obstructable and lootable resources by one standard 
deviation, other factors kept constants, predicts a 1.6% decrease in the termination 
rate. For lootable, but unobstructable resources like alluvial diamonds, the effect is 
stronger, but still negative. If exports of alluvial diamonds and similar unobstructable 
and lootable resources increases with one unit, that is the export increases with 1%, the 
risk of termination of civil wars decreases with 9.7%, other factors kept constant. 
Raising this variable by one standard deviation, other factors kept constants, predicts a 
1.4% decrease in the termination rate. This implies that unobstructable and lootable 
resources prolong civil war duration to a larger extent than moderately obstructable 
and lootable resources. However, the only statistically significant estimates are the 
coefficients for highly obstructable and unlootable resources and moderately 
obstructable and unlootable resources. Nevertheless, there is support for H3a: 
Moderately and highly obstructable natural resources shorten civil war duration, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
In order to get a more substantial interpretation of the effect of lootable resources 
opposed to unlootable resources and the degrees of obstructability, the variables for 
lootability and obstructability have been grouped together as displayed in model 4 -7. 
The estimates for lootable natural resources are displayed in model 4. The coefficient 
is negative, indicating that lootable resources prolong civil war duration. Increasing 
lootable resources with one standard deviation predicts a 1% decrease in the 
termination rates, other factors kept constant. The hazard ratio for this covariate is 
0.99, indicating a 1% lower risk of civil wars lasting longer. Put differently, when 
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other factors are kept constant, the risk of termination decreases with 1%, when 
exports of lootable resources increase with 1%. This hazard ratio is however so close 
to 1 that it should rather be interpreted as having no effect on increasing or decreasing 
the hazard of event, as argued by Box-Steffensmeier & Jones (2004: 63). Moreover, 
none of the coefficients are statistically significant, thus H2: Lootable natural 
resources make civil wars last longer than unlootable natural resources, ceteris 
paribus cannot be rejected or confirmed. 
 
Model 5 contains the estimates for unlootable natural resources. The coefficient is in 
this model positive at 0.029, indicating that unlootable resources have a stronger effect 
on civil war duration, and that the survival time for civil war shortens. Raising 
unlootable resource exports by one standard deviation, other factors kept constants, 
indicates an 8.8% increase in the termination rates. The hazard ratio in this model is 
1.030, which means that the risk of termination of civil wars when exports of 
unlootable resources increase with 1% is predicted to be 3.0%, other factors kept 
constant. Moreover, this coefficient is statistically significant at a 10% level. Although 
the coefficient for lootable resources is not statistically significant, results from model 
5 nevertheless indicate that unlootable resources shorten civil war duration, which is in 
line with the theory presented in chapter 3. Thus, there is indirectly support for H2, 
and this hypothesis is therefore confirmed.  
 
The second last model in table 7, model 6 contains the estimates for unobstructable 
natural resources. In this model, the coefficient is positive, indicating that 
unobstructable resources shorten the duration of civil wars. The effect is relatively 
weak, but as only diamonds, precious stones, offshore gas, and offshore oil fall into 
this category, this is expected. Increasing unobstructable resources by one standard 
deviation indicates a 1.9% increase of the termination rate when other factors kept 
constant. Moreover, the hazard ratio is 1.014, which means that the risk of termination 
of civil wars when other factors are kept constant increases with 1.4% when exports of 
unobstructable resources increase with 1%. Results from table 6 indicate that there is 
no support for H3b: Unobstructable natural resources make civil wars last longer 
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than moderately and highly obstructable natural resources. However, since none of 
the coefficients in model 6 is statistically significant, the hypothesis cannot be rejected 
or confirmed although the results indicate a positive, not negative correlation.  
 
Obstructable resources are analysed in model 7. As in model 6, the coefficient is 
positive, and implies that obstructable resources shorten civil war duration. This effect 
is stronger compared to the coefficient in model 6, but as this group contains a 
substantially larger number of natural resources, this is again expected. Increasing the 
this estimate by one standard deviation, other factors kept constant, the termination 
rate is predicted to increase with 8.1%. The hazard ratio for obstructable resources 
indicates that with an increase of 1% of export of obstructable resources, other factors 
kept constant, the risk of civil war termination increases with 0,2%. Moreover, none of 
the coefficients are statistically significant, which means that although civil war 
duration is reduced with exports of obstructable resources, H3a cannot be rejected or 
confirmed. 
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Table 8. Multivariate Results, Price/Weight Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 contains the model in which price to weight ratio is analysed. The results are 
indirectly in line with the theoretical perspectives: natural resources with a high price 
to weight ratio have a negative coefficient, indicating a negative effect on the 
termination rate. Civil war duration is thus prolonged. Resources, for example 
diamonds and coltan (tantalum), which belong to this group, will in this way prolong 
civil war duration as argued by Ross (2003b). When export of resources with a high 
price to weight ratio increases with 1%, other factors kept constant, the risk of 
termination of civil wars decreases with 5%. Moreover, increasing this estimate by one 
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standard deviation, other factors kept constants, indicates a 4% decrease in the 
termination rate. Model 8 also contains estimates for resources with a medium and a 
low price to weight ratio. Resources with a medium price to weight ratio are resources 
like fish, and cocoa, whereas rice, natural gas and sands are resources with a low price 
to weight ratio. 
 
The effect of medium price to weight ratio compared with the coefficients for low 
price to weight ratio indicates that medium price to weight resources have a weaker 
impact on civil war duration. Increasing medium price to weight ratio by one standard 
deviation, other factors kept constants, indicates a 0.9% increase in the termination 
rate. Both medium and low price to weight ratio are positive. The results indicate 
further that for medium price to weight resources, other factors kept constant, the risk 
of termination increases with 0.6% when exports of this group of resources increases 
with one unit, that is 1%. Since the hazard rate is 1.006, and thus very close to 1, this 
coefficient has negligible impact on the increasing or decreasing hazard of event, as 
outlined by Box-Steffensmeier & Jones (2004).  
 
Low price to weight resources, on the other hand, have a stronger effect compared 
with the estimate for natural resources with a medium price to weight ratio. Increasing 
this estimate by one standard deviation predicts a 9.1% increase in the termination rate 
when other factors are kept constant. Furthermore, the results indicate that with low 
price to weight ratio, other factors kept constant, civil war termination increases with 
3.5% as exports of resources with a low price to weight increases with 1%. Moreover, 
this is the only significant estimate. Since the other two coefficients are not statistically 
significant, H4: civil wars in countries with natural resources with a high price to 
weight ratio last longer than in countries with a low or medium price to weight ratio 
cannot be directly confirmed or rejected. However, since low price to weight ratio are 
significant, there is support for H4, and H4 are thus indirectly confirmed. See chapter 
5.3 and table 10 (page 71) for further explanation. 
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In addition to running regression analysis in order to test the hypotheses, I have chosen 
to analyse the effect of oil and alluvial diamonds on the duration of natural resources. 
There are several reasons behind this choice. First of all, previous studies have shown 
that these resources in particular fuel civil war duration as they inhibit different 
qualities of obstructability and lootability. In addition, collected data from the 
UNCOMTRADE reveal that these resources are high-value resources, which I believe 
cause incentives for rebels and government to not settle for peace, thus prolonging 
civil wars. Although it would be desirable to analyse the direct effect of deep shaft 
diamonds, this type of natural resources have very few observations and are thus 
excluded. The results from the Cox regression for these resources are displayed in 
table 9.  
 
Table 9 Multivariate Results, Diamonds & Oil 
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Model 9 contains the coefficient for alluvial diamonds exports measured as percentage 
of GDP. The results show that this coefficient is of satisfactory size and negative. The 
hazard ratio is estimated to be 0.89, implying that the risk of civil war termination, 
other factors kept constant, decreases with 11 % as alluvial diamond exports increases 
1%. In this model, however, none of the coefficients are statistically significant and 
cannot be used as support for a relationship between alluvial diamonds and civil war 
duration.  
 
The different effects between onshore and offshore oil is displayed in the last model, 
model 10. Both onshore and offshore oil are classified as unlootable and are in 
accordance with the previous findings. Moreover, the coefficient for this variable is 
positive, indicating that with oil exports, civil wars have a shorter duration time. 
Increasing onshore oil exports by one standard deviation indicates a 9.6% increase in 
the termination rate when other factors are kept constant. With onshore oil, the risk of 
civil war termination, other factors kept constant, increases with 3.3 % when onshore 
oil exports increase with 1%. Offshore oil, on the other hand, indicates the same. 
Increasing onshore oil exports by one standard deviation indicates a 2% increase in the 
termination rate when other factors are kept constant. Furthermore, the hazard ratio is 
1.013, implying that the risk of termination increases with 1.3 % when offshore oil 
exports increase with 1% when other factors are kept constant. The hazard ratio for 
both of these variables are quite close to 1, meaning that it can be argued that these 
resources may not have an effect at all. Onshore oil is additionally the only statistically 
significant variable, but at a 10 % level. This means that it cannot be concluded with 
statistical significance that offshore oil affects the duration of civil war as this may be 
as well caused by the control variable, none of which becomes significant.  
 
5.2 Discussions and Summary 
A possible correlation between natural resources dependence and civil war duration 
has been under scrutiny in the regression analysis described above, and the results are 
mixed. First, the theoretical arguments from previous researchers stating that resource 
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dependence makes civil wars last longer have been analysed. When analysing data on 
total primary export ratio to GDP based on data from UNCOMTRADE, the coefficient 
does not become statistically significant. When applying the World Bank data, the 
coefficient is statistically significant, but to some extent weak. These findings are thus 
similar to those of Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002) and Buhaug & Lujala (2005) who 
find no statistical relationship or get weak results. 
 
Although data on primary exports from the World Bank and GDP data from Penn 
World Table is the same as applied in studies by Collier & Hoeffler (1998), my results 
(although barely) go in the opposite direction. As indicated in table 7, resource 
dependence measured as the commodity primary export ratio to GDP in percentages 
indicates that resource dependence shortens the duration of civil wars. There may be 
several reasons for this. First of all, the World Bank data contains data for all primary 
commodities, but which natural resources this is, is not given. This is evident with the 
UNCOMTRADE data where I have chosen which primary commodities are classified 
as natural resources. For this reason, the World Bank data may contain more than 55 
natural resources. In addition, it may include primary commodities, which I may have 
excluded. This can explain why only the estimate based on the World Bank data 
becomes statistically significant.  
 
Moreover, both data from the World Bank and UNCOMTRADE are a collection of 
reported data from the countries in the dataset. It is reasonably to assume that the 
reported export data apply mainly for government revenues and not rebel income.  
In this way, the data from both institutions may be biased as it catches the effects for 
the government more easily than for the rebels. If more precise data on rebel export 
were available, results might be less biased and we might observe lootable resources to 
prolong civil war duration, as argued by researcher mentioned in chapter 2 and 3 (See 
Lujala forthcoming, Ross 2002, 2003a, 2003b, and Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2004). As 
argued by Ross (2002), both the government and rebels benefit from natural resource 
exports. Furthermore, resource dependence is more likely to result in civil war victory 
for the government, according to DeRouen & Sobek (2004). The argument is that 
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primary commodity exports in most instances favour the government. In addition, the 
government will have incentives to put an end to internal fighting as discussed in 
chapter 3. Moreover, by selling primary commodities, the government will gain large 
revenues, are thus able to finance a strong military force. In turn, this may shorten civil 
war duration, as the government are able to stop riots and rebellions by the use of 
military force. To conclude, dependence on resources for the government only cannot 
be argued to fuel civil war and prolong duration. Instead, as natural resource exports 
measured as ratio to GDP in percentages increases, the risk of termination of civil war 
increases. 
 
Additionally, it can be argued that it would have been more suitable to use exports data 
from before the conflict instead of the ongoing conflict year as is done in this thesis. 
The argument is that exports may be stalled during a conflict, and that the real trade 
value and profitability of the resources is not revealed when using data from the 
conflict years. However, since this thesis explores only duration of civil wars in the 
conflict years provided by the UCDP/PRIO dataset, this is found to be sufficient. 
Nevertheless, it is of interest to explore the changes in the exported trade value as it 
may reveal the nature of the correlation between civil war duration and primary 
commodities exports. 
 
Model 3 analysed the different effects between lootability and obstructability. Since 
there is reason to believe that the lootability accounts for the effect of obstructability, 
model 4-7 was created in order to substantially interpret and separate between the 
direct effects of lootability and obstructability. The results from the analysis indicate 
an indirect support for the hypothesis that lootable resources prolong civil war 
duration, as only the coefficient for unlootable resources became statistically 
significant. The reason for this may as well be that exports data apply mainly for the 
government, causing data to be biased, as it does not account for, or to a little extent 
account for rebel revenues. However, the results are in line with the theoretical 
framework outlined in chapter 3. According to Lujala (forthcoming), lootable 
resources such as alluvial diamonds prolong civil war duration, and unlootable 
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resource, like oil, are most likely to benefit the government whose incentives is most 
often to clamp down on rebel insurgencies, thus shorten civil war duration (see Ross 
2002). This also follows the arguments of Fearon (2004 and 2005). He argues that 
lootable contraband resources, for instance opium and coca, when controlled by rebels 
provide them with a means of finance, consequently prolonging civil wars since the 
rebels can in this way pay soldiers and by arms.  
 
In sum, unlootable resources shorten civil war duration as unlootable resources, like 
oil, mostly benefit the government since they can provide the technology, the finance 
and logistic to extract unlootable natural resources. As argued earlier, the revenues the 
government receives by exporting these types of natural resources can be used to build 
up strong armies that will clamp down on rebel movements. In this way, unlootable 
resources shorten civil war duration. Lootable natural resources, on the other hand, 
will to a larger extent benefit the rebels more than unlootable resources. This is 
because unskilled labourers at low production costs can easily extract the former 
compared with the latter. In this way, rebels can finance further insurgencies and can 
pressure the government to heed their claims. Accordingly, lootable natural resources 
will prolong civil war duration.  
 
It can be questioned whether or not it is sensible to separate between different levels of 
obstructability, as both of the coefficients for unobstructable and unlootable resources 
when analysed in model 6 and 7 are positive and quite similar in size. Moreover, most 
of the natural resources belong to the moderately obstructable group, the only 
resources that are highly obstructable or unobstructable are diamonds, oil, gas, and 
precious stones. It is more likely that any differences between these groups are caused 
by the lootability of the resources. This is evident when comparing the unobstructable 
resources in model 3 and model 6. In model 3, the coefficient for unobstructable and 
unlootable is positive and in the same model, the coefficient for unobstructable and 
lootable is negative. Comparing these coefficients with model 6 which analyses only 
unobstructable resources, the coefficient is positive and the effects for all the estimates 
from model 3 and 6 are almost the same. Moreover, results from model 6 and 7 show 
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that both unobstructable and obstructable resources shorten civil war duration, and that 
there are little differences between the effects of these two coefficients. Furthermore, 
none of the estimates in model 6 or 7 are statistically significant, which supports the 
notion that separating natural resources by obstructability provides little substantial 
interpretation of the effect of natural resources on civil war duration.  
 
Profitable resources measured as price to weight ratio have also an effect on civil war 
duration. As with lootable resources, there is indirect support for the hypothesis that 
high price to weight resources prolong civil war duration, as the only significant 
coefficient in model 9 is the coefficient for low price to weight ratio. Again, illicit 
trade of resources by rebels can explain this. Resources like coltan (tantalum) and 
diamonds have a high price to weight ratio, whereas oil and gas have a low price to 
weight ratio. As argued earlier, the export data from the UNCOMTRADE and the 
World Bank may be biased as it mainly contains export revenue data for the 
government and not for the rebels. Nevertheless, since there is indirect support for H4, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the profitability of natural resources matter for the 
nature of civil wars. Natural resources with a high price to weight ratio, although there 
are only indirectly support for this, prolong civil war duration. If rebels control these 
resources, they will in this way be able to finance further operations. Natural resources 
with a low or medium price to weight ratio on the other hand, like oil, are more likely 
to benefit the government and thus shorten civil war duration as these types of 
resources may not be considered to be profitable for rebels. 
 
Fearon (2005) argues that resource dependence does not affect civil war duration as 
argued by Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 2004). He argues that what accounts for a 
relationship between natural resources and civil wars is oil, but this is again related to 
very specific effects of oil on the nature and quality of government institutions (see 
Ross 2001, Tsui 2005 and Wantchekon 2002). In order to see if this argument holds 
true, analysis including only diamonds and oil are conducted. In model 10, the results 
showed that alluvial diamonds have a negative effect on civil war duration. Since none 
of the coefficients was statistically significant, it cannot be concluded that alluvial 
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diamonds prolong civil war duration. When it comes to oil, onshore and offshore oil is 
included, but both types are unlootable. Only onshore oil exports are statistically 
significant. This result is nevertheless in accordance with previous findings: oil does 
not prolong civil war duration. Rather, oil, being an unlootable resource, its extraction 
and production requires knowledge, skills, and large-scale investments, which the 
government are more likely to be able to provide than rebel groups. The revenues from 
exporting oil may give the government capabilities of building up large armies that can 
stop rebel insurgencies at an earlier time in civil war duration than government in 
countries not abundant or not dependent on natural resources. Moreover, governments 
that are dependent on primary exports sales have incentives to ensure that production 
continues, and that new extraction and investment from foreign companies take place. 
If a resource dependent country experiences civil war, then production and 
investments may end, as civil war does not make it lucrative for foreign investment. 
This is another way of not finding support for Collier & Hoeffler’s (1998 and 2004) 
findings. Instead, resource dependence, illustrated with the case of oil, shortens the 
duration of civil war. 
 
Table 10 sums up the main results.   
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Table 10. Hypothesis and Results Summary 
Hypotheses to be tested statistically 
H1: Civil wars in countries dependent on natural resources last longer than countries that are not 
dependent on natural resources, ceteris paribus. 
No, opposite results when using data from the World Bank.  
No significant results when using UNCOMTRADE data. 
H2: Lootable natural resources make civil wars last longer than unlootable natural resources, ceteris 
paribus. 
No direct support, but indirect support. Unlootable resources shorten civil war duration, 
insignificant results for lootable resources. 
H3a: Moderately and highly obstructable natural resources shorten civil war duration, ceteris paribus. 
Yes, in model 3. When only analysing obstructability in model 6 and 7, no difference in the effects 
and no significant results 
H3b: Unobstructable natural resources make civil war last longer than highly obstructable resources, 
ceteris paribus. 
No significant results, cannot be rejected or confirmed, but results indicate prolonged civil war 
duration. 
H4: Civil wars in countries with natural resources with a high price to weight ratio last longer than 
countries with a low price to weight ratio, ceteris paribus. 
No direct support, but indirect support. High price to weight resources prolongs civil war 
duration, low and medium price to weight ratio shorten civil war duration, only significant results 
for low price to weight ratio. 
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6 THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
THE CONGO 
This chapter investigates the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo16
 
 (DRC) in 
order to illustrate how environmental factors may affect the duration civil war, and to 
see if the findings from the statistical analysis can inform us about the case of the 
DRC. The DRC, particularly the Kivu provinces in the east, is abundant with natural 
resources, some of which are crucial for the current electronics industry today. Natural 
resources have been exploited in the DRC ever since colonial time, and in recent years 
illicit trade with several resources during wartime such as cobalt, coffee, diamonds, 
gold, and timber have been initiated. There is one mineral in particular that is said to 
fuel the war, and this chapter focuses on this resource: coltan (Winer & Roule 2003: 
201). 
6.1 The DRC and Civil War 
In the late 19th century, the DRC emerged as a colony, controlled by the Belgian King 
Leopold II. The colony was gravely exploited due to the massive amounts of natural 
resources and potential labour force. Congo gained independence in 1960, and the 
country’s military leader, Mobutu Sese Seko, seized control over the state apparatus 
through a coup d’état shortly after (Hayes & Burge 2003: 25 and Bøås 2009:5). 
Political instability characterized the country throughout the 1990s as civilian refugees 
fled the 1994-genocide in the neighbouring country of Rwanda to the DRC. In addition 
to civilian refugees, Rwandan Hutu militia, and rebels from Burundi and Uganda 
crossed the Congolese border (Hayes & Burge 2003: 25 and Bøås 2009:5). These 
groups were allowed to continue their political and military organizations in the 
refugee camps, which resulted in the formation of the FDLR17
 
. 
                                                 
16 The name Congo and the DRC is used interchangeably throughout this chapter for simplicity and 
convenience. The name refers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly known as Zaïre. 
17 Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda. 
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In 1997, a rebel movement called ADFLC18
 
, profoundly supported by Rwandan and 
Ugandan armies, surfaced from Eastern Congo and overthrew Mubutu. The rebel 
leader, Laurent Desire Kabila, did not meet any particular resistance. Nevertheless, a 
year later conflict broke out again in the east of Congo, worsening the environmental 
circumstances and creating a large-scale humanitarian disaster (Hayes & Burge 2003: 
25 and Bøås 2009:5). Rebellions took place in the provincial capital of Goma, North 
Kivu, and Kabila went to measures to pre-empt a coup. The conflict escalated as the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), a Rwandan and Ugandan-
backed rebel group fought to replace Kabila as president of the country (Jackson 
2003:22). Trying to save the Kabila government from collapsing, Angola and 
Zimbabwe entered the conflict, later to be joined by Namibia, Chad, and Sudan which 
later became known as the Great African War, starting in 1998 (Olsson & Fors 
2004:325). 
A cease-fire agreement was signed in 1999 in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, which 
established the largest peacekeeping operation in the world (the United Nation’s 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC) and the involving countries 
accordingly deployed their armed troops from the DRC (International Crisis Group 
2003, Bøås 2009:5 and Hayes & Burge 2003:26-27). In 2001, Kabila was assassinated 
which created an opportunity for peace as his son, Joseph Kabila, replaced his father. 
Despite these encouraging signs, fighting stilled continued in the Kivu provinces, 
especially in North Kivu. This was most likely the result of the political vacuum that 
arose as Rwanda and Uganda withdrew their armies, leaving rebels to hold power in 
towns, airstrips, and important mines (Hayes & Burge 2003: 27-28). The fighting 
escalated in 2008, characterized by attempts of coups and sporadic violence. Militias 
clashed with government forces, and although the rebel General Laurent Nkunda 
signed a peace deal, clashes still broke out again. In January 2009, the government 
appealed to Rwandan troops to remove the rebel Rwandan Hutu militias, FDLR, in the 
Kivu provinces, including General Nkunda. Despite this success, the situation for the 
                                                 
18 Alliances de Forces pour la Libération de Congo/Zaïre. 
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civilian population in the Kivu provinces has not improved much. There are still armed 
rebels in the area and violence, especially raping of women, continues (BBC News 
2009). 
 
6.2 The Kivus 
The Kivus is mainly referred to as the Congolese provinces of North Kivu, South 
Kivu, and Maniema, which is located in the eastern part of the DRC as figure 3 
illustrates (International Crisis Group 2003). Internal fighting has mainly been 
concentrated here, and this area will subsequently be the focus of analysis in the 
following chapter. As the map illustrates, natural resources are abundant in the Kivus, 
and the provinces have additionally fertile lands and mountains (Bøås 2009: 7). 
 
Figure 3. Map of the DRC and the Kivus 
 
Source: http://journal.heinz.cmu.edu/media/img/figures/congofigure.jpg 
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While the rest of the country mainly speak Lingala, the people in the Kivus are Swahili 
speakers, and belong culturally to East Africa. Immigrants have influenced the region 
substantially, and in the backdrop of foreign dominations, the Kivus’ identities have 
been formed (International Crisis Group 2003: 1-3). In addition to the indigenous 
minority of the Kivus, there exists a large group of immigrants of Hutu and Tutsi 
origin from Rwanda, called the Bayarwanda, who started to arrive in eastern Congo 
from the 18th century until the present (ibid: 4). Moreover, immigrants from the other 
neighbouring countries are also present in the Kivus. The Bayarwandas speak 
Kinyarwanda, adding another language to the linguistic mix (ibid). Although quite 
different in ethnic and linguistic terms, these people have in common a contested 
citizenship status with questions regarding the right to land, to vote, and to run for 
election. (Bøås 2009: 7). In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, these 
questions have become more disputed as access to land has decreased, a consequence 
of the settling of Rwandan refugees in the Kivus (ibid). According to the International 
Crisis Group (2003), the Kivus never fell under the complete control by the Rwandan 
army who only controlled strategic positions such as the mines, airstrips, and towns 
(International Crisis Group 2003). Nevertheless, this strategic control came to be a 
major component in the civil war in Congo as the sales of natural resources, like 
coltan, became a means of revenue income for the involving partners.  
 
6.3 Tantalum and Coltan  
Tantalum is a mineral that is extracted from the tantalite ore, which also contains iron, 
manganese, and niobium. The mineral can resist corrosion and can be objected to 
extremely high temperatures, which makes tantalum a highly lucrative mineral. 
Tantalum is increasingly used in the telecommunications and the electronics industry, 
particularly in the production of cell phones, computers, DVD-players, but also 
surgical equipment (Emsley 2001: 418-421, Hayes & Burge 2003: 11+20+33, and 
Winer & Roule 2003: 200). The main tantalum producing country is Australia, 
accounting for about 41% of the world’s production. Countries like Congo, Nigeria 
and Burundi that reportedly are producing lower amounts, may however possess large 
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deposits that have not completely been accounted for, or are experiencing internal 
conflict, suspending most of the commercial activities (Hayes & Burge 2003:16-17). It 
is also reasonable to assume that although commercial activities are suspended during 
time of war, illegal trade of the resource executed by the Congolese rebels have taken 
place, accounting for the low official figures.  
 
Coltan is not a crude mineral, but a type of tantalum ore. More precisely, it is the result 
of a combination of tantalum and columbium, or niobium (Jackson 2003). Its name is 
derived from the abbreviation of the name these two resources put together 
(columbium + tantalum = coltan). In Congo, coltan appears in streambeds, alluvial 
deposits, and soft rock, and the mineral is easy to extract without the use of skilled 
workers (Bøås 2009:28). Tantalum, however, is not easily refined. Extracting tantalum 
from the ore is by Lide (2003) described as a complicated and difficult process, and 
are in the dataset coded as unlootable and moderately obstructable since this resource 
is according to the SITC grouped together with similar ores like niobium, titanium and 
molybdenum (see table 5). Coltan mining in the DRC can easily be done by hand and 
does not require knowledge and skilled men. Therefore, the mineral is classified as 
lootable and moderately obstructable in the discussion of this mineral in the DRC.  
 
According to Jackson (2003), rebel groups have looted significant amount of tantalum 
ore. In 1998, the RCD seized control over the east of Congo and as a result gained 
control over large stockpiles of minerals that where already mined. 42.5 million USD 
are estimated losses of the Congolese state department, Société minieré et industrielle 
du Kivu, in South Kivu (Jackson 2003:27). Looting already mined tantalum ore is thus 
highly lucrative for rebels, and the mere threat of the use of violence from the RDC is 
sufficient enough to empty mining areas for looting (Jackson 2003:28). Additionally, 
the mineral is unobstructable since anyone can pocket the mineral and smuggle it 
across the national border without being noticed. For this reason, it is almost 
impossible for a central government to hinder illicit trade in countries such as Congo.  
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6.4 Coltan Mining and Exports in the DRC 
In the east of Congo, especially around the Kivus, coltan is extensively distributed. 
Until the 1990s, tantalum had not been exploited in these provinces, but from 1996 
exploitation was initiated and thereafter accelerated (Jackson 2003:25). As mentioned 
previously, coltan is mined by hand, and a team of a few men can produce about two 
kilos of ore a day. The mining process is described in Jackson (2003:26): 
 
“after digging a few metres, one person bails water from the hole, one person digs up from the  
hole onto a pile of the sluice, […] one person refills the sluice periodically with materials from  
the pile, and one sluices, continuously turning and scraping the materials with a spade. The dirt  
runs away in the water; turning it brings the bigger stones to the top to be skimmed.”  
 
The mines are mainly dug by labourers and controlled by the military, the RDC or 
Rwandan officials (Jackson 2003: 27) and have evolved during the time of production. 
What was previously artisanal exploitation where digging took place close to the 
surface has now become formal 
exploitations with mines that go as 
deep as ten metres (Winer & Roule 
2003: 200). Additionally, the 
mines are in dire conditions, and 
several collapses have taken place, 
killing many of the miners (Bøås 
2009: 27). According to the UN 
Panel of Experts, which was 
established as a result of the cease- 
            Boys mining coltan in the DRC19
control the exploitation of the natural resources present in the DRC in areas controlled 
by the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda (United Nations 2002). Common for these 
networks is that they consist of a small core of political and military elites, and of rebel 
.         fire in 1999, elite networks 
                                                 
19 Source: http://kimpavitapress.org/2009/04/11/from-rebel-held-congo-to-beer-can/comment-page-1/ 
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leaders in the occupied areas. These networks cooperate to ensure revenues by 
monopolizing production, commerce, and fiscal functions. Revenues also come from 
theft, smuggling, illicit trade, and taxes through the production and exploitation of 
natural resources. Using these strategies, rebels and the elite networks generate 
revenues  (United Nations 2002). It also occurs that in return for a percentage of the 
ore, the military offers protection of the mines (Jackson 2003: 27).  
 
Coltan has a long and complex extraction chain, shown in figure 4. This makes it hard 
to execute a chain of custody certification, and pressure from the consumers will 
according to Crosser, Hayman & Taylor (2003), most likely be an ineffective driving 
force of change (Crosser, Hayman & Taylor 2003: 134). The ones that profit from this 
extraction chain are especially the Rwandan army, known as the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army (RPA) (Winer & Roule 2003: 201- 202 and United Nations 2002). As much as 
60-70% of the coltan exports have been mined under RPA control, which have used 
military aircraft to export much of the coltan from their controlled airstrips. Rwandans 
and the Congolese control the rest of the mining sites, and struggle to compete with the 
RPA on exporting coltan (Winer & Roule 2003 and United Nations 2002). 
International trading companies buy coltan from Congo, and despite their claims of 
only trading with small scale local suppliers and not with rebel leaders, the UN Panel 
states that: “no coltan exist from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 
without benefiting either the rebel group or foreign armies” (United Nations 2002:16). 
Furthermore, the Panel have set out recommendations of placing financial restriction 
on several Congolese and foreign firms in addition to travel bans for named persons 
(United Nations 2002). 
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Figure 4. Coltan Extraction Chain from Eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
 
 
Source: Crossin, Hayman & Taylor 2003: 135 in Bannon & Collier (eds) 2003. 
 
According to Congolese laws, extraction of coltan and other minerals requires 
licenses. However, these rules come to short as most government regulations do during 
time of war (Hayes & Burge 2003: 33). Since licenses for mineral extraction are both 
difficult to obtain and costly (sums as high as 40 000 USD per year are reported), 
coltan is regularly smuggled across the DRC borders into Rwanda by road or even air. 
Coltan vendors are also subjected to taxes, bribes, and the risk of getting caught in 
which their ores are consequently confiscated (Hayes & Burge 2003:33). The RDC 
rebels and the Rwandan army benefit from administrating these licensing fees. Jackson 
has estimated a surplus of 17 million USD in the late 2000. This is based on 100 
metric tonnes of coltan that have been exported during a period of 18 months at a 
80 
 
world price of 200 USD per kilo, with an average of 300 USD per kilo being paid to 
intermediaries (Jackson 2003: 29). 
 
In the end of the 1990s, the world demand for tantalum increased drastically as the 
technology sector tried to meet the consumer demands. This is illustrated in figure 5, 
which shows that the tantalum demand more than doubled in the period from 1993 to 
2000. 
 
Figure 5. Tantalum Concentrate Demand, 1993-2000 
      Source: Jackson 2003:2520
 
 
                                                 
20 In Jackson’s article, this table is taken from the Australian mining company, “Sons of Gwalia.” Their 
web site, which Jackson refers to, is at the time of writing no longer functioning. Instead, Jackson 
(2003) is listed as the source of reference. The web site he refers to is: 
http://www.sog.com.au/web/tantover.htm. 
81 
 
The world shortage of tantalum lead to a ten-fold increase in the spot price of the 
resource and this increase also coincided with the Great African War (from 1998) 
(Bøås 2009). In 2000, the price of tantalum experienced a boom, and the world market 
price went up from about 50 USD per pound to over 200 USD per pound (Bøås 
2009:27), shown in figure 6. Although risky, coltan mining became highly profitable, 
particularly for the rebels controlling the mines. This boom, or “coltan fever” as the 
locals named it, did have implications for life in the Kivus (Jackson 2003).  
 
Figure 6. Tantalum and World Price Movements, 1996-2001 
 
Source: Jackson 2003: 25 
 
As a result of the war and the boom in coltan, many people ceased to farm and started 
mining coltan instead, causing food shortages to erupt (Bøås 2009:27). In the 1990s, 
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farming on cattle ranches dominated the landscape. At the time when coltan became 
profitable, that is between 1993 and the Great African War in 1998, these ranches were 
destroyed in order to open the land for exploitation of coltan. Coltan mining 
consequently became a more attractive pursuit of living (Jackson 2003:26). To 
illustrate, price on staple food increased by 9000 percent in the period of 1999-2001. 
(Bøås 2009: 27). A local NGO director which Jackson (2003) interviewed in 2001 
stated that: “we have already seen the beginning of a bad impact of coltan on 
agricultural production […] almost all of the young, from the age of ten up, are 
involved in this, and they would normally be the labour force for agricultural 
production” (Jackson 2003: 33). Even though agricultural production has not 
completely ceased to exist, in combination with insecurity of war, young people 
leaving the farm life for coltan mining have caused a drop in the agricultural 
production (Jackson 2003: 33). 
 
Coltan mining has thus become a means of obtaining food and other supplies from the 
occupying military forces (Winer & Roule 2003: 201). Tantalum exports from the 
DRC is shown in figure 7. Although this figure contains the export values for 
molybdenum, titanium, niobium, tantalum, and vanadium, and does not contain data 
after 1980, it still indicates the general trend of tantalum, or coltan, exports from 
Congo. 
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Figure 7. Exports of Tantalum, (including similar ores and concentrates) in the 
DRC, 1960-2001
 
Source: UNCOMTRADE 2009c, graph generated in Stata from the applied dataset in this thesis. 
 
Winer & Roule (2003: 200) argue that there are no official figures of the revenues of 
illicit coltan trade during the periods of civil war. An estimate indicates nevertheless 
that the Rwandan army earned about 20 million USD in just one month during the 
boom in 2000 (Winer & Roule 2003:200). Illegal trade of coltan may account for the 
missing data in figure 7. Even though the UNCOMTRADE does not report of any 
export of this resource group from the DRC after 1978, reports from the UN Panel of 
Experts (United Nations 2002) still indicate that coltan was to a large extent exported 
out of the country, but illegally as described by figure 4. There is little doubt that this 
illegal trade have benefitted the rebels controlling the coltan mines. 
 
In 2001, the UN condemned illicit trade in Congo, and the same year the monopoly of 
coltan mining was lifted (Hayes & Burge 2003). The reason for this was according to 
the former RCD leader, Dr Adolphe Onusumba, that smuggling was increasing, and 
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reduced revenues was making it hard to maintain modest health services they strived 
to provide (Hayes & Burge 2003). The price of tantalum also dropped in 2001 (see 
figure 6), and the quantities being exported out of the DRC dropped as a result of this 
(Hayes & Burge 2003). Rebels, occupying forces, and armed militias all experienced 
as sharp reduction of income, and consequently started to demand higher taxes and 
imposing higher customs tariffs from coltan vendors as a desperate way of gaining 
finances for future operations (Hayes & Burge 2003:34). Hayes & Burge (2003) claim 
that the reduction in illicit trade, rather than the UN condemnation was “[…] 
attributable to manufacturers working off their expensive inventories […]” (Hayes & 
Burge 200:3 34).  
 
With the fall of tantalum (or coltan) prices, the capacitor manufacturers have 
progressively been using more contracts that are fixed with large suppliers (Crosser, 
Hayman & Taylor 2003: 134). This has had consequences for the young people that 
left farming in order to make easy dollars mining coltan.  Some went back to their 
farms, others have tried to combine mining with farming and accepting the new coltan 
price (Jackson 2003: 34). Regardless, other minerals have ensured revenues for armed 
rebels. The price of tin, or cassiterite (the name of the tin ore), increased during the 
2000s, and experienced in 2004 a boom like coltan (Bøås 2009). Tungsten has also 
experienced a similar boom, and became in 2006 the new growth sector of mining in 
North Kivu (Bøås 2009:27 and Tegera & Johnson 2007: 40-41). Even though the UN 
condemned illegal mining in 2001, the price of coltan has decreased, and the media 
continues to spread negative publicity, coltan is still mined for the world market. This 
is allegedly due to the availability of cheap labour force and low extraction costs 
(Hayes & Burge 2003:34).  
 
6.5 Natural Resources and the Duration of Civil War in the DRC 
In addition to coltan, other lootable resources like cobalt, tin, coffee, diamonds, gold 
and timber are illicitly traded in Congo. The sales of these resources have contributed 
to the Great African War (Winer & Roule 2003 and Bøås 2009). According to Winer 
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& Roule (2003), 4 million people died in three years during internal fighting (Winer & 
Roule 2003:201). The DRC’s central government has managed to control the northern 
and central parts of the DRC, whereas eastern Congo, where the coltan mines are 
concentrated, is still under rebel control (Bøås 2009: 27).  
 
Can the long-lasting civil war in Congo be explained by resource dependence?  
Results from the analysis in chapter 5, using both data from the UNCOMTRADE and 
the World Bank, implies that resource dependence have a positive effect on the 
duration of civil wars. This means that resource dependent countries do not experience 
longer civil wars; in fact being dependent on the revenues from primary commodity 
export shortens civil war duration. This does not support the findings from Collier & 
Hoeffler (1998, 2004) and the hypothesis described in chapter 2 and 3, and cannot 
account for the long time period of internal conflict in Congo. Moreover, this is more 
in line with previous findings from researchers like DeSouen & Soebek (2004) and 
Humphreys (2005). Both studies argue that resource dependence does not prolong civil 
war duration, rather. Instead, in countries dependent on natural resources (measured as 
primary commodity export ratio to GDP), there is increased likelihood that civil wars 
will be over shortly after breaking out, ending in a military victory for one of the 
conflicting parts. DeRouen & Soebek (2004) conclude that the government will most 
likely be the victor, whereas Humphreys (2005) does not conclude which part this may 
be. Both studies, however, come to the conclusion that military victory is most likely 
the outcome instead of a cease-fire agreement.  
 
The empirical results from the DRC do not however support this. Although the 
statistical results indicate a short duration for civil wars when countries are dependent 
on natural resources, civil war in Congo has taken place in the last four decades. 
Cease-fires have been signed, but still, violence takes place. This implies that resource 
dependence cannot explain the long-lasting war in Congo. However, the effects from 
the statistical analysis are relatively weak, and it can be argued that resource 
dependence does not have an effect on increasing or decreasing resource dependence. 
If more precise data are collected and analysed, a statistical analysis may reveal more 
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robust coefficients, leading to different results, thus perhaps proving this conclusion to 
be wrong. 
 
According to the collected data, the export value of primary commodities exceeds the 
GDP in Congo. This implies that the country is highly dependent on natural resources. 
However, since illicit trade of coltan and other minerals has taken place, these figures 
are questionable. When examining data more thoroughly, both data obtained from the 
World Bank and the UNCOMTRADE have problems of missing data. This indicates 
that either the DRC did not export the certain types of primary commodities for the 
specific years that are reported as missing, or that both institutions have not been able 
to gather data. Several implications follow from the lack of data. First of all, it may be 
that exports did not at all take place during the conflict years since trade was 
practically impossible.  
 
Another possibility is that trade still took place in these conflict years, but illegally. As 
explained previously, during the war illegal trade became increasingly a source of 
revenue for belligerent groups, thus enabling them to execute violence. The sales of 
coltan and other resources have been the main source of revenue for rebel groups, 
enabling them to fund insurgencies through commercial operations of these minerals 
(Winer & Roule 2003:201). According to Dr Adolphe Onusumba, the previous RCD-
Goma leader, in 2000 his rebel government raised 200 000 USD per month from the 
sales of diamonds compared to 1 million USD per month from the trades of coltan 
(Hayes & Burge 2003:34). When comparing the sums from the sales of natural 
resources, the profitability of natural resources becomes more apparent. High-value 
resources such as diamonds and coltan in the DRC are both lootable, enabling rebels to 
extract these resources easily themselves and trade them illegally, avoiding all 
government taxes, and pocketing the money directly. In spite of efforts from the 
Kabila government to seize control over Eastern Congo and the mines, armed groups 
are still in control. The mines where resources are exploited are thus a great source of 
income to maintain continuous warfare (Bøås 2009:27). Although resource 
dependence has a relatively weak and positive effect on civil war duration, illegal trade 
87 
 
of coltan may still indicate resource dependence. However, since coltan is a lootable 
resource, it might be that this quality of the resource accounts for the long-lasting war, 
not the dependence as measured as primary export ratio to GDP. 
 
As the results from the statistical analysis estimates, lootable natural resources have a 
negative effect on civil war duration, and unlootable resources have a positive effect.  
This indicates that countries exporting unlootable resources will experience shorter 
duration than with lootable resources, which prolongs civil war duration. These 
findings are in line with the results from the scholarly research. According to Lujala’s 
findings (forthcoming), lootable resources doubles the duration of civil wars, and civil 
wars are additionally more durable in conflicts with gemstone production (Buhaug, 
Gates & Lujala 2009). Moreover, unlootable resources is claimed by Ross (2002) to 
most likely benefit the government, implying that resources like onshore oil will be a 
source of income for the government to clamp down on rebel insurgencies. However, 
the statistical findings are mostly statistically insignificant except for unlootable 
resources that are moderately or highly obstructable. Nevertheless, natural resources 
that are both unlootable and moderately obstructable have strong, positive effect on 
civil war duration, indicating that these types of natural resources do not contribute to 
longer-lasting civil wars. Tantalum, the ore from which coltan is extracted is classified 
as unlootable and moderately obstructable, whereas coltan as it appears in the DRC is 
classified (but only in the DRC) as lootable and moderately obstructable. The 
coefficient for moderately obstructable and lootable resources is according to the 
results from the analysis negative, implying that with this type of natural resources, 
civil wars last longer. This implies that coltan nevertheless may fuel civil war duration 
since this resource, as it appears mostly in the DRC, is a lootable resource.  
 
Lootable natural resources on the other hand have a negative effect on civil war 
duration. This implies that lootable resources prolong civil war duration. In this case, 
the results are not statistically significant and thus cannot be used to support the claim 
that lootable resources fuel the civil war in Congo. Even though coltan does not fit into 
this group, the DRC are abundant with unobstructable and lootable resources like 
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alluvial diamonds. In chapter 5, alluvial diamonds were also analysed. The results 
indicate that alluvial diamonds prolong the duration of civil wars, but the results are 
not statistically significance. However, since figures on tantalum exports are 
questionable because of documented illicit trade, lootable and moderately obstructable 
resources may still prolong civil wars, although this cannot be confirmed using 
statistical methods. Even if there is no statistical significance in support of lootable 
resources prolonging civil war, there is evidence that unlootable resources shorten civil 
wars duration. This implies that there is indirectly support for H2, thus supporting the 
notion that lootable resources like coltan indeed have fuelled the civil war in the DRC. 
Thus, it can be argued that lootable resources have fuelled the civil war in Congo. 
Despite the fact that there is missing data for Congo, this can be explained by illegal 
trade and smuggling of resources by rebels, who in this way have a means of finance 
further operations.  
 
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) state that rebellions occur when it is profitable for rebels, 
meaning that the revenues from primary commodities are high and the costs are low.  
It is easy to see that rebels are motivated by the high price of coltan and other natural 
resources caused by world demands. These economic incentives do not only prolong 
internal conflict. Additionally, settling for peace will be hindered as rebels will fear the 
loss of control of resources and will thus try to spoil peacemaking efforts (United 
Nations Environment Programme 2009). This implies that the conflict is mainly over 
the control of resources, even resources that may not yet been extracted yet (Le Billon 
2008). Controlling the coltan mines is very important for the rebels in order to secure 
incomes to finance not only armed violence, but also to benefit personally from the 
sales of the resources, selling the primary commodities illegally and pocketing most of 
the profit for own personal use. The price to weight ratio of natural resources can be 
used as a measure of profitability natural resources, which both rebel groups and 
government seek. The results from the analysis indicate indirectly that resources with a 
high price to weight ratio prolong civil war duration compared with resources with a 
low price to weight ratio. Coltan, and other lootable resources, for instance alluvial 
89 
 
diamonds, have a high price to weight ratio, and the occurrence of these resources can 
explain the duration of civil war in Congo.  
 
Since duration of civil war cannot be explained by resource dependence, other 
elements may explain the long-lasting civil war. The conflict may be result of long 
international borders, as the DRC borders to nine countries (Hayes & Burge 2003:25), 
and the Kivu provinces borders to Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda (see  
figure 3). Buhaug & Gates (2002) conclude that conflicts situated close to a border is 
correlated with the scope and duration of civil war and that long-lasting conflicts 
involves vast geographic areas, and the DRC falls into this conclusion. Moreover, 
Buhaug & Gates (2002) find that civil wars are affected by rebel motivations to 
succeed and if the rebel group has an ethnic or religious identity (ibid). Ethnicity is 
highly relevant when discussing factors that trigger civil war in the DRC. As described 
earlier, the Kivu provinces where the conflict have mainly taken place are populated 
with several ethnic groups, some of which have also formed rebel groups. In the DRC, 
the heterogenic Congolese population consist of 49 to 59 million people, divided into 
more than 100 ethnic groups (Hayes & Burge 2003: 25). Ethnicity and civil wars are 
correlated, especially when there is a dispute between an ethnic minority and majority 
as studies from Fearon (2004) have shown.  
 
In the case of the DRC, there is no easy explanation. The DRC was a lucrative colony 
for Belgium as the country was abundant with cheap labour force and natural 
resources. After exploiting the country for several decades, Mobutu came into power, 
only to exploit the natural resources himself in the 1970s (Olsson & Fors 2004: 323). 
In spite of being rich with natural resources, the country experienced during this time 
low growth rates and the external debt increased. Even though a cease-fire was signed 
in 1999, the fighting stilled continued in the Kivu provinces, especially in the North in 
the end of the 1990’s and the beginning of the 2000’s. As mentioned earlier, the Kivus 
are where the coltan mines are located, and this is the area the central government no 
longer has control. The reason why this area has become the cradle of violence can be 
questioned. The location of minerals in North Kivu makes the province of strategic 
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importance, as rebels easily can use the mines as a means of finance. By possessing 
such a profitable source of revenue, continuing fighting will be of no particular 
difficulty for the rebels.  
 
Overall, the Congolese civil war is complicated and cannot be explained by possession 
of natural resources alone. As Morten Bøås (2009:2) puts it: “there is no doubt that the 
conflict is fuelled and sustained by the extraction of minerals, but coltan […] did not 
start the war in the first place. The conflict is deeply entrenched in history and rooted 
in a combination of land rights issues combined with uncertainties about citizenship.” 
However, researchers should not overlook the effect natural resources have on the 
dynamics of war, even though the results from the statistical analysis indicate that 
conflicts in resource dependent countries do not last longer. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
Why should scholars consider the resource dimensions of civil war? Environmental 
factors are seldom the only cause that prolongs civil war. Other factors such as the 
level of development and ethno-linguistic fractionalization are additionally drivers of 
civil war. Nevertheless, the existence of natural resources that are easily extracted and 
gained control over can contribute to undermining peace settlements, as rebels will 
benefit from fighting. This gives rebels an incentive to keep fighting since this is more 
profitable than signing a cease-fire, which involves giving up contested land and 
control over natural resources. 
 
This thesis have provided a new empirical approach to studying the effect of natural 
resources on the duration of civil wars by combining previous approaches. Instead of 
only concentrating on resource dependency of the total primary export, this thesis has 
included a classification of natural resources into lootability and obstructability of each 
and one of 55 natural resources. In this way, the effect of not only primary 
commodities are measured, but the difference between lootability and obstructability 
natural resources are measured, not only as having a effect, but also as resource 
dependence.  
 
Results from the analysis indicate several implications. First of all, the results go 
seemingly in the opposite direction of the hypothesized findings and theories. The 
coefficients indicate that resource dependence has a positive effect on civil war 
duration, the data coming from World Bank or UNCOMTRADE being of no 
difference. This is in line with the results from DeRouen and Sobek (2004). They find 
that natural resource availability for rebels, measured with the same proxy as I have, 
the primary commodity export ratio to GDP does little do benefit the rebels. Instead, 
exports will mostly benefit the government and end in a government truce, victory or 
treaty. 
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Furthermore, this thesis has also scrutinized a categorization of resources by lootability 
and obstructability. Results from the analysis indicate that there is indirect support for 
the hypothesis that lootable resources prolong civil war duration. This is because there 
is only statistically significant support for unlootable natural resources to shorten civil 
war duration. There may be several reasons for this. The most likely explanation is that 
the data on primary exports apply to the government revenues, not rebel revenues 
since rebel income are most likely a result of smuggling and illicit trade, which are 
consequently not reported to the central government. The obstructability approach on 
the other hand proved not to be statistically significant. Moreover, the results indicate 
that both obstructable and unobstructable natural resources both shorten civil war 
duration, and that there is little difference between the effects of the different levels of 
obstructability. Differentiating between obstructability of natural resources is in this 
way a less suitable approach in order to conclude more substantial how natural 
resources prolong civil war duration.  
 
Additionally, low-price-to-weight resources shorten civil war duration, and there is 
thus indirect support that high-price-to-weight resources prolong civil war duration. 
This is most likely because high-price-to-weight resources, like diamonds and coltan, 
are considered to be highly profitable for rebels who will therefore strive to gain and 
remain in control of these types of resources. In turn, this will prolong civil war 
duration. To conclude, resource dependence does not lead to longer lasting civil wars 
and coding natural resources by lootability can be said to give a better empirical 
picture of civil war duration. However, classifying natural resources into different 
levels of obstructability is not found to give a better empirical picture of the effects of 
natural resources on civil war duration. 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a country that has experienced several long-
lasting civil wars. Natural resources have played an important role as demonstrated in 
chapter 6. This illustrated the methods of which rebels can gain revenues from the 
sales of lootable resources like coltan. Coltan and alluvial diamonds are lootable, and 
alluvial diamonds in particular are unobstructable. This implies that not only can 
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rebels extract the resource themselves easily, it is also possible to smuggle the resource 
without obstruction. This has enabled the rebels of the DRC to finance their 
insurgency and continuous warfare. Although there are many other factors that play an 
important role when it comes to the civil war in Congo, the role of natural resources 
should not be ignored as it clearly fuels the fighting. 
 
According to the data, 207 of the 236 civil wars ended during the period of 1946-2004. 
This means that after the end of 2004, 29 conflicts had not ceased. Since 2004, several 
conflicts have awakened anew, and the DRC conflict intensified during 2008. This put 
the DRC and the role of natural resources on the global agenda, but the internal 
violence still continues. If civil wars are to end, and natural resources contribute to the 
onset and duration of civil wars, policy makers should focus more on the role of 
natural resources and implement this element in the peace- making process. Instead of 
natural resources being a curse for countries like the DRC, resources should be used as 
a way of increasing the GDP and end inequality. In this way, the state apparatus can 
function better and the country can more easily solve problems that may cause civil 
war outbreak. The results from this thesis are ambivalent. Resource dependence cannot 
explain long duration time of civil wars, and insignificant coefficients make it difficult 
to infer directly that lootability and obstructability of natural resource matter. 
However, the general trend indicates that if more precise data is obtained, this may be 
proven statistically. Finally, researchers and policymakers should be aware that natural 
resources, in addition to other underlying factors, makes it difficult to settle for peace 
permanently.  
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Natural Resource SITC Code Rev. 1 Lootable Obstructable Sources Excluded Resources Why
Aluminium ores and concentrates 283.3 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Answers.com 2009 Antimony Not found in SITC Rev 1
Arsenic 512.82 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Emsley 2001 Arable land Not exportable
Asbestos 276.4 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Answers.com 2009 Asphalt By-product
Calcium 514.94 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Emsley 2001 Chicle Coincide with rubber
Chalk 276.91 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Answers.com 2009 Coastal Climate Not exportable
Chromium ores and concentrates 283.91 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Emsley 2001 Diatomite Not found in SITC 
Clay 276.21 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, US Geology Survey 2009 Emeralds Coincides with Preacious Stones
Coal, wether or not pulverized, but not agglomerated 321. Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, World Coal Institute 2009 Forest Not exportable
Cobalt 513.54 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Davis 2000 Gemstones Coincides with Preacious Stones
Cocoa 072.1 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, FAO 2009 Hydropower Not exportable
Coffee, wether or not roasted 071. Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, FAO 2009 Kaolin Coincide with clay
Copper ores and concentrates 283.11 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Answers.com 2009 Lignite No data availble in UNCOMTRADE
Crude rubber 231.1 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, IRRDB 2009 Methane Could not find a match in UNCOMTRADE
Diamonds, industrial 275.1 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Britannica 2009 Natron Could not find a match in UNCOMTRADE
Diamonds, other than industrial (deep shaft) 667.22 No Unobstructable Wikipedia 2009, Gilmore, Gleditsch, Lujala & Rød 2005 Nitrates Could not find a match in UNCOMTRADE
Diamonds, other than industrials (alluvial) 667.21 Yes Unobstructable Wikipedia 2009, Gilmore, Gleditsch, Lujala & Rød 2005 Pyrites Could not find a match in UNCOMTRADE
Feldspar 276.54 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Answers.com 2009, IMA-NA 2009 Scenic beauty Not exportable
Fish 031. Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, FAO 2009 Shrimp Not found in SITC Rev 1
Flourspar 276.54 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, MII 2009 Silica Sand Coincides with Sand, Stone and Gravel
Granite 273.13 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Answers 2009 Soda Ash Could not find a match in UNCOMTRADE
Graphite 276.22 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Minerals Zone 2009 Timber Could not find a match in UNCOMTRADE
Gypsum 273.21 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Mindat.org 2009 Wildlife Could not find a match in UNCOMTRADE
Iron ore and concentrates, not agglomerated 281.3 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, MII 2009 Zircon Could not find a match in UNCOMTRADE
Lead ores and concentrates 283.4 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009 US Geology Survey 2009 
Limestone flux 273.22 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, US Geology Survey 2009
Magnesite 276.24 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Webmineral 2009
Manganese ores and concentrates 283.7 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Emsley 2001
Marble 273.12 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, US Geology Survey 2009 
Mercury 512.83 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Emsley 2001
Mica 276.52 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Answers.com 2009
Molybdenum ores and concentrates 283.93 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Lide 2003
Natural barium sulphates (barytes) 276.93 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Britannica 2009
Natural gas in the gaseous state, offshore 341.12 No Unobstructable Wikipedia 2009, Lujala, Rød & Thieme 2007
Natural gas in the gaseous state, onshore 341.11 No Highly Wikipedia 2009, Lujala, Rød & Thieme 2007
Nickel ores and concentrates 283.21 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Answers,com 2009
Niobium, tantalum and vanadium ores and concentrates 283.93 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Lide 2009
Palm Oil 422.2 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Palm Oil World 2009
Peat 321.7 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, US Geology Survey 2009
Petroleum oils, offshore 331.2 No Unobstructable Wikipedia 2009, Lujala, Rød & Thieme 2007
Petroleum oils, onshore 331.1 No Highly Wikipedia 2009, Lujala, Rød & Thieme 2007
Phosphates, phosphinates 514.26 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Mining Technology 2009
Platinum 681.21 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Emsley 2001
Potassium hydroxide (potash) 513.63 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, US Geology Survey 2009 
Precious and semiprecious stones, alluvial 667.31 Yes Unobstructable Wikipedia 2009,  Gilmore, Gleditsch, Lujala & Rød 2005
Precious and semiprecious stones, deep shaft 667.32 No Unobstructable Wikipedia 2009,  Gilmore, Gleditsch, Lujala & Rød 2005
Pumice 275.23 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Britannica 2009
Quartz 276.51 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Answers.com 2009
Rice 042. Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, FAO 2009
Salt (Sodium chloride) 276.3 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Britannica 2009
Silver ores and concentrates 285. No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Emsley 2001
Slate 273.11 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Minerals Zone 2009
Stone,Sand & Gravel 273. Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Department of Geology 2009
Sulphur 512.81 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, US Geology Survey 2009 
Talc 276.95 Yes Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Britannica 2009
Tin ores and concentrates 283.6 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, MII 2009
Titanium ores and concentrates 283.93 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Lide 2003
Tungsten (or wolfram) ores and concentrates 283.92 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Lide 2003
Uranium ores and concentrates 286. No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Emsley 2001
Zinc ores and concentrates 283.5 No Moderately Wikipedia 2009, Emsley 2001
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Country Type Source Country Type of resource Sources
Afghanistan Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Afghanistan Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Algeria Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Algeria Alluvial diamonds and Precious stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Angola Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Angola Alluvial diamonds and Precious stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Argentina Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Argentina Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Azerbaijan Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Bangladesh Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Bangladesh Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Bolivia Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Bolivia Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Burundi Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Bosnina-Herzegovina Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Cameroon Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Burkina Faso Gas UNCOMTRADE 2009c Central African Republic Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Burma Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Chad Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Burundi Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Chile Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Cambodia Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c China Deep shaft diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Cameroon Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Colombia Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Central African Republic Gas UNCOMTRADE 2009c Congo Alluvial diamonds Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Chad Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Costa Rica Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Chile Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Croatia Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
China Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Democratic Republic of the Congo Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Colombia Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Djibouti Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Congo Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Dominican Republic Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Costa Rica Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Egypt Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Croatia Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c El Salvador Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Cuba Onshore oil Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Ethiopia Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Djibouti Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c France Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Dominican Republic Gas UNCOMTRADE 2009c Gabon Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
DRC Onshore oil Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Gambia Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Egypt Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Georgia Precious stones (exports from 2008, year not included in dataset) UNCOMTRADE 2009c
El Salvador Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Ghana Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Eritrea Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Greece Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Ethiopia Onshore gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Guatemala Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
France Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Guinea Alluvial diamonds Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Gabon Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Haiti Diamonds UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Gambia Gas UNCOMTRADE 2009c India Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Georgia Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Indonesia Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Ghana Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Iran Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Greece Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Israel Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Guatemala Onshore oil Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Ivory Coast Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
India Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Kenya Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Indonesia Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Korea Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Iran Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Laos Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Iraq Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Lebanon Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Israel Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Lesotho Deep shaft diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Ivory Coast Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Liberia Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Kenya Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Macedonia Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Korea Offshore gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Madagascar Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Lebanon Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Malaysia Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Macedonia Onshore oil Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Mali Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Madagascar Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Mexico Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Malaysia Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Moldova Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Mali Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Morocco Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Mexico Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Mozambique Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Moldova Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Myanmar (Burma) Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Morocco Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Nepal Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Mozambique Onshore gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Nicaragua Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Nepal Gas UNCOMTRADE 2009c Niger Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Nicaragua Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Nigeria Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Niger Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Oman Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Nigeria Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Pakistan Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Oman Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Panama Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Pakistan Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Papua New Guinea Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Panama Gas UNCOMTRADE 2009c Paraguay Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Papua New Guinea Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Peru Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Paraguay Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Phillippines Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Peru Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Romania Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Philippines Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Russia Deep shaft diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Philippines Onshore gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Rwanda Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Romania Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Saudi Arabia Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Russia Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Senegal Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Rwanda Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Serbia&Montenegro Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Saudi Arabia Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Sierra Leone Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Senegal Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c South Africa Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Serbia Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Spain Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Sierra Leone Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Sri Lanka Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Somalia Onshore gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Suriname Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
South Africa Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Syria Diamond exports from 2006, year not included in thesis UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Spain Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Thailand Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Sri Lanka Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Togo Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Sudan Onshore oil Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Trinidad&Tobago Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Sudan Offshore gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Tunisia Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Suriname Onshore oil Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Turkey Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Syria Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Uganda Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Tajikistan Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c United Kingdom Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Thailand Offshore oil Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Uruguay Deep shaft diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Thailand Onshore gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Venezuela Alluvial diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Togo Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c Vietnam Diamonds and Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Trinidad & Tobago Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Yemen Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Tunisia Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Yugoslavia Precious stones UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Turkey Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c Zimbabwe Deep shaft diamonds and stones Gilmore, Buhaug, Lujala & Rød 2005a and 2005b & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Turkmenistan Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Uganda Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c
United Kingdom Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Uzbekistan Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Venezuela Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Vietnam Offshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Yemen Onshore oil and gas Lujala, Rød &Tieme 2007 & UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Zimbabwe Gas and Petroleum UNCOMTRADE 2009c
Appendix II Classification and Coding of Oil, Precious Stones, and 
Diamonds 
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Variable       Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Low Medium High 
W1_2311 898 0 0 0 0 W1_3311 W1_51426 W1_286
W1_285 898 0 0 0 0 W1_66732 W1_27693 W1_285
W1_286 898 0 0 0 0 W1_27654 W1_3312 W1_4222
W1_3311 898 958610 5447657 .0143923 3.19e+07 W1_27322 W1_27624 W1_071
W1_66732 898 .0885445 .3340231 0 1.811719 W1_273 W1_28311 W1_27652
W1_27654 898 .1884059 .2207933 .0298816 1.294211 W1_34112 W1_2833 W1_28321
W1_27322 898 .204928 .3281566 .0090386 1.961757 W1_2813 W1_2764 W1_66721
W1_273 898 .2757744 .2875685 .0440855 1.591315 W1_2835 W1_2836 W1_321
W1_34112 898 .324899 .308098 .0486849 2.23578 W1_27695 W1_68121 W1_27311
W1_2813 898 .4462204 .5244558 .0134311 2.497098 W1_2834 W1_66731 W1_27651
W1_2835 898 .4575613 .784999 .0416192 5.487584 W1_27313 W1_51283 W1_51281
W1_27695 898 .552849 .3788235 .0488963 1.432106 W1_2763 W1_51354 W1_51282
W1_2834 898 .6156113 .5837801 .0784 3.354275 W1_27621 W1_031 W1_27523
W1_27313 898 .6253688 1.652892 .0328843 9.861315 W1_27691 W1_27622 W1_28392
W1_2763 898 .6280065 1.758898 .0327338 10.06707 W1_28391 W1_27321 W1_2751
W1_27621 898 .6550337 1.256099 .0359167 5.971055 W1_042 W1_51363 W1_66722
W1_27691 898 .6988628 1.072726 .0283873 4.962213 W1_27312 W1_0721 W1_28393
W1_28391 898 .8344471 2.042903 .0280954 12.07557 W1_51494 W1_2837
W1_042 898 .8387045 1.703997 .1648412 9.740527 W1_34111 W1_3217
W1_27312 898 .8641599 2.620276 .0841902 17.9807
W1_51494 898 .9054474 .9095871 .1329449 4.816054 Low Price/Weigth Medium Price/Weigth High Price/Weight
W1_34111 898 .9792529 1.198682 .0627674 6.266187 S1_3311 S1_51426 S1_286
W1_51426 898 1.001081 .8783807 .1762285 4.754539 S1_66732 S1_27693 S1_285
W1_27693 898 1.050805 4.831946 .019527 27.95331 S1_27654 S1_3312 S1_4222
W1_3312 898 1.326928 4.981555 .0095085 33.88661 S1_27322 S1_27624 S1_071
W1_27624 898 1.382019 3.766505 .0484799 24.58873 S1_273 S1_28311 S1_27652
W1_28311 898 1.509193 2.577964 .1313597 15.99549 S1_34112 S1_2833 S1_28321
W1_2833 898 1.706672 3.469515 .0081619 14.7764 S1_2813 S1_2764 S1_66721
W1_2764 898 1.932223 3.035052 .1347557 15.30307 S1_2835 S1_2836 S1_321
W1_2836 898 11.55384 36.39384 1.202907 224.1918 S1_27695 S1_68121 S1_27311
W1_68121 898 1416.204 3099.008 0 9623.225 S1_2834 S1_66731 S1_27651
W1_66731 898 1533.608 7146.516 0 38628 S1_27313 S1_51283 S1_51281
W1_51283 898 16.69048 49.29608 0 285 S1_2763 S1_51354 S1_51282
W1_51354 898 16.71592 11.88792 1.828479 54.99558 S1_27621 S1_031 S1_27523
W1_031 898 2.672273 1.184086 .5237395 4.925326 S1_27691 S1_27622 S1_28392
W1_27622 898 2.787779 6.762831 .1590941 42.37261 S1_28391 S1_27321 S1_2751
W1_27321 898 2.803313 14.23875 .0230033 90.44267 S1_042 S1_51363 S1_66722
W1_51363 898 2.847028 3.046783 .1646867 12.63104 S1_27312 S1_0721 S1_28393
W1_0721 898 2.880102 4.698754 .4079826 24.51923 S1_51494 S1_2837
W1_4222 898 3.474041 16.09393 .2152182 98.50298 S1_34111 S1_3217
W1_071 898 3.517284 2.188205 .8042197 12.33104
W1_27652 898 3.86564 9.31024 .200785 51.16068
W1_28321 884 4.145785 7.159494 .0097608 38.23929
W1_66721 898 4762.528 21447.8 0 117475.1
W1_321 898 5.517647 26.71227 .0307589 149.0289
W1_27311 898 5.899316 15.60741 .0183248 74.02996
W1_27651 898 6.663785 14.86354 .0605637 96.38502
W1_51281 898 7.274209 7.455299 .8316101 46.89822
W1_51282 898 7.454422 36.76334 0 269.9048
W1_27523 898 7.992772 32.39989 .1337034 198.5919
W1_28392 898 8.952617 15.67017 .5732083 91.30536
W1_2751 898 8180.624 23412.12 0 117433.6
W1_66722 898 83407.56 253400.6 0 1276091
W1_28393 898 9.187751 30.68529 .5600133 184.5887
W1_2837 898 9.205423 46.05375 .0453147 256.7452
W1_3217 898 9.961729 51.22235 .0103962 285.2943
Appendix III Classification of Natural Resources by Price to Weight 
Ratio 
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Appendix IV Do-files 
set mem 1000m 
insheet using "M:\MA thesis\Data\CSVfiles\allcommmodities1962-2008 (sorted by reporter).csv", delimiter(";") 
names 
rename period year 
keep year reporter commoditycode tradevalue netweightkg 
destring tradevalue, force replace 
destring netweightkg, force replace 
 
sort reporter year commoditycode 
capture drop first 
gen first = 0 
replace first = 1 in 1 
replace first = 1 if year != year[_n-1] | reporter != reporter[_n-1] 
sort reporter year  
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-031" 
by reporter year: egen S1_031 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-042" 
by reporter year: egen S1_042 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-071" 
by reporter year: egen S1_071 = max(temp) 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-0721" 
by reporter year: egen S1_0721 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-2311" 
by reporter year: egen S1_2311 = max(temp) 
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capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-273" 
by reporter year: egen S1_273 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27312" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27312 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27313" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27313 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27321" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27321 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27322" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27322 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-2751" 
by reporter year: egen S1_2751 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27523" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27523 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27621" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27621 = max(temp) 
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capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27622" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27622 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27624" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27624 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-2763" 
by reporter year: egen S1_2763 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-2764" 
by reporter year: egen S1_2764 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27651" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27651 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27652" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27652 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27654" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27654 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27691" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27691 = max(temp) 
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capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27693" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27693 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27695" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27695 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-2813" 
by reporter year: egen S1_2813 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-28311" 
by reporter year: egen S1_28311 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-28321" 
by reporter year: egen S1_28321 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-2833" 
by reporter year: egen S1_2833 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-2834" 
by reporter year: egen S1_2834 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-2835" 
by reporter year: egen S1_2835 = max(temp) 
capture drop temp 
114 
 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-2836" 
by reporter year: egen S1_2836 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-2837" 
by reporter year: egen S1_2837 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-28391" 
by reporter year: egen S1_28391 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-28392" 
by reporter year: egen S1_28392 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-28393" 
by reporter year: egen S1_28393 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-285" 
by reporter year: egen S1_285 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-286" 
by reporter year: egen S1_286 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-321" 
by reporter year: egen S1_321 = max(temp) 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
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replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-3217" 
by reporter year: egen S1_3217 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-3311" 
by reporter year: egen S1_3311 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-3312" 
by reporter year: egen S1_3312 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-34111" 
by reporter year: egen S1_34111 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-34112" 
by reporter year: egen S1_34112 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-4222" 
by reporter year: egen S1_4222 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-51281" 
by reporter year: egen S1_51281 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-51282" 
by reporter year: egen S1_51282 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
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replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-51283" 
by reporter year: egen S1_51283 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-51354" 
by reporter year: egen S1_51354 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-51363" 
by reporter year: egen S1_51363 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-51426" 
by reporter year: egen S1_51426 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-66721" 
by reporter year: egen S1_66721 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-66722" 
by reporter year: egen S1_66722 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-66731" 
by reporter year: egen S1_66731 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-66732" 
by reporter year: egen S1_66732 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
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replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-68121" 
by reporter year: egen S1_68121 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-27311" 
by reporter year: egen S1_27311 = max(temp) 
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = tradevalue if commoditycode== "S1-51494" 
by reporter year: egen S1_51494 = max(temp) 
 
sort year 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-031" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_031 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-042" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_042 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-071" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_071 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-0721" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_0721 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-2311" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_2311 = mean(temp2) 
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capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-273" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_273 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27311" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27311 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27312" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27312 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27313" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27313 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27321" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27321 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27322" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27322 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-2751" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_2751 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27523" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27523 = mean(temp2) 
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capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27621" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27621 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27622" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27622 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27624" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27624 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-2763" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_2763 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-2764" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_2764 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27651" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27651 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27652" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27652 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27654" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27654 = mean(temp2) 
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capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27691" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27691 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27693" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27693 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-27695" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_27695 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-2813" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_2813 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-28311" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_28311 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-28321" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_28321 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-2833" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_2833 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-2834" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_2834 = mean(temp2) 
 
121 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-2835" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_2835 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-2836" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_2836 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-2837" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_2837 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-28391" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_28391 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-28392" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_28392 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-28393" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_28393 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-285" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_285 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-286" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_286 = mean(temp2) 
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capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-321" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_321 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-3217" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_3217 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-3311" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_3311 = mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-3312" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_3312= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-34111" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_34111= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-34112" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_34112= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-4222" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_4222= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-51281" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_51281= mean(temp2) 
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capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-51282" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_51282= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-51283" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_51283= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-51354" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_51354= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-51363" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_51363= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-51426" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_51426= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-51494" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_51494= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-66722" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_66722= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-66721" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_66721= mean(temp2) 
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capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-66732" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_66732= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-66731" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_66731= mean(temp2) 
 
capture drop temp2 
gen temp2 = . 
replace temp2 = tradevalue/netweightkg  if commoditycode== "S1-68121" & netweightkg >0 
by year: egen W1_68121= mean(temp2) 
 
drop if first == 0 
drop temp 
drop temp2 
drop commoditycode 
drop tradevalue 
drop netweightkg 
 
label variable  S1_031 "Fish" 
label variable  S1_042 "Rice" 
label variable  S1_071 "Coffee" 
label variable  S1_0721 "Cocoa" 
label variable  S1_2311 "Crude Rubber" 
label variable  S1_273 "Stone,Sand & Gravel" 
label variable  S1_27311 "Slate" 
label variable  S1_27312 "Marble" 
label variable  S1_27313 "Granite" 
label variable  S1_27321 "Gypsum" 
label variable  S1_27322 "Limestone flux' 
label variable  S1_2751 "Diamonds, industrial" 
label variable  S1_27523 "Pumice" 
label variable  S1_27621 "Clay" 
label variable  S1_27622 "Graphite" 
label variable  S1_27624 "Magnesite" 
label variable  S1_2763 "Salt (Sodium chloride)" 
label variable  S1_2764 "Asbestos" 
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label variable  S1_27651 "Quartz" 
label variable  S1_27652 "Mica" 
label variable  S1_27654 "Feldspar and Flourspar" 
label variable  S1_27691 "Chalk" 
label variable  S1_27693 "Natural barium sulphates (barytes)" 
label variable  S1_27695 "Talc" 
label variable  S1_2813 "Iron ore and concentrates, not agglomerated" 
label variable  S1_28311 "Copper ores and concentrates" 
label variable S1_28321 "Nickel ores and concentrates" 
label variable S1_2833 "Aluminium ores and concentrates"  
label variable S1_2834 "Lead ores and concentrates"  
label variable S1_2835 "Zinc ores and concentrates" 
label variable S1_2836 "Tin ores and concentrates" 
label variable S1_2837 "Manganese ores and concentrates" 
label variable S1_28391 "Chromium ores and concentrates" 
label variable S1_28392 "Tungsten (or wolfram) ores and concentrates" 
label variable S1_28393 "Molybdenum,Titanium Niobium,Tantalum and Vanadium ores and concentrates" 
label variable S1_285 "Silver ores and concentrates" 
label variable S1_286 "Uranium ores and concentrates" 
label variable S1_321 "Coal, wether or not pulverized, but not agglomerated" 
label variable S1_3217 "Peat" 
label variable S1_3311 "Petroleum oils, onshore" 
label variable S1_3312 "Petroleum oils, offshore" 
label variable S1_34111 "Natural gas, onshore" 
label variable S1_34112 "Natural gas, offshore" 
label variable S1_4222 "Palm Oil" 
label variable S1_51281 "Sulphur" 
label variable S1_51282 "Arsenic" 
label variable S1_51283 "Mercury" 
label variable S1_51354 "Cobalt" 
label variable S1_51363 "Potassium hydroxide (potash)" 
label variable S1_51426 "Phosphates, phosphinates" 
label variable S1_51494 "Calcium" 
label variable S1_66721 "Diamonds,alluvial 
label variable S1_66722 "Diamonds,deepshaft 
label variable S1_66731 "Precious and semiprecious stones, alluvial 
label variable S1_66732 "Precious and semiprecious stones, deepshaft" 
label variable S1_68121 "Platinum" 
label variable  W1_031 "Fish" 
label variable  W1_042 "Rice" 
126 
 
label variable  W1_071 "Coffee" 
label variable  W1_0721 "Cocoa" 
label variable  W1_2311 "Crude Rubber" 
label variable  W1_273 "Stone,Sand & Gravel" 
label variable  W1_27311 "Slate" 
label variable  W1_27312 "Marble" 
label variable  W1_27313 "Granite" 
label variable  W1_27321 "Gypsum" 
label variable  W1_27322 "Limestone flux' 
label variable  W1_2751 "Diamonds, industrial" 
label variable  W1_27523 "Pumice" 
label variable  W1_27621 "Clay" 
label variable  W1_27622 "Graphite" 
label variable  W1_27624 "Magnesite" 
label variable  W1_2763 "Salt (Sodium chloride)" 
label variable  W1_2764 "Asbestos" 
label variable  W1_27651 "Quartz" 
label variable  W1_27652 "Mica" 
label variable  W1_27654 "Feldspar and Flourspar" 
label variable  W1_27691 "Chalk" 
label variable  W1_27693 "Natural barium sulphates (barytes)" 
label variable  W1_27695 "Talc" 
label variable  W1_2813 "Iron ore and concentrates, not agglomerated" 
label variable  W1_28311 "Copper ores and concentrates" 
label variable  W1_28321 "Nickel ores and concentrates" 
label variable W1_2833 "Aluminium ores and concentrates"  
label variable W1_2834 "Lead ores and concentrates"  
label variable W1_2835 "Zinc ores and concentrates" 
label variable W1_2836 "Tin ores and concentrates" 
label variable W1_2837 "Manganese ores and concentrates" 
label variable W1_28391 "Chromium ores and concentrates" 
label variable W1_28392 "Tungsten (or wolfram) ores and concentrates" 
label variable W1_28393 "Molybdenum,Titanium Niobium,Tantalum and Vanadium ores and concentrates" 
label variable W1_285 "Silver ores and concentrates" 
label variable W1_286 "Uranium ores and concentrates" 
label variable W1_321 "Coal, wether or not pulverized, but not agglomerated" 
label variable W1_3217 "Peat" 
label variable W1_3311 "Petroleum oils, onshore" 
label variable W1_3312 "Petroleum oils, offshore" 
label variable W1_34111 "Natural gas, onshore" 
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label variable W1_34112 "Natural gas, offshore" 
label variable W1_4222 "Palm Oil" 
label variable W1_51281 "Sulphur" 
label variable W1_51282 "Arsenic" 
label variable W1_51283 "Mercury" 
label variable W1_51354 "Cobalt" 
label variable W1_51363 "Potassium hydroxide (potash)" 
label variable W1_51426 "Phosphates, phosphinates" 
label variable W1_51494 "Calcium" 
label variable W1_66721 "Diamonds,alluvial 
label variable W1_66722 "Diamonds,deepshaft 
label variable W1_66731 "Precious and semiprecious stones, alluvial 
label variable W1_66732 "Precious and semiprecious stones, deepshaft" 
label variable W1_68121 "Platinum" 
 
gen gwno = . 
replace gwno = 700 if reporter == "Afghanistan" 
replace gwno = 615 if reporter == "Algeria" 
replace gwno = 540 if reporter == "Angola" 
replace gwno = 160 if reporter == "Argentina" 
replace gwno = 373 if reporter == "Azerbaijan" 
replace gwno = 771 if reporter == "Bangladesh" 
replace gwno = 145 if reporter == "Bolivia (Plurinational State of)" 
replace gwno = 346 if reporter == "Bosnia Herzegovina" 
replace gwno = 439 if reporter == "Burkina Faso" 
replace gwno = 516 if reporter == "Burundi" 
replace gwno = 811 if reporter == "Cambodia" 
replace gwno = 471 if reporter == "Cameroon" 
replace gwno = 482 if reporter == "Central African Rep." 
replace gwno = 483 if reporter == "Chad" 
replace gwno = 155 if reporter == "Chile" 
replace gwno = 710 if reporter == "China" 
replace gwno = 100 if reporter == "Colombia" 
replace gwno = 581 if reporter == "Comoros" 
replace gwno = 484 if reporter == "Congo" 
replace gwno = 490 if reporter == "Dem. Rep. of the Congo" 
replace gwno = 94 if reporter == "Costa Rica" 
replace gwno = 344 if reporter == "Croatia" 
replace gwno = 40 if reporter == "Cuba" 
replace gwno = 522 if reporter == "Djibouti" 
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replace gwno = 42 if reporter == "Dominican Rep." 
replace gwno = 651 if reporter == "Egypt" 
replace gwno = 92 if reporter == "El Salvador" 
replace gwno = 411 if reporter == "Equatorial Guinea" 
replace gwno = 531 if reporter == "Eritrea" 
replace gwno = 530 if reporter == "Ethiopia" 
replace gwno = 530 if reporter == "Fmr Ethiopia" 
replace gwno = 220 if reporter == "France" 
replace gwno = 481 if reporter == "Gabon" 
replace gwno = 420 if reporter == "Gambia" 
replace gwno = 372 if reporter == "Georgia" 
replace gwno = 452 if reporter == "Ghana" 
replace gwno = 350 if reporter == "Greece" 
replace gwno = 90 if reporter == "Guatemala" 
replace gwno = 438 if reporter == "Guinea" 
replace gwno = 404 if reporter == "Guinea-Bissau" 
replace gwno = 41 if reporter == "Haiti" 
replace gwno = 750 if reporter == "India"  
replace gwno = 750 if reporter == "India, excl. Sikkim" 
replace gwno = 850 if reporter == "Indonesia" 
replace gwno = 630 if reporter == "Iran" 
replace gwno = 645 if reporter == "Iraq" 
replace gwno = 666 if reporter == "Israel" 
replace gwno = 437 if reporter == "Côte d'Ivoire" 
replace gwno = 501 if reporter == "Kenya" 
replace gwno = 732 if reporter == "Rep. of Korea" 
replace gwno = 812 if reporter == "Lao People's Dem. Rep." 
replace gwno = 660 if reporter == "Lebanon" 
replace gwno = 570 if reporter == "Lesotho" 
replace gwno = 450 if reporter == "Liberia" 
replace gwno = 343 if reporter == "TFYR of Macedonia" 
replace gwno = 580 if reporter == "Madagascar"  
replace gwno = 820 if reporter == "Malaysia" 
replace gwno = 820 if reporter == "Peninsula Malaysia" 
replace gwno = 432 if reporter == "Mali" 
replace gwno = 70 if reporter == "Mexico" 
replace gwno = 359 if reporter == "Rep. of Moldova" 
replace gwno = 600 if reporter == "Morocco" 
replace gwno = 541 if reporter == "Mozambique" 
replace gwno = 698 if reporter == "Muscat and Oman, United Kingdom" 
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replace gwno = 775 if reporter == "Myanmar" 
replace gwno = 790 if reporter == "Nepal" 
replace gwno = 93 if reporter == "Nicaragua" 
replace gwno = 436 if reporter == "Niger" 
replace gwno = 475 if reporter == "Nigeria" 
replace gwno = 698 if reporter == "Oman" 
replace gwno = 770 if reporter == "Pakistan"  
replace gwno = 770 if reporter == "East and West Pakistan" 
replace gwno = 95 if reporter == "Panama" 
replace gwno = 95 if reporter == "Fmr Panama, excl.Canal Zone" 
replace gwno = 910 if reporter == "Papua New Guinea" 
replace gwno = 150 if reporter == "Paraguay"  
replace gwno = 135 if reporter == "Peru" 
replace gwno = 840 if reporter == "Philippines" 
replace gwno = 360 if reporter == "Romania" 
replace gwno = 365 if reporter == "Russian Federation" 
replace gwno = 517 if reporter == "Rwanda" 
replace gwno = 670 if reporter == "Saudi Arabia" 
replace gwno = 433 if reporter == "Senegal" 
replace gwno = 451 if reporter == "Sierra Leone" 
replace gwno = 520 if reporter == "Somalia" 
replace gwno = 560 if reporter == "South Africa" 
replace gwno = 365 if reporter == "Soviet Union" 
replace gwno = 230 if reporter == "Spain" 
replace gwno = 780 if reporter == "Sri Lanka"  
replace gwno = 625 if reporter == "Sudan" 
replace gwno = 115 if reporter == "Suriname" 
replace gwno = 652 if reporter == "Syria" 
replace gwno = 702 if reporter == "Tajikistan" 
replace gwno = 800 if reporter == "Thailand" 
replace gwno = 461 if reporter == "Togo" 
replace gwno = 52 if reporter == "Trinidad and Tobago" 
replace gwno = 616 if reporter == "Tunisia" 
replace gwno = 640 if reporter == "Turkey" 
replace gwno = 500 if reporter == "Uganda" 
replace gwno = 200 if reporter == "United Kingdom" 
replace gwno = 165 if reporter == "Uruguay" 
replace gwno = 704 if reporter == "Uzbekistan" 
replace gwno = 101 if reporter == "Venezuela" 
replace gwno = 817 if reporter == "Fmr Rep. of Vietnam" 
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replace gwno = 678 if reporter == "Fmr Arab Rep. of Yemen" 
replace gwno = 680 if reporter == "Fmr Dem. Yemen" 
replace gwno = 345 if reporter == "Serbia and Montenegro" 
replace gwno = 552 if reporter == "Zimbabwe" 
 
replace S1_031 = 0 if S1_031 == . 
replace S1_042 = 0 if S1_042 == . 
replace S1_071 = 0 if S1_071 == . 
replace S1_0721 = 0 if S1_0721 == .  
replace S1_2311 = 0 if S1_2311 == .  
replace S1_273 = 0 if S1_273 == . 
replace S1_27311 = 0 if S1_27311 == . 
replace S1_27312 = 0 if S1_27312 == . 
replace S1_27313 = 0 if S1_27313 == . 
replace S1_27321 = 0 if S1_27321 == . 
replace S1_27322 = 0 if S1_27322 == . 
replace S1_2751 = 0 if S1_2751 == . 
replace S1_27523 = 0 if S1_27523 == . 
replace S1_27621 = 0 if S1_27621 == . 
replace S1_27622 = 0 if S1_27622 == . 
replace S1_27624 = 0 if S1_27624 == . 
replace S1_2763 = 0 if S1_2763 == . 
replace S1_2764 = 0 if S1_2764 == . 
replace S1_27651 = 0 if S1_27651 == . 
replace S1_27652 = 0 if S1_27652 == . 
replace S1_27654 = 0 if S1_27654 == . 
replace S1_27691 = 0 if S1_27691 == . 
replace S1_27693 = 0 if S1_27693 == . 
replace S1_27695 = 0 if S1_27695 == . 
replace S1_2813 = 0 if S1_2813 == . 
replace S1_28311 = 0 if S1_28311 == . 
replace S1_28321 = 0 if S1_28321 == . 
replace S1_2833 = 0 if S1_2833 == . 
replace S1_2834 = 0 if S1_2834 == . 
replace S1_2835 = 0 if S1_2835 == . 
replace S1_2836 = 0 if S1_2836 == . 
replace S1_2837 = 0 if S1_2837 == . 
replace S1_28391 = 0 if S1_28391 == . 
replace S1_28392 = 0 if S1_28392 == . 
replace S1_28393 = 0 if S1_28393 == . 
131 
 
replace S1_2835 = 0 if S1_2835 == . 
replace S1_2836 = 0 if S1_2836 == . 
replace S1_285 = 0 if S1_285 == . 
replace S1_286 = 0 if  S1_286 == . 
replace S1_321 = 0 if S1_321 == . 
replace S1_3217 = 0 if S1_3217 == . 
replace S1_3311 = 0 if S1_3311 == .  
replace S1_3312 = 0 if S1_3312 == . 
replace S1_34111 = 0 if S1_34111 == . 
replace S1_34112 = 0 if S1_34112 == . 
replace S1_4222 = 0 if S1_4222 == .  
replace S1_51281 = 0 if S1_51281 == . 
replace S1_51282 = 0 if S1_51282 == . 
replace S1_51283 = 0 if S1_51283 == . 
replace S1_51354 = 0 if S1_51354 == . 
replace S1_51363 = 0 if S1_51363 == . 
replace S1_51426 = 0 if S1_51426 == . 
replace S1_51494 = 0 if S1_51494 == . 
replace S1_66721 = 0 if S1_66721 == . 
replace S1_66722 = 0 if S1_66722 == . 
replace S1_66731 = 0 if S1_66731 == . 
replace S1_66732 = 0 if S1_66732 == . 
replace S1_68121 = 0 if S1_68121 == . 
 
drop if gwno == . 
gen primkey = (gwno * 10000 )+ year 
gen hiobs_unloot = S1_3311 + S1_34111 
gen modobs_loot = S1_27622 +  S1_031 + S1_042 + S1_071 +  S1_0721 + S1_2311 + S1_273 + S1_27311 + 
S1_27312 + S1_27313 + S1_27321 + S1_27322 + S1_27523 + S1_27621  +  S1_2763 + S1_27651 + S1_27652 
+ S1_27654 + S1_27654  +  S1_27691 + S1_27695 + S1_2813 + S1_28311 + S1_2834  + S1_2835 + S1_28391 
+ S1_321 + S1_3217 + S1_4222  +  S1_51281 + S1_51283 + S1_51363 + S1_51494  
gen modobs_unloot = S1_2751 + S1_27624 + S1_2764 + S1_27693 + S1_28321 + S1_2833 + S1_2836 + 
S1_2837 + S1_28392 + S1_28393 + S1_285 + S1_286 + S1_51282 + S1_51354 + S1_51426 + S1_68121    
gen unobs_loot =  S1_66721 + S1_66731 
gen unobs_unloot = S1_3312 + S1_34112 + S1_66722 + S1_66732 
 
label variable hiobs_unloot "highly obstructable and unlootable" 
label variable modobs_loot "moderately obstructable and lootable" 
label variable modobs_unloot "moderately obstructable and unlootable" 
label variable unobs_loot "unobstructable and lootable" 
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label variable unobs_unloot "unobstructable and unlootable" 
sort primkey 
 
edit  reporter gwno primkey if gwno == 530 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1678 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1679 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1680 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1681 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1682 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1683 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1684 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1685 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1686 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1687 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1688 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1689 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1690 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1691 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1692 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1693 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1694 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1695 
replace reporter = "Ethiopia" in 1696 
edit  reporter gwno primkey if gwno == 820 
replace reporter = "Malaysia" in 2656 
replace reporter = "Malaysia" in 2657 
edit  reporter gwno primkey if gwno == 770 
replace reporter = "Pakistan" in 2415 
replace reporter = "Pakistan" in 2416 
replace reporter = "Pakistan" in 2417 
replace reporter = "Pakistan" in 2418 
replace reporter = "Pakistan" in 2419 
replace reporter = "Pakistan" in 2420 
replace reporter = "Pakistan" in 2421 
replace reporter = "Pakistan" in 2422 
replace reporter = "Pakistan" in 2423 
replace reporter = "Pakistan" in 2424 
edit  reporter gwno primkey if gwno == 750 
replace reporter = "India" in 2368 
replace reporter = "India" in 2369 
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replace reporter = "India" in 2370 
replace reporter = "India" in 2371 
replace reporter = "India" in 2372 
replace reporter = "India" in 2373 
replace reporter = "India" in 2374 
replace reporter = "India" in 2375 
replace reporter = "India" in 2376 
replace reporter = "India" in 2377 
replace reporter = "India" in 2378 
replace reporter = "India" in 2379 
replace reporter = "India" in 2380 
edit  reporter gwno primkey if gwno ==95 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 324 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 325 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 326 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 327 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 328 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 329 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 330 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 331 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 332 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 333 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 334 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 335 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 336 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 337 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 338 
replace reporter = "Panama" in 339 
save comexp.dta 
clear 
 
insheet using "M:\MA thesis\Data\Text files\Penn.txt" 
gen gwno = . 
replace gwno = 700 if country== "Afghanistan" 
replace gwno = 615 if country== "Algeria" 
replace gwno = 540 if country== "Angola" 
replace gwno = 160 if country== "Argenti" 
replace gwno = 373 if country== "Azerbaijan" 
replace gwno = 771 if country== "Bangladesh" 
replace gwno = 145 if country== "Bolivia" 
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replace gwno = 346 if country== "Bosnia and Herzegovi" 
replace gwno = 439 if country== "Burki  Faso" 
replace gwno = 516 if country== "Burundi" 
replace gwno = 811 if country== "Cambodia"  
replace gwno = 471 if country== "Cameroon" 
replace gwno = 482 if country== "Central African Republic" 
replace gwno = 483 if country== "Chad" 
replace gwno = 155 if country== "Chile" 
replace gwno = 710 if country== "Chi  Version 2" 
replace gwno = 100 if country== "Colombia" 
replace gwno = 581 if country== "Comoros" 
replace gwno = 484 if country== "Congo. Republic of" 
replace gwno = 490 if country== "Congo. Dem. Rep." 
replace gwno = 94 if country== "Costa Rica" 
replace gwno = 344 if country== "Croatia" 
replace gwno = 40 if country== "Cuba" 
replace gwno = 522 if country== "Djibouti" 
replace gwno = 42 if country== "Dominican Republic" 
replace gwno = 651 if country== "Egypt" 
replace gwno = 92 if country== "El Salvador" 
replace gwno = 411 if country== "Equatorial Guinea" 
replace gwno = 531 if country== "Eritrea" 
replace gwno = 530 if country== "Ethiopia" 
replace gwno = 220 if country== "France" 
replace gwno = 481 if country== "Gabon" 
replace gwno = 420 if country== "Gambia. The" 
replace gwno = 372 if country== "Georgia" 
replace gwno = 452 if country== "Gha" 
replace gwno = 350 if country== "Greece" 
replace gwno = 90 if country== "Guatemala" 
replace gwno = 438 if country== "Guinea" 
replace gwno = 404 if country== "Guinea-Bissau" 
replace gwno = 41 if country== "Haiti" 
replace gwno = 750 if country== "India" 
replace gwno = 850 if country== "Indonesia" 
replace gwno = 630 if country== "Iran" 
replace gwno = 645 if country== "Iraq" 
replace gwno = 666 if country== "Israel" 
replace gwno = 437 if country== "Cote d`Ivoire" 
replace gwno = 501 if country== "Kenya" 
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replace gwno = 732 if country== "Korea. Republic of" 
replace gwno = 812 if country== "Laos" 
replace gwno = 660 if country== "Lebanon" 
replace gwno = 570 if country== "Lesotho" 
replace gwno = 450 if country== "Liberia" 
replace gwno = 343 if country== "Macedonia" 
replace gwno = 580 if country== "Madagascar" 
replace gwno = 820 if country== "Malaysia" 
replace gwno = 432 if country== "Mali" 
replace gwno = 70 if country== "Mexico" 
replace gwno = 359 if country== "Moldova" 
replace gwno = 600 if country== "Morocco" 
replace gwno = 541 if country== "Mozambique" 
replace gwno = 698 if country== "Muscat and Oman United Kingdom" 
replace gwno = 775 if country== "Myanmar" 
replace gwno = 790 if country== "Nepal" 
replace gwno = 93 if country== "Nicaragua" 
replace gwno = 436 if country== "Niger" 
replace gwno = 475 if country== "Nigeria" 
replace gwno = 698 if country== "Oman" 
replace gwno = 770 if country== "Pakistan" 
replace gwno = 95 if country== "Pama" 
replace gwno = 910 if country== "Papua New Guinea" 
replace gwno = 150 if country== "Paraguay" 
replace gwno = 135 if country== "Peru" 
replace gwno = 840 if country== "Philippines" 
replace gwno = 360 if country== "Romania" 
replace gwno = 365 if country== "Russia" 
replace gwno = 517 if country== "Rwanda" 
replace gwno = 670 if country== "Saudi Arabia" 
replace gwno = 433 if country== "Senegal" 
replace gwno = 451 if country== "Sierra Leone" 
replace gwno = 520 if country== "Somalia" 
replace gwno = 560 if country== "South Africa" 
replace gwno = 365 if country== "Soviet Union" 
replace gwno = 230 if country == "Spain" 
replace gwno = 780 if country== "Sri Lanka" 
replace gwno = 625 if country== "Sudan" 
replace gwno = 115 if country== "Surime" 
replace gwno = 652 if country== "Syria" 
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replace gwno = 702 if country== "Tajikistan" 
replace gwno = 800 if country== "Thailand" 
replace gwno = 461 if country== "Togo" 
replace gwno = 52 if country== "Trinidad &Tobago" 
replace gwno = 616 if country== "Tunisia" 
replace gwno = 640 if country== "Turkey"  
replace gwno = 500 if country== "Uganda" 
replace gwno = 200 if country== "United Kingdom" 
replace gwno = 165 if country== "Uruguay" 
replace gwno = 704 if country== "Uzbekistan" 
replace gwno = 101 if country== "Venezuela" 
replace gwno = 817 if country== "Vietm" 
replace gwno = 678 if country== "Yemen" 
replace gwno = 680 if country== "Yemen. Peoples Republic of" 
replace gwno = 345 if country== "Serbia" 
replace gwno = 552 if country== "Zimbabwe" 
drop if gwno == . 
 
label variable pop "Population in Thousands" 
label variable cgdp "Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita Current Price" 
label variable rgdpch "Real GDP Per Capita (Chain) Constant Price" 
 
gen primkey = (gwno * 10000)+ year  
drop if year < 1962 
drop if year > 2004 
drop if primkey == 5311962 
drop if primkey == 5311963 
drop if primkey == 5311964 
drop if primkey == 5311965 
drop if primkey == 5311966 
drop if primkey == 5311967 
drop if primkey == 5311968 
drop if primkey == 5311969 
drop if primkey == 5311970 
drop if primkey == 5311971 
drop if primkey == 5311972 
drop if primkey == 5311973 
drop if primkey == 5311974 
drop if primkey == 5311975 
drop if primkey == 5311976 
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drop if primkey == 5311977 
drop if primkey == 5311978 
drop if primkey == 5311979 
drop if primkey == 5311980 
drop if primkey == 5311981 
drop if primkey == 5311982 
drop if primkey == 5311983 
drop if primkey == 5311984 
drop if primkey == 5311985 
drop if primkey == 5311986 
drop if primkey == 5311987 
drop if primkey == 5311988 
drop if primkey == 5311989 
drop if primkey == 5311990 
drop if primkey == 5311991 
drop if primkey == 5311992 
sort primkey 
save PWT 
clear 
 
insheet using "M:\MA thesis\Data\Text files\primaryexports.txt", names 
drop partner partnername flowname 
gen gwno = . 
replace gwno = 700 if  reportername == "Afghanistan" 
replace gwno = 615 if  reportername== "Algeria" 
replace gwno = 540 if  reportername== "Angola" 
replace gwno = 160 if  reportername== "Argentina" 
replace gwno = 373 if  reportername== "Azerbaijan" 
replace gwno = 771 if  reportername== "Bangladesh" 
replace gwno = 145 if  reportername== "Bolivia" 
replace gwno = 346 if  reportername== "Bosnia and Herzegovina" 
replace gwno = 439 if  reportername== "Burkina Faso" 
replace gwno = 516 if  reportername== "Burundi" 
replace gwno = 811 if  reportername== "Cambodia"  
replace gwno = 471 if  reportername== "Cameroon" 
replace gwno = 482 if  reportername== "Central African Republic" 
replace gwno = 483 if  reportername== "Chad" 
replace gwno = 155 if  reportername== "Chile" 
replace gwno = 710 if  reportername== "China" 
replace gwno = 100 if  reportername== "Colombia" 
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replace gwno = 581 if  reportername== "Comoros" 
replace gwno = 484 if  reportername== "Congo. Rep." 
replace gwno = 490 if  reportername== "Congo. Dem. Rep." 
replace gwno = 94 if  reportername== "Costa Rica" 
replace gwno = 344 if  reportername== "Croatia" 
replace gwno = 40 if  reportername== "Cuba" 
replace gwno = 522 if  reportername== "Djibouti" 
replace gwno = 42 if  reportername== "Dominican Republic" 
replace gwno = 651 if  reportername== "Egypt. Arab Rep." 
replace gwno = 92 if  reportername== "El Salvador" 
replace gwno = 411 if  reportername== "Equatorial Guinea" 
replace gwno= 530 if  reportername== "Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea)" 
replace gwno = 531 if reportername == "Eritrea" 
replace gwno = 220 if  reportername== "France" 
replace gwno = 481 if  reportername== "Gabon" 
replace gwno = 420 if  reportername== "Gambia. The" 
replace gwno = 372 if  reportername== "Georgia" 
replace gwno = 452 if  reportername== "Ghana" 
replace gwno = 350 if  reportername== "Greece" 
replace gwno = 90 if  reportername== "Guatemala" 
replace gwno = 438 if  reportername== "Guinea" 
replace gwno = 404 if  reportername== "Guinea-Bissau" 
replace gwno = 41 if  reportername== "Haiti" 
replace gwno = 750 if  reportername== "India" 
replace gwno = 850 if  reportername== "Indonesia" 
replace gwno = 630 if  reportername== "Iran. Islamic Rep." 
replace gwno = 645 if  reportername== "Iraq" 
replace gwno = 666 if  reportername== "Israel" 
replace gwno = 437 if  reportername== "Cote d'Ivoire" 
replace gwno = 501 if  reportername== "Kenya" 
replace gwno = 732 if  reportername== "Korea. Rep." 
replace gwno = 812 if  reportername== "Lao PDR" 
replace gwno = 660 if  reportername== "Lebanon" 
replace gwno = 570 if  reportername== "Lesotho" 
replace gwno = 450 if  reportername== "Liberia" 
replace gwno = 343 if  reportername== "Macedonia. FYR" 
replace gwno = 580 if  reportername== "Madagascar" 
replace gwno = 820 if  reportername== "Malaysia" 
replace gwno = 432 if  reportername== "Mali" 
replace gwno = 70 if  reportername== "Mexico" 
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replace gwno = 359 if  reportername== "Moldova" 
replace gwno = 600 if  reportername== "Morocco" 
replace gwno = 541 if  reportername== "Mozambique" 
replace gwno = 698 if  reportername== "Muscat and Oman, United Kingdom" 
replace gwno = 775 if  reportername== "Myanmar" 
replace gwno = 790 if  reportername== "Nepal" 
replace gwno = 93 if  reportername== "Nicaragua" 
replace gwno = 436 if  reportername== "Niger" 
replace gwno = 475 if  reportername== "Nigeria" 
replace gwno = 698 if  reportername== "Oman" 
replace gwno = 770 if  reportername== "Pakistan" 
replace gwno = 95 if  reportername== "Panama" 
replace gwno = 910 if  reportername== "Papua New Guinea" 
replace gwno = 150 if  reportername== "Paraguay" 
replace gwno = 135 if  reportername== "Peru" 
replace gwno = 840 if  reportername== "Philippines" 
replace gwno = 360 if  reportername== "Romania" 
replace gwno = 365 if  reportername== "Russian Federation" 
replace gwno = 517 if  reportername== "Rwanda" 
replace gwno = 670 if  reportername== "Saudi Arabia" 
replace gwno = 433 if  reportername== "Senegal" 
replace gwno = 451 if  reportername== "Sierra Leone" 
replace gwno = 520 if  reportername== "Somalia" 
replace gwno = 560 if  reportername== "South Africa" 
replace gwno = 365 if  reportername== "Soviet Union" 
replace gwno = 230 if  reportername == "Spain" 
replace gwno = 780 if  reportername== "Sri Lanka" 
replace gwno = 625 if  reportername== "Sudan" 
replace gwno = 115 if  reportername== "Suriname" 
replace gwno = 652 if  reportername== "Syrian Arab Republic" 
replace gwno = 702 if  reportername== "Tajikistan" 
replace gwno = 800 if  reportername== "Thailand" 
replace gwno = 461 if  reportername== "Togo" 
replace gwno = 52 if  reportername== "Trinidad and Tobago" 
replace gwno = 616 if  reportername== "Tunisia" 
replace gwno = 640 if  reportername== "Turkey"  
replace gwno = 500 if  reportername== "Uganda" 
replace gwno = 200 if  reportername== "United Kingdom" 
replace gwno = 165 if  reportername== "Uruguay" 
replace gwno = 704 if  reportername== "Uzbekistan" 
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replace gwno = 101 if  reportername== "Venezuela" 
replace gwno = 817 if  reportername== "Fm Vietnam Rp" 
replace gwno = 678 if  reportername== "Yemen"  
replace gwno = 680 if  reportername== "Yemen Democratic" 
replace gwno = 345 if  reportername== "Yugoslavia. FR (Serbia/Montene" 
replace gwno = 552 if  reportername== "Zimbabwe" 
 
reshape long v, i(reportername product) 
gen year = _j+1955 
drop in 1/54 
drop if gwno == . 
drop if year >2004 
drop if year <1962 
sort reportername year  
 
capture drop temp 
gen temp = . 
replace temp = v if product == "primary" 
by reportername year: egen primexp_WB = max(temp) 
label variable primexp_WB "primary export of SITC codes 0,1,2,3,4 and 68 from the World Bank" 
replace primexp_WB = 0 if  primexp_WB == . 
 
drop temp 
drop  product productname 
drop  _j v 
duplicates drop 
 
gen primkey = (gwno * 10000) + year 
sort primkey 
drop if primkey == 5311962 
drop if primkey == 5311963 
drop if primkey == 5311964 
drop if primkey == 5311965 
drop if primkey == 5311966 
drop if primkey == 5311967 
drop if primkey == 5311968 
drop if primkey == 5311969 
drop if primkey == 5311970 
drop if primkey == 5311971 
drop if primkey == 5311972 
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drop if primkey == 5311973 
drop if primkey == 5311974 
drop if primkey == 5311975 
drop if primkey == 5311976 
drop if primkey == 5311977 
drop if primkey == 5311978 
drop if primkey == 5311979 
drop if primkey == 5311980 
drop if primkey == 5311981 
drop if primkey == 5311982 
drop if primkey == 5311983 
drop if primkey == 5311984 
drop if primkey == 5311985 
drop if primkey == 5311986 
drop if primkey == 5311987 
drop if primkey == 5311988 
drop if primkey == 5311989 
drop if primkey == 5311990 
drop if primkey == 5311991 
drop if primkey == 5311992 
sort primkey 
save primaryexportsWB2 
clear 
 
use "M:\MA thesis\Data\Dataset\dur1.dta", clear 
sort primkey  
save, replace 
 
merge primkey using "M:\MA thesis\Data\Dataset\PWT.dta", keep (pop cgdp rgdpch) _merge (merge_PWT) 
tab merge_PWT 
drop if merge_PWT == 2 
sort primkey  
drop if year <1962 
drop if year >2004 
 
merge primkey using "M:\MA thesis\Data\Dataset\comexp.dta",  _merge (commexp) 
tab commexp 
drop if commexp == 2  
sort primkey 
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merge primkey using "M:\MA thesis\Data\Dataset\primaryexportsWB2.dta", _merge (primexpWB) 
tab primexpWB 
drop if primexpWB == 2 
sort primkey 
drop commexp reportername primexpWB merge_PWT  
save Duration_mergecomexp 
 
replace hiobs_unloot = 0 if hiobs_unloot ==. 
replace modobs_loot = 0 if modobs_loot ==. 
replace modobs_unloot = 0 if modobs_unloot == . 
replace unobs_loot =0 if unobs_loot ==. 
replace unobs_unloot = 0 if unobs_unloot ==. 
 
gen hiobs_unlootscaled = (hiobs_unloot/1000000) 
gen modobs_lootscaled =  (modobs_loot/1000000) 
gen modobs_unlootscaled =  (modobs_unloot/1000000) 
gen unobs_lootscaled = ( unobs_loot/1000000) 
gen unobs_unlootscaled =  (unobs_unloot/1000000) 
 
label variable hiobs_unlootscaled "highly obstructable unlootable scaled" 
label variable modobs_lootscaled  "moderately obstructable lootable scaled" 
label variable modobs_unlootscaled "moderately obstructable unlootable scaled" 
label variable unobs_lootscaled "unobstructable lootable scaled " 
label variable unobs_unlootscaled "unobstructable unlootable scaled" 
 
gen totalprimexport =  hiobs_unlootscaled + modobs_lootscaled + modobs_unlootscaled + unobs_lootscaled+ 
unobs_unlootscaled 
label variable totalprimexport "total primary commodities export" 
 
gen totalgdp= (pop/1000)*cgdp 
label variable totalgdp "total GDP" 
 
gen HULratioGDP = (hiobs_unlootscaled/totalgdp)*100 
label variable HULratioGDP "highly obstructable and lootable export ratio to GDP" 
 
gen MLratioGDP = (modobs_lootscaled/totalgdp) * 100 
label variable MLratioGDP "moderately obstructable and lootable export ratio to GDP" 
 
gen MULratioGDP = (modobs_unlootscaled/ totalgdp) * 100 
label variable MULratioGDP " moderately obstructable and unlootable export ratio to GDP 
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gen ULratioGDP = (unobs_lootscaled/ totalgdp) * 100 
label variable ULratioGDP  "unobstructable and lootable export ratio to GDP" 
 
gen UULratioGDP = (unobs_unlootscaled/totalgdp) * 100 
label variable UULratioGDP "unobstructable and unlootable export ratio to GDP" 
 
gen primexp_WBratioscaled = (primexp_WB/1000) 
label variable primexp_WBratioscaled "primary export WB scaled" 
 
gen primexp_WBratioGDP= (primexp_WBratioscaled/totalgdp) * 100  
label variable primexp_WBratioGDP "primary export WB ratio to GDP" 
 
gen totalprimexportratioGDP = (totalprimexport/totalgdp) * 100 
label variable totalprimexportratioGDP "total commodity export ratio to gdp"  
 
drop lnpop (variable name from original dataset) 
gen lnrgdpch = ln(rgdpch) 
gen lncgdp = ln(cgdp) 
gen lnpop= ln(pop) 
gen lnpop_t = lnpop*_t 
gen  polityiv_t =  polityiv* _t 
summ W* 
gen high_PW =  S1_286 + S1_285 + S1_4222 + S1_071 + S1_27652 + S1_28321 + S1_66721 + S1_321 +  
S1_27311 + S1_27651 + S1_51281 + S1_51282 + S1_27523 + S1_28392 + S1_2751 + S1_66722 + S1_28393 + 
S1_2837 + S1_3217   
 
gen medium_PW = S1_51426 + S1_27693 + S1_3312 + S1_27624 + S1_28311 + S1_2833 + S1_2764 + 
S1_2836 + S1_68121 + S1_66731 + S1_51283 + S1_51354 + S1_031 + S1_27622 + S1_27321 + S1_51363 + 
S1_0721  
 
gen low_PW = S1_3311 + S1_66732 + S1_27654 + S1_27322 + S1_273 + S1_34112 + S1_2813 + S1_2835 + 
S1_27695 + S1_2834 + S1_27313 + S1_2763 + S1_27621 + S1_27691 + S1_28391 + S1_042 + S1_27312 + 
S1_51494 + S1_34111    
 
label variable high_PW "high price to weight ratio" 
label variable medium_PW "medium price to weight ratio" 
label variable low_PW "low price to weight ratio" 
replace high_PW = 0 if high_PW == . 
replace medium_PW = 0 if medium_PW == . 
replace low_PW = 0 if low_PW == . 
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gen high_PWscaled = (high_PW/1000000) 
gen medium_PWscaled = (medium_PW/1000000) 
gen low_PWscaled = (low_PW/1000000) 
 
label variable high_PWscaled "high price to weight ratio scaled" 
label variable medium_PWscaled "medium price to weight ratio scaled" 
label variable low_PWscaled "low price to weight ratio scaled" 
 
gen high_PWratioGDP = (high_PWscaled/totalgdp) * 100 
gen medium_PWratioGDP = (medium_PWscaled/totalgdp) * 100 
gen low_PWratioGDP = (low_PWscaled/totalgdp) * 100 
 
label variable high_PWratioGDP "high price to weigth ratio to GDP" 
label variable medium_PWratio "medium price to weigth ratio to GDP" 
label variable low_PWratio "low price to weigth ratio to GDP" 
 
save Duration_NaturalResourcescomepx 
 
summ  totalprimexportratioGDP primexp_WBratioGDP HULratioGDP MLratioGDP MULratioGDP 
ULratioGDP UULratioGDP  high_PWratioGDP medium_PWratioGDP low_PWratioGDP  lnpop_t lnpop 
lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq 
 
stcox  totalprimexportGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq, schoenfeld(sch*) 
scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox  primexp_WBratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq  , schoenfeld(sch*) 
scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox HULratioGDP MLratioGDP MULratioGDP ULratioGDP UULratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq  
polityiv_t polity_sq, schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
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stcox HULratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq  , schoenfeld(sch*) 
scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox MLratioGDP lnrgdpch lnpop_t cenelfsq cenelf polityiv_t polity_sq , schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox MULratioGDP lnrgdpch lnpop_t cenelfsq cenelf polityiv_t polity_sq  , schoenfeld(sch*) 
scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox ULratioGDP lnrgdpch lnpop_t cenelfsq cenelf polityiv_t polity_sq  , schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox UULratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq  , schoenfeld(sch*) 
scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox  high_PWratioGDP medium_PWratioGDP low_PWratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv 
polity_sq  , schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox MLratioGDP ULratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq, schoenfeld(sch*) 
scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
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stcox HULratioGDP MULratioGDP UULratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq  , 
schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox HULratioGDP MULratioGDP MLratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq  , 
schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox UULratioGDP ULratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq, schoenfeld(sch*) 
scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox totalprimexportGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq  
stcox primexp_WBratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq 
stcox HULratioGDP  MLratioGDP  MULratioGDP  ULratioGDP  UULratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf 
cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq 
stcox HULratioGDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq 
stcox MLratioGDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq 
stcox MULratioGDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq 
stcox ULratioGDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq 
stcox UULratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq 
stcox high_PWratioGDP medium_PWratioGDP low_PWratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv 
polity_sq 
stcox MLratioGDP ULratioGDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq 
stcox HULratioGDP MULratioGDP UULratioGDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq 
stcox HULratioGDP MULratioGDP MLratioGDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq 
stcox ULratioGDP UULratioGDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv_t polity_sq 
 
gen DiaAll = (S1_66721/1000000) 
gen DiaAll_GDP = (DiaAll/totalgdp )*100 
label variable DiaAll_GDP "Diamonds, alluvial ratio to GDP 
 
gen OilOnshore = (S1_3311/1000000)  
gen OilOnshore_GDP = (OilOnshore/totalgdp) * 100 
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label variable OilOnshore_GDP "Oil, onshore ratio to GDP" 
gen OilOffshore = (S1_3312/1000000)  
gen OilOffshore_GDP = (OilOffshore/totalgdp) * 100 
label variable OilOffshore_GDP "Oil, offshore ratio to GDP" 
 
stcox DiaAll_GDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq, schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox OilOnshore_GDP OilOffshore_GDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq, 
schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*)nohr 
stphtest, detail 
capture drop sch* 
capture drop sca* 
 
stcox DiaAll_GDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq, nohr 
stcox DiaAll_GDP  lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq 
stcox OilOnshore_GDP OilOffshore_GDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq, nohr 
stcox OilOnshore_GDP OilOffshore_GDP lnpop_t lnrgdpch cenelf cenelfsq polityiv polity_sq 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b b b b b
(SE) exp (b ) (SE) exp (b ) (SE) exp (b ) (SE) exp (b ) (SE) exp (b )
Highly Obstructable & Unlootable Exports/GDP .0288948* 1.029316
(.0172765)
Moderately Obstructable & Lootable Exports/GDP -.0084587 .991577
(.0507215)
Unobstructable & Unlootable Exports/GDP .0152678 1.015385
(.047537)
Moderately Obstructable & Unlootable Exports/GDP .3874784*** 1.473261
(.1434902)
Unobstructable & Lootable Exports/GDP -.0648828 .9371773
(.6306769)
Population Interaction (lnpop * _t) -.0001733 .9998267 .1494934 1.161246 -.000173 .9998271 .135055 1.1446 .1489872 1.160658
(.0000336) (.1109452) (.0000336) (.1117369) (.1110051)
GDP Per Capita, Constant USD (ln) .1196077 1.127055 -.0001736 .9998264 .1471869 1.15857 -.0001694 .9998307 -.000173 .9998271
(.1126004) (.0000337) (.1113903) (.0000335) (.0000336)
Ethnic-lingustic Fractionalization (cen) -.138 .8710987 -.2893403 .7487574 -.1677939 .8455281 -.4048897 .6670504 -.3100836 .7333856
(.407588) (1.571441) (.4096764) (1.564835) (1.562366)
Ethnic-linguistic Fractionalization (cen) (sq) -.5846032 .557327 -.1402455 .8691448 -.3131976 .7311055 -.2426353 .7845576 -.147144 .8631697
(1.57615) (.4154029) (1.559839) (.4110731) (.4124721)
Regime Type
Regime Type Interaction (polityiv * _t) -8.43e-06* .9999916 -9.12e-06* .9999909 -9.07e-06* .9999909 -9.13e-06* .9999909 -9.14e-06* .9999909
(5.01e-06) (4.97e-06) (4.98e-06) (4.96e-06) (4.98e-06)
Regime Type (sq) -.0003801 .99962 -.0002423 .9997577 -.0002798 .9997203 -.0002214 .9997786 -.0002432 .9997568
(.0029154) (.0029115) (.0029132) (.002921) (.0029112)
df
LR
N
* = p<0.10, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 -635.1415  -636.18176 -636.14703   -634.03251  -636.19065    
7 7 7 7 7
1024 1024 1024 1024 1024
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